


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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Continuing Problem of 'Dedovshchina' in Armed Forces Examined

92UM1378A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Aug 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Albert Khraptovich, deputy chairman of the Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen and Their Family Members Under the Russian Federation Government: "A Barrier for Dedovshchina: It Did Not Protect the Union Armed Forces From It but It Must Protect the Russian Army"]

[Text] After the outburst of emotions at the dawn of glasnost, the subject of relations at variance with regulations in the army—the notorious "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts]—has practically disappeared from newspaper and magazine pages today. Nevertheless, people continue to die in the army and in the navy and no one is able to console the grief of mothers who have lost their sons. More than 5,500 servicemen died in the Armed Forces during 1991. Of them, 96 were for relations at variance with regulations. For that same reason, 4,205 people received trauma or serious injuries, although the actual figures are probably significantly greater—the objectivity of the investigations that have been conducted is far from ideal.

This year the situation has also not improved—based on our Committee's data, 12,568 people suffered in the army and in the navy during the first two months of 1992 alone for various reasons—violation of safety regulations, everyday trauma, or relations at variance with regulations! And moreover that is when a series of measures has long since been developed to prevent relations at variance with regulations and when their causes are known, but... As before, letters with news about tragedies arrive addressed to the Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen and Their Family Members Under the Russian Federation Government. Is there some reason why the barrier that is called upon to ensure the protection of the honor and dignity of servicemen in the Russian Army "will not work"?

I will hardly reveal anything new if I say that, as before, the struggle with relations at variance with regulations must be conducted along two directions. But it must be conducted and not just declared. And there are actually only two directions of work: within military collectives and in society. And we need to begin with the latter.

The draft Law on the Status of Servicemen and Their Socio-Legal Support and Protection has already been developed and submitted for discussion. We also need new regulations. We need the provisions that are set forth in them to be put into action and not just remain on paper. Then the prestige of military service will also increase and the selection of cadres will be significantly improved.

Obviously, there is also a need to create special commissions (committees, groups) for servicemen's affairs under the local authorities at military unit deployment locations. Besides the functional duties that proceed from the name,

here we could resolve issues of propaganda of military service, the issues of conscription into the army and into the navy, etc. And they could operate jointly with existing social movements—the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers and veterans organizations. That link between the authorities and the society of the Russian Army is simply necessary.

In the army itself, the spirit and letter of the law must reign, for which the organs of military justice and the military police will certainly not be superfluous, as the Main Military Procurator discussed in his interview (see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 21 July 1992). In the opinion of many servicemen, the system of window dressing and eyewash that developed during the years of stagnation, when commanders were not interested in an objective assessment of the state of affairs and were inclined to hide all negative phenomena, has prevented that until the present time. Yes and that is understandable. For many long years, the commander and not the wrongdoer, answered for violations of the law. Therefore, even though this was talked about previously, it is time to in fact put an end to the system of assessing the work of commanders according to the number of gross violations of military discipline. If the commander must also be punished, then only for not carrying out his functional duties and, first of all, for not taking steps on cases of subverting the combat readiness or military discipline of the subunit or unit entrusted to him. And the system of socio-legal protection that has been created will be adequate to prevent extremes in the actions of commanders who are too zealous and who punish left and right.

Therefore, it is clearly premature to reduce or eliminate stockades, disciplinary battalions, and the military procurator. In the U.S. Army, for example, there are twice as many military lawyers in an army that is smaller than ours. And the rights of commanders, beginning with sergeants, are substantially different from the rights of commanders in our Armed Forces. It hardly seems possible to solve that problem without conducting military reform. Because it is impossible to resolve the problem of competitive selection of cadres, to reorganize unmanned units, to write off obsolete ships, to eliminate construction and railroad troops and units that have nothing to do with the Armed Forces and that are used in economic work without military reform.

Of course, the Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen and Their Family Members is not inclined to simplify the problem. But the barrier on the path of "dedovshchina" in the Russian Army must be put into operation. Because any delay with its consolidation based on the fact that it has already been well-thought out and may provide positive results—this is the life, health, and fate of people.

CIA: POLICY

Draft RF Law on Status, Social Guarantees of Servicemen

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17 Jul 92 First Edition pp 1-3

[Text of Russian Federation Draft Law "On the Status and Social Guarantees of Military Personnel"]

[Text] This Law defines the set and mechanism for realization of the state's guarantees of social protection of military personnel and their rights, freedoms, duties, and responsibility when performing military duty.

Section 1. General Provisions

Article 1. Military Personnel and Military Service

1. Citizens of the Russian Federation who are in state military service in the Armed Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs border troops, Ministry of Security troops, civil defense troops, and railroad troops, as well as those in military posts of other troops, formations, organizations, and institutions, the list of which is approved by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, are military personnel [service members].

Included among them are officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik," "michman"], extended-term servicemen, and servicewomen in the posts of sergeant, petty officer, and private (hereafter called servicewomen), cadets in military schools, sergeants, petty officers, and soldiers and seamen who were conscripted or are performing compulsory military service under contract.

All citizens of the Russian Federation assigned to military service (conscripts, persons enrolling in military schools, and those who conclude contracts) take the military oath of allegiance, the text of which is ratified by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

2. Military service is a special, priority type of state service and the constitutional duty of citizens of Russia. The content and procedures for serving in the military are defined by the Law "On Military Duty and Military Service" and military regulations and manuals.

While performing the duties of military service, military personnel are representatives of state power and are under the protection of the state. They are subordinate only to persons who in accordance with military regulations are their superior officers, and no one else has the right to interfere in their service activity.

3. Military personnel are in the performance of the duties of military service in all cases when actually performing them, during participation in combat operations, while on alert duty (combat duty), on shipboard cruises, on exercises, at assemblies, during temporary duty travel, and while proceeding to and from the duty position.

Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen who are under contract are considered to be in fact performing the duties of military service when they are at the location of the military unit, ship, installation, institution, enterprise, or military school (hereafter called military unit) during on-duty time established by regulation or in a different location and at a different time if this is linked to service necessity, while regular-term military personnel who have been conscripted are considered to be such throughout the entire time there are in military service.

Military personnel who have voluntarily surrendered as well as persons who have gone AWOL from a military unit are not considered to be in the performance of the duties of military service.

Article 2. Status of Military Personnel

1. The status of military personnel includes the general rights, freedoms, and duties of military personnel as citizens of the Russian Federation with the exceptions and restrictions established by legislation, as well as their rights, duties, and responsibility resulting from the specific characteristics of military service.

The status of military personnel envisions the state's guarantees in realizing their rights and duties, as well as their social protection both while they are serving in the military and after they are discharged from it.

2. The restricted rights and freedoms and special duties and responsibility of military personnel are compensated by additional rights and benefits established by this Law and other legislative enactments and decrees of the Russian Federation government.

No one has the right to restrict military personnel and members of their families in terms of the rights and freedoms established by the Russian Federation Constitution and this Law.

3. Organs of state power and government of the republics which are part of the Russian Federation, local organs of state power and government, enterprises, organizations, and institutions may establish additional benefits for military personnel and members of their families which improve their social well-being.

4. The specific characteristics of the status of military personnel during wartime and under a state of emergency are established by wartime laws and legislation on a state of emergency.

Article 3. Persons Who Have the Status of Military Personnel

1. Citizens of the Russian Federation who are serving in the military in accordance with the Law "On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service" and Article 1 of this Law have the status of military personnel.

Military construction workers as well as military reservists at assemblies are, in accordance with legislation, equivalent to military personnel in terms of their status.

2. A citizen of the Russian Federation acquires the status of a service member the day he is assigned to (or conscripted for or joins) military service and loses it the day he is removed from the rolls of the military unit in connection with discharge from military service.

3. Certain provisions and norms of legislation on the status of military personnel extend to members of their families and to persons discharged from military service.

4. The status of citizens of Russia who are serving in the military in the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS on the territory of other states, like the status of citizens of other

states or persons with dual citizenship who are serving in the military on Russia's territory, as well as on the territory of other states in the troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, is determined by international agreements.

5. This Law does not extend to citizens of the Russian Federation who are serving in the military of the national armies and other military formations of other states.

6. The status of service member is retained for military personnel who have been captured or have been interned in neutral countries. The military command and other state organs authorized to do so are obligated to take steps to protect the rights of these military personnel in accordance with the norms of international law.

7. If military personnel are convicted and sentenced to deprivation of freedom, the realization of their rights envisioned by the status of service member as well as the rights of the members of their families is suspended (or terminated) following procedures established by legislation.

Article 4. Guarantees of Social and Legal Protection of Military Personnel

1. The state guarantees the social and legal protection of military personnel and provides a worthy standard of living and the appropriate conditions of military service for them with consideration of its special character and priority over other types of state service.

2. All military personnel are equal before the law regardless of the post or military rank they hold. Any differences in rights and duties, conditions for serving in the military, and material security are established only by legislative enactments of the state.

3. Realization of the rights and freedoms established for military personnel and the members of their families and support of their lawful interests is charged to the organs of state power and government, including committees under the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Russian Federation specially created for these purposes, courts, and other law enforcement organs, and military administrative organs, and this is the fundamental duty of commanders and superior officers. Their ad hoc organizations, public associations, and citizens also help realize the rights and freedoms of military personnel.

4. The procurator's office provides supervision of the execution of legislation on the status of military personnel, while the courts provide legal protection of their rights.

5. The leaders of state organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, commanders and superior officers, and other persons guilty of failing to perform their duty to realize the rights and lawful interests of military personnel and members of their families bear the administrative and material responsibility established by legislation.

6. Persons who offend against the life, health, and honor and dignity of military personnel in connection with their

performance of the duties of military service bear responsibility for an offense against a representative of state power.

7. The organs of state power and government and the military command are charged with the duty to protect and properly maintain military monuments and military cemeteries and places of burial.

Person who are guilty of destroying, wrecking, damaging, or committing outrages upon military monuments, war memorials, or military cemeteries and places of burial or of violating the rules for their protection bear responsibility in accordance with legislation.

Article 5. Legislation on the Status of a Military Serviceman

1. Legislation on the status of military personnel is based on the Russian Federation Constitution and the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms. It consists of this Law and other legislative enactments of Russia, as well as ratified international-legal enactments defining the rights, duties, and responsibility of military personnel and guaranteees of their realization.

2. During the transitional period provisions of the appropriate legislative enactments of the former USSR which do not contradict the legislation of the Russian Federation are also included in legislation on the status of military personnel.

Section 2. The Rights of Military Personnel and Guarantees of Their Realization

Article 6. Participation in State and Public Life

1. Military personnel have the right to participate in managing the affairs of society and the state both directly and through their representatives and have the right to freely vote, advance their candidates and be elected to organs of state power in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution, and participate directly in deciding state affairs at any level.

The specific characteristics of the legal position of military personnel elected to the organs of state power are determined by the Law "On the Status of People's Deputies" and other enactments of legislation.

2. Military personnel are prohibited from joining political parties, while previous membership in them is suspended during active military service.

3. Military personnel may join together into public organizations of a nonpolitical nature and participate in them in off-duty time.

4. The functions of public (or collective) protection of the rights and interests of military personnel are charged to their ad hoc organizations (assemblies and councils of different categories of military personnel). Assemblies and councils of military personnel operate within the framework of laws and military regulations. The regulation on the Assembly of Officers is approved by the president of

the Russian Federation. Ad hoc organizations of military personnel are not legal persons and have no right to examine political questions.

Article 7. Freedom of Speech and Participation in Rallies, Meetings, Street Demonstrations, Parades, and Acts of Protest

1. Military personnel have the right to freedom of speech, the freedom to express their opinions and convictions, and the freedom to have access to obtain and disseminate information. In realizing this right, military personnel may not permit divulging of state, military, or official secrets, which information is enumerated by legislation.

2. Military personnel have the right in off-duty time to conduct assemblies and participate in rallies, street demonstrations, and parades being conducted with the authorization of the organs of state power and government.

3. The organization and participation of military personnel in strikes, picketing, and other acts of protest is prohibited.

Article 8. Freedom of Conscience and Religion

1. Military personnel have the right to profess any religion or to profess none and in their off-duty time to perform religious rites and to have religious or atheistic beliefs.

Military personnel are not exempt from performing the duties of military service for reasons of religious conviction or to perform religious rites.

2. The state and its organs do not assume the obligations of satisfying military personnel's needs stemming from their religious convictions and the need to perform religious rites.

The creation of religious associations in military units is not permitted.

Article 9. Protection of the Freedom, Honor, and Dignity of the Individual. Personal Inviolability

1. The personal freedom and safety and honor and dignity of military personnel are preserved by law.

2. A service member is guaranteed personal inviolability.

Insulting a service member or threatening or committing violence or an offense against his life, health, or property and other acts impeding the performance of duties charged to the service member as well as violation of and infringement on his rights entail disciplinary, administrative, material, and criminal responsibility for the guilty persons.

A service member may not be subjected to detention and arrest other than for reasons envisioned by legislation.

A service member may be subjected to punishment in the form of arrest with confinement in the stockade by the authority of the commander (or superior officer) in accordance with procedures defined by military regulations.

Article 10. Freedom of Movement and Selection of the Place of Residence

1. Military personnel's freedom of movement must be correlated with maintenance of combat readiness of military units and subunits and the promptness of their arrival at duty positions in necessary cases.

Conscripted regular-term military personnel have the right to move freely within the boundaries of military bases (or populated points) to which, with the command's authorization, they have been released from the location of the military unit (or have come to on a short leave or on temporary duty). Other military personnel have the right to move freely within the boundaries of the military base and outside its boundaries.

2. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term military personnel, servicewomen, and regular-term military personnel who are serving under contract have the right to change their place of service, including moving to a different locality, for reasons which take into account the following: the conditions of military duty; the state of health of military personnel and members of their families in accordance with the finding of a military medical board; the fact they have served the established term of duty in localities with difficult and unpleasant climatic and ecological conditions, following procedures established by legislation.

3. The departure of military personnel outside the borders of the Russian Federation is done with the authorization of military command.

4. Persons being discharged from military service have the right to choose a place of residence and the right to a residence permit for any populated point of the Russian Federation.

Article 11. Realization of the Right To Work

1. Military service is a special type of socially necessary labor activity. The state guarantees military personnel the right to the following:

- to occupy posts and advance in service in accordance with the qualifications received and the results achieved in service activity, and, as a rule, on a competitive basis;
- to upgrade occupational skills with consideration of the interests of the military service and personal choice;
- to change the place of service and receive service transfers for reasons indicated in Article 10;
- to receive by established procedures military ranks corresponding to table of organization categories. No one has the right to delay the promotion of a service member to the next military rank, with the exception of cases defined by legislative enactments.

2. The time citizens are in military service is counted in their total, continuous period of labor and in the period of labor in the specialization under privileged conditions: 1 year of military service counts as two years of labor service.

The amount of time the wife (or husband) of a service member lived together with her husband (or wife) in a locality where there was no opportunity to find a job in the specialization is counted in the total period of labor needed for an old age pension to be set.

3. Difficult climatic, physical, or occupational conditions of military service are compensated with pay supplements and privileged calculation of years of service. Service in remote localities and difficult climatic conditions is limited to periods of time set by legislative action. Military personnel who perform duties in regions declared to be in a state of emergency by legislative enactments and decrees of the government are granted additional rights and benefits.

4. The members of the families of conscripted regular-term servicemen have a preferential right in job hiring and for remaining on the job when there are staff reductions; they also have a preference when persons are being sent for occupational training, upgrading of skills, and retraining with a leave from production and payment of the average wage during the period of study.

5. Military personnel are prohibited from doing the following: engaging in any type of entrepreneurial activity; doing work or performing services using the job position and receiving remuneration and benefits for this.

6. Enlisting military personnel to do work which is not necessitated by military service is permitted only in cases envisioned by legislation. In that case the benefits envisioned for other persons performing these jobs apply to the military personnel.

Article 12. On-duty Time and Recreation

1. The length of the service week is established as follows: for conscripted regular-term servicemen and cadets and students of military educational institutions and training centers (units)—six days with one day off;
—for officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract—five days with two days off.

2. The overall length of the weekly on-duty time of officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract must not as a rule exceed the length of work time established by legislation for workers and employees.

Alert duty (combat duty), exercises, shipboard cruises, and other measures enumerated by the minister of defense and heads of other ministries and organizations in which military personnel perform military service are conducted without limiting the total duration of on-duty time.

In cases where the military personnel indicated in this point are regularly enlisted to perform duties of military service beyond the established length of the weekly on-duty time and it is not possible to compensate for this with rest on other days of the week, they are granted additional leave for up to 14 days a year.

For military personnel enlisted to perform the duties of military service on days off and holidays, rest is granted on other days of the week in the manner defined by military regulations.

3. The length of on-duty time of conscripted regular-term servicemen is determined by the schedule of daily routine of the military unit in accordance with the demands of military regulations. These servicemen are granted at least eight hours for sleep and two hours personal time a day.

4. Military personnel are granted daily breaks for rest and eating, weekly rest days, rest on holidays, and leaves.

5. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract are granted a yearly basic leave. Its length depends on the total years in service and the specific characteristics and conditions of military service; it is set in the following amounts:

- for those who have less than 10 calendar years of service—30 days;
- from 10 to 15 years—35 days;
- from 15 to 20 years—40 days;
- 20 or more years—45 days, not counting the time needed to travel to and from the place the leave is being spent.

For those in flight work, serving on submarines or surface ships, or serving in regions of the Far North and localities similar to them, as well as in other localities which the government enumerates,—45 days.

Military personnel (with the exception of conscripted regular-term servicemen) may divide their leave into two parts with due regard for the interests of the service and the service member's wish.

If they so desire, military personnel who have 20 or more calendar years of service are granted a basic leave of three months in one of the last three years before they are discharged from the military service in order to take care of matters related to the discharge.

Additional leave (or rest) is granted for performing duties in harmful (or difficult) conditions and for a particular nature of service (shipboard cruises at sea, extended work trips for flight crews, temporary-residence tours of alert duty, and other instances where military personnel are away from their permanent locations for extended periods of time).

6. For the entire period of military service conscripted regular-term servicemen are granted a leave—for soldiers and seamen—20 days and for sergeants and petty officers—25 days, not counting the time it takes to travel to and from the place the leave is being taken. Regular-term servicemen whose service lasts two years are granted this leave each year. For incentive the length of the leave may be increased by up to five days for these servicemen in accordance with the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Moreover, for performing duties in harmful conditions or for a particular type of service in accordance with Point 5 of this article

they are granted additional leave lasting up to seven days. This additional leave may be joined with the basic leave.

The length of the leave is reduced by the number of days under arrest of military personnel who are kept in the stockade, but in all cases leave may consist of no less than 10 days for soldiers and seamen and 13 days for sergeants and petty officers.

7. When necessary military personnel are granted sick leave or short-term leave (because of family circumstances). And officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, and cadets of military educational institutions are in addition granted vacation leave (officers also get leave in connection with graduating from military educational institutions).

8. The procedure for granting leaves (or rest) to service personnel as well as the length of those leaves when the length is not indicated in this Law are determined by the Statute on Performance of Military Service by Citizens of the Russian Federation.

9. Working wives (or husbands) of military personnel should be granted leave simultaneously with the regular leave of their husbands (or wives). In this case the length of the leave may be made equal to the length of the husband's (or wife's) leave by granting additional leave without pay.

Article 13. Material Support

1. The state provides military personnel with pay in amounts that stimulate citizen interest in military service. The pay of military personnel takes into account the particular characteristics of the military service and depends on the post held, the military rank, qualifications, the length and conditions of service, and the quality and results of service activity.

The base pay by post for junior officers, warrant officers, and extended-term servicemen appointed for the first time to posts which are staffed from these categories of military personnel may not be below five times the minimum wage of workers and employees, while the base pay by military rank is at least half the base pay by post.

The base pay by post of sergeants, petty officers, and conscripted regular-term soldiers and seamen must be at least half the minimum wage of workers and employees.

2. When the cost of living index changes and labor payment rises, the pay of military personnel is subject to increase in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation on indexing of monetary income for the population in the manner determined by the government of the Russian Federation.

3. At the end of each year (or training year) military personnel are paid a cash bonus in the amount of up to two months pay and allowances for maintenance of high combat readiness, conscientious performance of duties, and irreproachable discipline.

4. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract are paid material assistance in the amount of one

month's pay and allowances when they take their basic leave, while conscripted regular-term servicemen are paid the minimum wage of workers and employees.

5. For a service transfer of military personnel (other than conscripted regular-term servicemen) involving a move from one locality to another (including to a military unit and subunit), they are paid a posting allowance in the amount of two month's pay and allowances for each service person and half a month's pay and allowances for each member of the family who has moved along with him.

6. Military personnel are provided with food and clothing and related gear at state expense in accordance with scientifically substantiated norms established by the government of the Russian Federation with due regard for their military service.

If military personnel (other than conscripted regular-term servicemen) so desire, they may be paid cash compensation instead of receiving actual food, clothing, and military gear.

7. Military personnel are offered the opportunity to obtain foodstuffs and industrial goods through commissary stores as well as to be served in commissary cafeterias at reduced prices through priority, preferential (without value added tax) supply of military trade enterprises and public catering of the commissary with foodstuffs and industrial goods as well as material-technical supply products in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On Deliveries of Output and Goods for State Needs."

Article 14. The Right of Property and Tax Benefits

1. A service member has the right to be the owner and to possess, use, and dispose of his property and other objects of ownership in accordance with the RSFSR Law "On Ownership in the RSFSR."

The property of military personnel is created and augmented by their receiving cash and in-kind allowances (except for conscripted regular-term servicemen), working personal private plots, receiving income from entrepreneurial activity before they were conscripted (or joined or were assigned) to military service, or receiving property as an inheritance or a gift, as well as other activity not prohibited by this Law.

The state guarantees that military personnel, as citizens of the Russian Federation, receive a share of public property on an equal footing with other citizens as this property is privatized.

2. If they so desire, parcels of land are transferred to ownership or an inheritable life estate free of charge to officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract who have served for more than 10 calendar years in the following parcel sizes:

—for individual housing construction—0.10 hectares in cities and urban-type settlements and 0.25 hectares in rural areas;

—for individual dacha construction and to work a personal private plot—up to 0.25 hectares; in rayons with irrigated farming—0.12 hectares;
—for garage construction.

3. At the petition of the military command, local organs of state power and government at the chosen place of residence transfer to ownership or inheritable life estate, free of charge, land parcels for individual housing construction in the amounts indicated in this article and for working a peasant (or private) farm and doing entrepreneurial activity (after discharge)—in amounts set by legislation of the republics which are part of the Russian Federation and by local soviets of people's deputies but no less than 0.30 hectares to these military personnel no less than three years before discharge by reason of age or upon discharge by reason of state of health or staff reductions.

4. Military personnel who have been conscripted (or joined or assigned) to military service and appointed to a post after graduating from military educational institutions and have been transferred or moved to a new place of military service have the right to receive a three-month interest-free loan to set themselves up in an amount up to 30 times the minimum monthly wage; other military personnel receive the interest-free loan for emergency needs in an amount up to 20 times the minimum monthly wage. Compensation to banks for losses from granting these loans to military personnel is made using federal budget capital.

5. The procedure for keeping and using property belonging to military personnel in the military unit location is determined by military regulations.

6. Military personnel are exempt from paying income tax on the pay given to them, cash bonuses, and other payments received by them in connection with performing the duties of military service and from paying land tax and the tax on property of physical persons.

Military personnel and members of their families may be fully or partially exempted by the local organs of power from paying other taxes and fees in accordance with legislative and other normative enactments on this question.

Article 15. The Right to Housing

1. The state guarantees that living quarters will be offered to military personnel.

Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract and the members of their families living together with them are granted living quarters in accordance with the norms and in the manner envisioned by housing legislation within three months of coming to the place of service through the state and municipal housing funds transferred to the Ministry of Defense and other ministries and departments of the Russian Federation to use; or these military personnel if they so desire are given the right within this same period to join housing construction cooperatives or receive a land parcel for construction of an individual residence.

These military personnel provided with living quarters while they are serving in the military have the right to improved housing with due regard for norms, the waiting list, and privileges in accordance with this Law and housing legislation.

2. Organs of state power and government of the republics which are part of the Russian Federation and local ones, ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, and organizations which engage in housing construction are obligated to accept and promptly utilize allocations transferred by the military administrative organs for construction of housing for military personnel or to sell finished residences and apartments to them, as a state order, under the conditions and privileges established by the government of the Russian Federation.

3. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract and members of their families have the right to receive residence permits at the military unit's address before they receive living quarters. Before they receive living quarters these military personnel are offered service housing (dormitories) suitable for temporary housing. If there is no such housing, the military unit is obligated to lease housing temporarily in order to provide it to the service member and his family or if the service member so desires, to pay monetary compensation for him to sublease (or lease) living quarters under the conditions and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation.

The duty of offering assistance to military units to rent (or sublease or lease) living quarters for temporary housing of the military personnel and members of their families is charged to the local organs of state power and government.

4. Officers called up from reserves to serve in the military for a two-year term and officers who have voluntarily joined the military from the reserves and are under contract, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract are offered dormitory-type bachelor officers' quarters or service living quarters for the first five years of service. During this time they and the members of their families retain the right to living quarters occupied before they went into military service, and they may not be taken off waiting lists for receiving living quarters by place of work or residence. If military service extends beyond this period of time, the military personnel are offered well-appointed apartments on general principles according to the waiting list.

5. In the case of a service transfer to a different locality military personnel (other than conscripted regular-term servicemen) who have apartments or individual residences in ownership or who are members of housing-construction (or housing) cooperatives, as well as military personnel who in accordance with legislation retain living quarters at the place they were called up or joined the service, are granted, along with members of their families living with them, service living quarters in the particular locality.

6. Living quarters in buildings of local organs of state power and government, ministries, enterprises, institutions, and organizations in which officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract are registered and live are reserved for the permanent use of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and other ministries and organizations in which military personnel are serving in the military. When these living quarters are vacated, they are settled with military personnel and their families.

7. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and military personnel under contract who are discharged from the service by reason of age, condition of health, or staff reductions are provided with living quarters by the local organs of state power and government in the manner established by the Law of the Russian Federation "On War and Armed Forces Veterans."

At the petition of the military command these military personnel are included by the local organs of state power and government at their chosen place of residence in the lists of those needing living quarters or they are included among members of housing-construction (or housing) cooperatives no less than 3 years before they are discharged by reason of age or upon discharge by reason of state of health or staff reductions. The local organs inform the military command of the decision made within a 3-month period.

These military personnel who participated in war are offered housing quarters at the place of residence they choose upon discharge from military service regardless of waiting lists or years of service.

8. Commanders of military units and officers in the military rank of colonel or the equivalent or higher are offered an additional room or additional living space. Military personnel with academic degrees or academic titles who are teachers in military educational institutions or military departments of civilian higher educational institutions and scientific workers have the same right. The procedures for granting an additional room or living space and its size are established by legislation.

9. For officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract who are sent to serve in the military abroad, in rayons of the Far North and localities similar to them, and to other localities with difficult climatic conditions, the living quarters they occupy are reserved for the entire time they are abroad or in these localities.

Legislative enactments may envision other reasons for reserving housing quarters for military personnel.

Military personnel for whom the housing quarters they occupy are reserved upon a service transfer are granted official living quarters at the new place of service.

10. Officers, warrant officers, and extended-term servicemen under contract pay for the housing space in state and municipal housing fund buildings they and the members of their families living with them occupy, regardless of its size, and for municipal services, regardless of the

affiliation of the housing quarters, at a rate of 50 percent. In buildings which do not have central heating, they are offered a 50-percent discount off the cost of fuel obtained within the limits of norms established for sale to the population.

11. Military personnel who have 20 years or more in service calculated by the calendar have the right to receive into ownership free of charge the housing quarters in state, departmental, or municipal housing fund buildings they occupy, regardless of their size, with the exception of housing quarters located in closed military cities.

12. Conscripted regular-term servicemen are billeted in barracks (or on ships) in the manner established by military regulations.

For conscripted regular-term servicemen and cadets of military educational institutions the housing quarters they occupied before they were called up for military service are retained, and they may not be taken off waiting lists to receive housing quarters.

13. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract who have 15 or more calendar years of service as well as those serving in the military abroad, in regions of the Far North and localities similar to them, and in other localities with difficult climatic conditions and in closed military cities have the right to join housing-construction (or housing) cooperatives and receive (or acquire) land parcels for building individual residences on a preferential basis.

14. Based on the norms envisioned by housing legislation for their place of service, military personnel who do not have living quarters for permanent residence or need better housing and who have joined housing-construction (or housing) cooperatives or are building (or buying) individual residences are offered financial assistance free of charge using the capital of the Ministry of Defense and other ministries and organizations in which military personnel are serving in the military, as appropriate, in the following amounts: for those who have served in the military without interruption for 10-15 calendar years—30 percent; for 15-20 years—50 percent, for 20-25 calendar years—75 percent, and for 25 years or more—100 percent of the cost of cooperative housing or bank credit obtained to build individual residences.

15. Local organs of state power and government are obligated to allocate, on a preferential basis, land parcels to officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract for building individual residences and to render assistance in construction of homes and acquisition of building materials.

These military personnel are offered interest-free loans to pay the cost of apartments in blocks of housing-construction (or housing) cooperatives and to build individual residences in an amount up to 100 times the minimum wage.

Compensation to banks for losses is made from the federal budget.

Article 16. Protection of Life and Health and Medical Support

1. Protection of life and health is ensured by the creation of healthy conditions of service and daily life and a system of measures to limit dangerous factors of military service. This is carried out by the military command in cooperation with organs of state power and government of the Russian Federation.

Responsibility for preserving the life and health of military personnel is the duty of commanders (or superior officers). They are charged with ensuring safety measures during exercises and other combat training activities, during service, during the operation of weapons and military equipment, and during work and everyday activities.

Commanders (or superior officers) do not have the right to issue orders whose performance creates a threat to the life and health of subordinates, with the exception of extreme necessity.

2. Military personnel have the right to free medical care (including medicines) in military-medical subunits, units, and institutions (hereafter called military-medical institutions). If there are no military-medical institutions at the place of service or where the personnel live or they lack the appropriate departments or special equipment, or in emergency cases, medical assistance is provided without restriction in health care institutions regardless of their departmental affiliation.

3. Members of families (wives and children under 18 years of age) of military personnel (with the exception of conscripted regular-term servicemen) have the right to medical assistance in military-medical institutions. For outpatient treatment, medicines are issued for payment at retail prices, with the exception of cases where in accordance with legislation payment is not charged. If there are no military-medical institutions at the place of residence of family members of military personnel or they lack the appropriate departments or special equipment, or in emergency cases, medical assistance is provided in health care institutions on general principles with other citizens of the Russian Federation.

4. Every year during leave military personnel (other than conscripted regular-term servicemen and cadets in military educational institutions) and members of their families are provided with health resort treatment and organized rest for payment in military sanatoriums, vacation lodges, and boarding hotels, at tourist bases, or in health resort and health institutions of other ministries and departments. In that case every year these military personnel are paid monetary compensation in the amount of the average cost of the voucher. Members of their families pay for vouchers under preferential conditions at a rate of 30 percent of the cost of the voucher.

Vouchers are offered free of charge to the military personnel indicated in this point when they are sent to military sanatoriums to continue hospital treatment.

5. Military personnel who participated in war have a preferential right to medical assistance and to health resort treatment.

6. When there are medical grounds, conscripted regular-term servicemen and cadets in military educational institutions are provided with free health resort treatment in military sanatoriums. Cadets of military educational institutions and the pupils of Suvorov and Nakhimov schools are granted vouchers to military tourist bases under preferential conditions with payment at the rate of 30 percent of the cost of the voucher.

Article 17. Insurance Guarantees for Military Personnel and Reimbursement for Damages

1. All military personnel and reservists called up for assembly are subject to state compulsory personal insurance in case of death by hostile action (or natural death), wounding (or contusion), injury, or illness incurred in the performance of the duties of military service (or at assemblies).

2. In case of natural or unnatural death of a service member (or reservist) occurring while he was performing the duties of military service (or at assembly) or death which occurred as a result of a wound, contusion, or injury received while performing the duties of military service (or at assembly) up to one year after discharge from military service (or the end of the assembly), the state pays his heirs an insurance sum in the amount of 120 times the monthly pay and allowances.

3. If a service member (or reservist) is declared disabled and that disability is related to his performing service duties or occurred up to one year after discharge from military service (or the end of the assembly) as a result of a wound, contusion, or injury received while performing the duties of military service, the state pays insurance sums in the following amounts:

—to a Group 1 disabled person—75 times the monthly pay and allowances;
—to a Group 2 disabled person—50 times the monthly pay and allowances;
—to a Group 3 disabled person—20 times the monthly pay and allowances.

4. If while performing the duties of military service a service member receives a serious wound which does not result in a disability, he is paid an insurance sum in the amount of four times the monthly pay and allowances; and if it is a minor wound—two times the monthly pay and allowances.

5. In the event a conscripted regular-term serviceman or reservist called up to assembly is declared unfit to continue serving in the military by reason of health, he is paid five times the monthly pay and allowances.

6. An insurance payment is not made if the natural or unnatural death, wound (or injury), or illness of a service member (or reservist at assemblies) ensued while he was committing a premeditated crime, by reason of alcoholic,

narcotic, or toxic intoxication, or through self-mutilation in order to get the insurance payment or to evade military service.

7. The state guarantees military personnel reimbursement for moral and material damages caused by the illegal actions of state organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and social associations as well as officials as a result of the following:

—unlawful institution of criminal or other proceedings; unlawful application of imprisonment under guard as a measure to ensure court appearance; unlawful conviction; damage, destruction, or loss of personal property; unlawful demotion in post or military rank; unlawful deprivation of rights, benefits, and privileges.

In these cases the service, pension, housing, and other personal and property rights of military personnel are restored by decision of the organs of state power and high command or judicial organs and damages are reimbursed through the guilty parties' budgets or the state budget.

Article 18. Obtaining Education and Participating in Cultural Life

1. Military personnel have the right to study in military educational institutions, while officers and warrant officers in addition have the right to do so in courses (or departments) for retraining and upgrading of skills.

Officers, warrant officers, and extended-term servicemen are granted the right to take exams for the complete course of a secondary military educational institution without attending regular classes.

2. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract are allowed to study in civilian higher and secondary specialized educational institutions in evening or extension classes.

3. Warrant officers, extended-term and regular-term servicemen under contract, and servicewomen are allowed to study in evening secondary general education schools at the place where they are performing their military service, as well as in preparatory courses for enrolling in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions. Conscribed regular-term servicemen cannot study in civilian higher and secondary general education and specialized educational institutions.

4. Persons called up for military service during the period they are studying in educational institutions retain the right to be enrolled to continue studies in that educational institution where they were studying before being called up when they are discharged from military service.

Citizens discharged from military service and having a positive personal record enjoy the right to preferential enrollment in higher, secondary specialized, and vocational-technical educational institutions and to preparatory departments at higher educational institutions, as well as to courses for vocational instruction. Citizens discharged from military service and enrolling in higher and

secondary specialized educational institutions based on recommendations of military units enjoy the right to noncompetitive enrollment in these educational institutions provided they receive positive evaluations in entrance exams.

Officers discharged from military service by reason of age, condition of health, or staff reductions are admitted into civilian higher and secondary specialized educational institutions without entrance exams following the procedures established by decree of the government.

Officers who have higher or secondary specialized civilian education which is similar to the training for a military specialization when performing military service in this specialization are equivalent in terms of education to persons who graduated from, accordingly, higher or secondary military educational institutions. Officers who graduated from higher or secondary military educational institutions receive a general civilian-type diploma (or certificate ["attestat"] or confirmation ["svidetelstvo"]) and are considered equivalent in terms of education to persons who graduated, accordingly, from civilian higher or secondary specialized educational institutions, while those who graduated from military educational institutions and were hired after discharge from military service to work in civilian educational institutions as teachers or staff military leaders are equivalent in terms of education to persons who graduated from pedagogical institutes.

Officers who graduated from secondary military educational institutions and after discharge from military service are hired to work in civilian educational institutions as teachers of military disciplines are equivalent in terms of education and labor payment to persons who graduated from teachers' institutes.

5. Military personnel have the right, on an equal footing with other citizens of the Russian Federation, to participate in the country's cultural life and use institutions of culture.

Conscripted regular-term servicemen, cadets in military educational institutions, and pupils of the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools are granted the right to use movie theaters, theaters, clubs, concert halls, and sports structures, as well as parks, museums, and exhibits, free of charge.

6. The military command is obligated to formulate and carry out a system of measures on the patriotic, moral, and ethical indoctrination of subordinate military personnel, instill respect for national traditions in them, and develop amateur creativity.

7. In the military unit area, military personnel enjoy the services of libraries and reading halls and cultural education property, see movie and video films and television programs, listen to radio programs, and engage in artistic amateur activity free of charge at the expense of the budget of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and other ministries and organizations where they are serving.

Article 19. Travel on Means of Transportation and Postal Shipments.

1. Military personnel and members of their families have the right to travel free of charge on rail, air, water, and motor vehicle transport, including to and from the states of the CIS, on official work trips, and on leave (or for treatment), while during a service transfer and discharge from military service, in addition they have the right to ship up to 10 tonnes of their own property at the expense of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and other ministries and organizations where they are serving in the military, and during a service transfer following the procedures established by legislation and decrees of the government.
2. Conscribed regular-term servicemen enjoy the right of free travel on all types of urban passenger transport (with the exception of taxis) and on general-use motor vehicle transport (with the exception of taxis) in rural areas, as well as on suburban rail and air transport and in suburban routed buses.
3. Military personnel enjoy the right to obtain tickets for all types of transport on a preferential basis when going on official work trips or traveling to a new place of service, as well as traveling to and from the place where they spend their leave.
4. Conscribed regular-term servicemen have the right to send letters, transmitted by the military unit free of charge. Letters addressed to conscribed regular-term servicemen are forwarded free of charge to the place of their military service. Personal clothing of citizens who have been called up to (or joined) regular-term military service is sent as free parcel post.

Article 20. Proposals, Petitions, and Appeals

1. Military personnel have the right to submit proposals to the organs of state power and government and send petitions in the manner established by legislation and military regulations.
2. Military personnel may through their commanders (or superior officers) or the court appeal wrongful actions of officials and military administrative organs which infringe upon the rights and personal dignity of military personnel and may appeal to the court concerning wrongful actions of organs of state management and of officials.
3. Appeals of military personnel on official matters are submitted, reviewed, and decided in the manner determined by military regulations. In the event the appeal is not accepted or not satisfied, the service member who made the appeal may turn to the higher-ranking commanding officer (or superior officer) as well as to the procurator's officer or the court.

It is prohibited to obstruct military personnel from submitting appeals and imposing penalties on them for doing so, to subject them to persecution, or to set them back in service. The parties guilty of that are brought to administrative or disciplinary responsibility.

Article 21. Discharge of Citizens from Military Service and Job Placement for Them

1. Military personnel have the right to be discharged from the military service after they have served out their time as established by the Russian Federation Law "On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service" or defined by the contract of term of service, or by reason of health or family status. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract have the right to be discharged from military service upon reaching the age limit for being in military service and for other circumstances which rule out the possibility of continuing military service; in addition, officers who so desire may be discharged if they have served at least 10 calendar years in officer posts.
2. Military personnel, other than conscribed regular-term servicemen, may not be discharged from military service before they have acquired the right to a pension awarded for years of service, with the exception of cases where their service is terminated in connection with state of health, nonextension of the contract, staff reductions, the commission of acts which defame the honor of the service member, a court conviction for committing crimes, for service unfitness, or at personal request.
3. In the event officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, or regular-term servicemen under contract are discharged from military service without grounds and violating the law, the damages done in connection with this are subject to full reimbursement at the expense of the guilty persons. Unfairly discharged military personnel are restored to military service in their former post and in the same geographic region and are provided with all types of pay not received after the unlawful discharge. This period is included in the number of years served and in the time in grade for awarding the next military rank.

The procedure for restoring military personnel to military service in these cases and reimbursement of damages done to them are established by the Statute on Performance of Military Service by Citizens of the Russian Federation.

4. Upon discharge from the military service, military personnel are paid a one-time grant in the following amounts:
 - for officers discharged from military service by reason of age, state of health, or staff reductions: 6 months times the monthly pay and allowances for those who have served from 10 to 15 calendar years, 7 times the monthly pay and allowances for those who have served from 15 to 20 years; 8 times the monthly pay and allowances for those who have served from 20 to 25 years, 9 times the monthly pay and allowances for those who have served from 25 to 30 years, and 10 times the monthly pay and allowances for those who have served more than 30 years;
 - for conscribed regular-term servicemen—in the amount of the minimum wage of workers and employees, and for these persons who are orphans or children left without parental supervision—5 times the minimum wage of workers and employees.

Officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term servicemen under contract who have from 15 to 20 years of military service and are discharged from military service by reason of state of health or staff reductions without the right to a pension are paid a monthly social benefit for five years in the following amounts: for serving 15 calendar years—40 percent of the sum of the monthly pay, and for each year of service beyond 15 years—3 percent of the sum of the monthly pay.

5. Jobs placement of citizens discharged from military service is handled in accordance with legislation on employment of the population and other legislative enactments.

Moreover, the following additional rights on job placement are established for persons discharged from military service:

- offers of jobs with consideration of their specialization no more than one month from the day they apply to the organs of the state employment service office or at an enterprise, institution, or organization;
- for citizens who worked at enterprises, institutions, or organizations before they were called up to (or joined) military service, retention for five years after the discharge from military service of the right to go back to work at the same enterprise, institution, or organization and for those who were regular-term servicemen and officers called up from the reserves to serve two years in the military, the additional right to a post no lower than the one they held before being called up to military service;
- the preferential right to remain at their initial job when the number or staff of workers is reduced;
- provision of military personnel discharged by reason of staff reductions or illness with the opportunity to acquire an occupation they desire free of charge;
- offers to citizens discharged after doing regular-term military service and hired at the former work place of material assistance to set themselves up at first in the manner established by decrees of the government.

6. In order to provide job placement for citizens discharged from military service, job placement structures and vocational instruction of these persons are set up in the state employment services office system.

The appropriate subunits working on these matters or on rendering assistance in job placement for members of families of military personnel are set up in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and other ministries and organizations in which military personnel are in military service.

Section 3. Obligations of Military Personnel

Article 22. General Obligations

Protecting the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, ensuring the country's external and internal security, and rebuffing an armed attack and defeating the aggressor, as well as protecting Russia's state interests and meeting objectives in accordance with its

international obligations, make up the essence of military duty, which obligates military personnel to do the following:

- be loyal to the Military Oath of Allegiance, selflessly serve their people, and courageously and skillfully protect their Fatherland;
- rigorously observe the Russian Federation Constitution and the laws and requirements of military regulations and unquestioningly obey commanders (or superior officers) exactly and execute their orders in time;
- value the honor and combat glory of protectors of their people and the honor of the military rank and troop comradeship;
- improve military proficiency, keep weapons and military equipment in permanent readiness for use, and guard military property;
- be disciplined and vigilant and keep military and state secrets.

Article 23. Official and Special Duties

1. The official duties of military personnel and the procedures for performing these duties are determined by military regulations and other legal enactments.

2. Commanders (or superior officers) are invested with sole command and are responsible in peacetime and wartime for all aspects of the life and activities of subordinates, namely: for constant combat and mobilization readiness, successful performance of military missions; combat training, indoctrination, troop discipline, the morale of personnel and the safety of military service; the condition and safekeeping of weapons and military equipment and property; material, technical, medical, financial, and domestic support.

3. When they are on alert duty (combat duty) or on daily and garrison detail, as well as when they have been enlisted to clean up the consequences of natural disasters and in other extraordinary circumstances, military personnel perform special duties. These duties and the procedures for performing them are established by legislative enactments, military regulations, and other legal enactments developed on their basis.

In order to perform special duties, by legislative enactments and military regulations military personnel may be assigned additional rights (to use weapons, to subjugate strictly defined persons, and others).

Article 24. The Right to Keep, Bear, and Employ Weapons

1. While performing the duties of military service, and when necessary in off-duty time, military personnel have the right to keep, bear, employ, and use weapons.

The rules for military personnel to keep and bear weapons are determined by military regulations. The procedures for employing and using weapons are established by this Law and other enactments of legislation.

2. As an extreme measure military personnel have the right to employ weapons personally or as part of a subunit in the following cases:

—to rebuff an armed attack committed by a group or a single person on guarded military and civilian installations, guard details, or the premises or structures of military units;

—to stop attempts at forceful seizure of weapons and military equipment;

to protect military personnel and civilians from an attack which threatens their lives or health, if using other methods and means to protect them is impossible;

—to detain persons who have committed a crime and offer armed resistance or are caught in the act of such a crime, as well as an armed person who refuses to comply with lawful demands to surrender weapons if other methods and means to suppress the resistance and detain the criminal or take away weapons are impossible.

Military personnel who are part of a guard detail also have the right to employ weapons in cases and in the manner determined by the manual of garrison and guard duties.

The commander (or superior officer), in addition, has the right to employ weapons personally or to order weapons to be employed to restore discipline and order in the event of open insubordination of a subordinate, when the insubordinate's actions are clearly directed to betraying the Fatherland or thwarting meeting objectives in combat conditions.

3. The employment of a weapon must be preceded by a warning of the intention to use it. A weapon may be used without warning during a sudden armed attack, an attack using combat equipment, means of transportation, aircraft, or seagoing or river vessels, or escape from under guard with a weapon or using means of transportation, as well as escape from means of transportation while it is moving, at night, or in conditions of limited visibility.

4. Military personnel have the right to use weapons to sound the alarm or call for help, as well as to render harmless an animal that is threatening people's lives or health.

5. While employing and using a weapon, a service member is obligated to take all possible steps to ensure the safety of the citizens in the area and if necessary to provide emergency medical assistance to victims.

It is prohibited to employ weapons against women and minors, with the exception of cases where they are committing an armed attack, offering armed resistance, or in case of a life-threatening group attack, if other methods and means to rebuff this attack are impossible.

6. The service member reports to the commander (or superior officer) on each case of the employment or use of a weapon.

Section 4. The Responsibility of Military Personnel

Article 25. General Principles for Bringing Military Personnel to Responsibility

1. Depending on the nature and degree of public danger of the legal offense committed, a service member is subjected to social influence or bears legal responsibility—disciplinary, administrative, civil, material, and criminal.

2. It is inadmissible to degrade the honor and dignity of the service member when he is being brought to responsibility.

3. For committing a legal offense military personnel are as a rule brought to one type of legal responsibility.

Military personnel subjected to disciplinary punishment in connection with committing a legal offense are not exempt from criminal responsibility for this legal offense.

In the event a legal offense which entailed material damages is committed, military personnel reimburse the damages regardless of the other types of responsibility imposed on them or the measures of social influence taken.

Article 26. Measures of Social Influence

1. For acts involving the violation of military discipline and public order, as well as for violation of the norms of ethics in the military unit, military personnel may be subjected to social influence: condemned at assemblies of personnel, and warrant officer and officers—at Assemblies of Officers. Moreover, the acts of military personnel may be reviewed by the comrades' courts of honor.

2. The procedures for discussing and reviewing the acts of military personnel and the application against them of measures of social influence are established by military and other legal enactments.

Article 27. Legal Responsibility

1. Military personnel bear disciplinary responsibility on the grounds and in the manner determined by the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

2. Military personnel bear administrative responsibility on general principles in accordance with legislation on administrative law offenses for violating traffic rules, the rules for hunting, fishing, and protecting fish reserves, and customs rules and for smuggling. In that case administrative penalties in the form of a fine, corrective labor, or administrative arrest may not be applied against him. Military personnel bear responsibility in accordance with the rules of the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for committing administrative law offenses.

3. Military personnel bear civil responsibility for failing to fulfill or improperly fulfilling obligations envisioned by legislation and for damages caused to the state, legal persons, or citizens while away from performance of the duties of military service.

They are brought to material responsibility in accordance with the Statute on Material Responsibility of Military

Personnel for material damages caused to the state while performing the duties of military service.

4. Military personnel bear criminal responsibility on general principles for committing state and general crimes. They bear responsibility under the Law of the Russian Federation for crimes against the established procedures of serving in the military.

Article 28. Criminal Judicial Proceedings Against Military Personnel

1. Judicial proceedings on criminal cases against military personnel are conducted in accordance with the law of criminal procedure of the Russian Federation, unless otherwise established by law.

2. A service member arrested in a criminal case is held, as a preventive measure, in places for preliminary incarceration pending trial or in the stockade.

3. During proceedings in a criminal case, a service member is guaranteed the right to defense in the manner established by legislation.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

New Radiation, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle Detailed

92UM1355B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Aug 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel Vitaliy Moroz: "The BRDM Serves in Reconnaissance"]

[Text] This vehicle's role has been reflected in its name—armored reconnaissance vehicle. However, besides reconnaissance, including special—radiation and chemical, other tasks are also assigned to it. For example, the BRDM [combat reconnaissance vehicle] served as the base during the development of the self-propelled antitank missile system [PTRK].

The troops had become acquainted with the initial variation of this vehicle, simply the BRDM, already in 1958. Many of its advantages were obvious: high off-road capability, amphibious capability, greater comfort than open-type armored transport vehicles, and various equipment for surveillance of the enemy during the day and at night.

The reconnaissance vehicle's undercarriage was and remains interesting in its own way. Four drive wheels with central pressure regulation in the tires augment two pairs of aircraft-type wheels that have been hidden away under the bottom. While driving over an obstacle, they turn, preventing the vehicle, so to speak, from "running aground". If it needs to surmount a trench, the driver lowers the wheels and imparts positive rotation to them from the engine through the chain drive.

The BRDM feels confident in the water thanks to the hull, which reminds you of a small surface craft from a distance and the water propulsion device with the rudders-baffles.

In contrast to its predecessor, the BRDM-2 has higher combat characteristics. The vehicle's external appearance has been changed which was primarily associated with moving the engine from the forward to the aft portion. The engine itself has become more powerful. The scouts' vehicle has received a conical turret for mounting the same type of weaponry as armored personnel vehicle weaponry: the KPVT 14.5 mm (Vladimirov Heavy-Caliber Tank Machinegun) and the PKT 7.62 mm (Kalashnikov Tank Machinegun) that is twin-mounted with it. The BRDM-1's weaponry was less powerful: initially, the improved version of the Goryunov Heavy Machinegun (SGMB), then the PKT.

Serious attention is devoted to reconnaissance vehicles abroad (like ours, the majority of them are wheeled). Their fleet was substantially upgraded and replaced in the 1970's. The requirements for reconnaissance subunit vehicles are understandable and natural: high off-road capability and mobility, amphibious capability, great range on one refueling, the maximum possible armor protection with limited weight, and equipping them with various devices, right up to radar for detection of moving ground targets, reliable communications equipment, and decent weaponry.

Our defense industry is also ready to produce a high-class reconnaissance vehicle. Everything depends on the orders. Be that as it may, at tactical exercises we will still be encountering for a long time yet the vehicle silhouette that cannot be confused with any other. The BRDM, although it has already been removed from production, will still serve reconnaissance for a while.

BRDM Technical Specifications:

	BRDM-1	BRDM-2
Combat weight, in tonnes	5.6	7
Crew, in men	5	4
Dimensions, in meters		
Length	5.66	5.75
width	2.25	2.35
Height	1.87	2.31
Engine	gasoline, 6-cylinder	gasoline, 8-cylinder (V)
Output, horsepower	90	140
Maximum speed, in kilometers per hour		
On dry land	80	95
Afloat	8-9	10
Range, in kilometers	500	750

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Problems of Aviation Regiment in Kuriles

92UM1325A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by I. Kots: "Islands in Shoulder Boards: Whom Is the Army Deterring in the Southern Kuriles"]

[Text] Any Kuriles lad knows that Kamikazes took off from Iturup Airfield to go to war. God only knows why an aviation regiment of Russian suicide volunteers is based here right now.

If He is where they fly.

"We fly out approximately 400-450 kilometers from the coast. And the range of the rescue helicopters is two times less," Pilot First Class, Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Savenkov explained to me.

The Kuriles aviation regiment is certainly the only one in the country that flies over the ocean. And it is precisely the only one in the world where they utilize single-engine fighter aircraft in the process. The first failure of a MIG-23 engine automatically becomes the last failure in the pilot's life. A ship or a submarine will arrive at the accident site three days later at best.

"How can you fly every day, knowing all of that?", I asked Savenkov.

"But not everyone flies," he responded. "Those who have remained fly".

First takeoff, then landing... The Japanese built the airfield on the very edge of the ocean, on an eternally foggy spot that, therefore, is ill-suited for landing. Landings were not required of Kamikazes, they only had a fuel reserve for one ending. Our pilots, in contrast to their predecessors, "have nothing more precious than human life", they never take off in thick "milk" and there is a rule for extraordinary cases: having returned, eject over the island. Of course, in so doing it is desirable to not end up in the boiling surf...

These are in brief the conditions of the game in the Kuriles roulette wheel where in the kitty is a year of service for two, a northern coefficient and unique flying experience. And understandably the main stake is the security of our sacred and inviolable places.

However, the "suicide volunteers" prefer to be silent about the latter.

"The Americans are operating against us here. They have fighter aircraft of another generation which we cannot fend off," a military inspector from Sakhalin, who asked me not to reveal his name, admitted to me. "We also have modern twin-engine aircraft but for some reason they fly in the Moscow suburbs. It certainly is not economical to maintain those aircraft in the Kuriles: there aren't even any hangars here and aircraft rust year-round under the open sky."

Now snow, now rain... It is difficult to imagine a more unattractive picture than Iturup's Burevestnik Airfield in

bad weather. Impassable mud and tilted structures that have become imbedded in it, a wooden BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline]-type "hut"—regimental headquarters, lonely "MIG's" wrapped in damp fog—serious state resources are certainly needed in order for all of these dismal activities on the edge of the earth to nevertheless function properly, issue orders and carry them out, take off, land, and attempt to catch up to and pass the Americans; so that the insane risk, the everyday stresses, and also my and your taxes that certainly covered the many meter long layer of concrete on the ocean shore are justified.

The dapper lieutenant colonel from the division intelligence section slid the pointer along the map of Hokkaido and impassively revealed the military secrets of the probable enemy whom we are deterring on the Kuriles. The enemy is strong: three divisions with a total strength of 50,000 men, 780 tanks, approximately 800 guns and mortars, 49 modern missiles, three major aircraft sub-units—interceptors, fighter-bombers, and tactical fighter aircraft. And here is our fire "power"—based on last year's assessment of former First Deputy Chief of the former General Staff Colonel-General B. Omelichev: "We have Far East Military District machinegun-artillery units deployed on these islands. Based on their composition—nearly 4,000 men—and structure, they are capable of carrying out only purely defensive tasks within the borders of the island territories. They have neither nuclear missile weapons nor air-amphibious assault troops in their inventory. There isn't a single ferry or pontoon... They also don't have any assault aircraft or helicopters."

Just how do we intend to deter the adversary if Hokkaido's shore-based missiles can score a direct hit on Kunashir across the 17-kilometer Bay of Izmena and the aggressor's assault force is capable of reaching our shores in half an hour?

That is a rhetorical question. What kind of rebuff of an armed invasion can there be if we are powerless before unarmed poachers?

Up to 40 Japanese schooners violate Russia's state border on a daily basis in the area of Kunashir, Shikotan, and the ridges of Habomai. At a Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet Border District directorate, they acquainted me with the curious calculation. During the first five months of 1992 alone, 697 vessels with a displacement of up to 20 tons and over 1,500 small fast-moving two-ton schooners have "grazed" in our territorial waters.

The ships which lag behind; the fighter aircraft which don't protect; the tanks of which there are few... And I would not like to incite passions but the question is too obvious: why is this army here? We also talked about that with Division Commander Colonel Vasiliy Grigoryevich Yenivatov. He has been in the Kuriles for just a year but he already perceives their misfortunes as his personal pain and he is also inclined toward decisive action: "You say that we don't have any high-speed craft? Yes I have machineguns! I could restrain any poacher within a week..."

But does the army exist to do that? And the radical division commander cited just one substantiated argument

in favor of a military presence on the islands. It turns out that not the enemy's missiles but the 51,000 peaceful fishing schooners that are registered on Hokkaido pose the main threat to us.

Is that amusing? But, on the other hand, Television Commentator Tsvetov's next subject amuses the artillery battalion's specialists no less: the reporter pronounces heartfelt words on philanthropy and on Japanese good intentions in the background... The Signals Intelligence Center at Nemuro is targeted, isn't that regrettable, directly at us.

Just where does the narrow departmental fear for itself end and where does state security begin in the Southern Kuriles?

This is not an alternative for Red Banner Pacific Ocean Border District Commander Major-General Boruchenko: Japan is ahead, Russia is behind, and here it is, an invisible line that he needs to defend. Everything is extremely simple! Nevertheless Vladimir Afanasyevich categorically refuses to comment on any statement on the island problem, no matter whose it is—the MID's [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], the Ministry of Defense's, Parliament's, or the President's. He says that in general people in uniform should not discuss the territorial issue: "Our brother can only be harmed by our statements." In the electrified opinions and rumors of the Kurile atmosphere, this stressed indifference to politics shocks me a little. Boruchenko, for example, thinks the situation on the border is normal, our border guards' contacts with the Japanese coastal defense are extremely productive and international poaching is inevitable.

We recall that the same thing occurred last summer on the Black Sea when Turkish fishermen carried out massive access to the border and "occupied" our waters—however, the third world war still was not unleashed. It has not been excluded that the Japanese, at the level of everyday consciousness, already consider the Kuriles to be their own and cast their nets here as if they were at home. Of course, the commander added, a seat of tension exists and the diplomats must first of all extinguish it. But in any case, this is not grounds to indulge in saber rattling or all the more so to use weapons. "When firing begins at the border, this signifies the failure of foreign policy," said Boruchenko.

The 1960's beat back the desire in him to shoot when the major-general was a captain and he was serving as a border outpost commander on the Far Eastern Chinese border: "At that time, we weren't afraid of anyone and we didn't prove anything but a quarter of a century was lost."

For a long, long time, border guards in particular have been demanding their honest share during the division of confiscated goods. The arrest of just one poaching schooner yields nearly R5 million foreign exchange rubles for the state treasury. The border district does not receive a single kopek of this sum. The very participants of the detention, which often entails a risk to their lives, are awarded R30 bonuses—in "wooden rubles", of course. It

is not enough that this residual principle does not stimulate the keen vision and vigilance of the sentries—we are losing there where we could be drawing from a golden well. Indeed, the same old, old song is already beginning—about how they need fast ships that are capable of catching the agile "junks" and about solar oil...

And moreover we have already heard the cries of the Kurile pilots, tank crewmen, and artillery men—and how are we worse off?!

The well-known five-stage plan for the solution of the territorial problem that has been proposed by President Yeltsin provides for the demilitarization of the islands over the course of five-seven years. Plus another three-five years, permitted by Boris Nikolayevich for the preceding stage—the economic revival of the Kuriles; minus the President's repeated statements on "compressed time periods"—in a word, we are pressed for time and the last bell has already rung for the military. The issue is only in details: Will everyone withdraw? Will the border guards remain? How many?

Much has been written about the destructive influence of the military on the ecology of the Southern Kuriles. There is this sin—here you neither reduce nor increase. Although I think that the hasty transfer of spawning streams to dubious cooperatives, which distinguished Iturup's civil authorities (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 19 March 1991), inflicted no less damage on the unique Kuriles environment. However, there is another side to the coin. Today the army protects the island dwellers not so much from external enemies as from internal boundlessness. Military helicopters and ships remain the only reliable means of transportation. The army provides heat and light to villages, shares gasoline and flour, treats the population at its hospitals and steams them at its own steam baths. In general and indeed, without any irony, it is a deterrent factor. The force that keeps afloat the half-sunken economic dreadnought that is isolated from Russia and from the even though weak but still active economic ties. What will the surgical separation of the army and the people result in?

And we still haven't touched upon such an explosive topic as social guarantees for future reserve officers: 656 families in the Kurile division alone do not have any housing whatsoever on the mainland....

That is why, on the threshold of parliamentary hearings on the Southern Kuriles, it is worth recalling the lessons of the most recent history when long smoldering dissatisfaction ended in an outburst of passions and the silence of the politicians released the language of cannons. Although the later also do not threaten, I hope, the Kuriles: the military person here is patient and accustomed to difficulties. The famous four seamen, who were carried away from here into the ocean on a barge made ends meet, I recall, even with boots and an accordion.

But will our four islands die without the soldier's porridge which they are also carrying away to God knows where?

Fate of Tu-160 Regiment in Ukraine Viewed
92UM1395A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Valentin Rudenko: "Russia Scrambles the Tu-160"]

[Text] Rumors that Russia, as a result of the unilateral privatization by Ukraine of the regiment of the most modern Soviet strategic missile aircraft, the Tu-160, had been left without these aircraft has turned out to be, as life has shown, exaggerated. Last week at one of the Russian airfields, long-range aviation pilots began the planned introduction to the heavy, multimode and multipurpose missile-carrying bomber with variable wing configuration, the Tu-160.

As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written (21 Jul 1992), the Tu-160 was developed as a counter to the new American strategic B-1 bomber and, in the assessment of specialists, is the most aviation powerful system in the world.

As it turned out, all the Tu-160 missile-carrying aircraft newly commissioned for the Air Forces ended up in Ukraine, in Priluki at the Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Poltava-Berlin Guards Air Regiment. On 22 June, this regiment was to celebrate its 54th anniversary. But the holiday, as was pointed out by the regiment's assistant commander for personnel, military navigator first class, Lt Col Vladimir Chernov, was turned into a funeral feast. The regiment had virtually ceased to exist as a strategic combat unit. In Priluki there was no one to fly the Tu-160.

Some 37 pilots and navigators as well as many aviation specialists from the Priluki regiment are presently serving in Russia.

It is no disaster that the social and service problems have not yet been resolved, that the airfield and physical plant require major reconstruction and modernization, that there is lack of seemingly the most elementary things such as crash helmets and special flight gear. All this can be overcome.

On the day we arrived in the regiment, a significant and to a certain degree even historical event had occurred there, as the crews of regimental commander Lt Col Anatoliy Zhikharev and the squadron commander Lt Col Aleksandr Malyshev, having first made several flights on the Tu-160 with the senior inspector pilot Lt Col Aleksandr Medvedev and the inspector navigator Lt Col Vladimir Karpov, were checked out for independent flights.

Everyone who was at the airfield warmly congratulated the pilots and navigators with the beginning of the operation of the Tu-160 strategic missile-carrying aircraft in the Russian skies.

Tu-95 Regiment Base for Caucasus Withdrawal
92UM1396A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Valentin Rudenko: "They Are Flying in the Skies of North Ossetia"]

[Text] In setting off on a mission to the regiment of Tu-95 strategic bombers stationed in North Ossetia, we, it must be admitted, felt that the flyers there would not be up to the flights. It would be necessary above all else to ensure dependable security for the airfield, the military facilities and the compound against possible guerrilla attack and maintain public order in the garrison. As is known, in this autonomous republic since mid June a state of emergency has been in effect.

The intensified criminogenic situation in the region has actually left its imprint on the life and combat training of the aviators. At present they must hold the controls of their missile-carrying aircraft but also the stock of an automatic weapon. But the main concern for the pilots and aviation specialists still is for the flights. And this, it must be said, has not been hindered even by the state of emergency. Incidentally, as for the relations of the aviators with the local population and the town authorities, as before they are warm and cordial. The waters are being muddied by the criminal elements.

On that day the crews were training in mid-air refuelling. We happened to participate in one of the sorties. We shall not describe in detail the work of the detachment commander Major Aleksandr Moroz and his crew in carrying out this complicated and far from safe operation which is mid-air refuelling. We would merely point out that when the two enormous aircraft, the Il-78 tanker and the Tu-95 missile aircraft had "docked" and, flying just 15-20 meters apart, began the refuelling, it took our breath away.

Later, back on the ground, from a conversation with the regiment's commander, Colonel Viktor Gubanov, we learned that on each combat-ready aircraft here there was a crew trained to carry out mid-air refuelling during the day and at night. The intensity of flight work in the regiment has not declined in comparison with previous years.

The town airfield has now become a sort of transit base for the units being withdrawn from the Transcaucasus. It has happened that during a 24-hour period the aviators had to receive and service 30 IL-76 transports and 20-25 helicopters. The fuel spent on their fuelling would suffice for a month of the regiment's combat work. But the pilots and aviation specialists do not complain of the difficulties. They realize that at present they determine when peace will come to this much-suffering land.

[Caption of unreproduced photo by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA photographer Sergey Fedorov.] In the photos: mid-air refuelling under way; the crew of military pilot 1st class, Major Aleksandr Moroz, returns from flight.

Medical Academy Chief on Causes of Air Accidents

92UM1355A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Aug 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with State Scientific Research Test Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine Chief, Academician, Major-General of the Medical Service Vladimir Aleksandrovich Ponomarenko by Colonel Aleksandr Andryushkov: "Accident in the Sky: Wasn't It Caused by the Situation on the Ground?"]

[Text] Our correspondent discussed the causes of flying accidents with State Scientific Research Test Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine Chief, Academician, Major-General of the Medical Service V. Ponomarenko.

[Andryushkov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, it has been reported in the press that two MIG-27 fighter-bombers suddenly fell while carrying out a spring training task. A bit more than a month passed before we heard about the collision of the refueling aircraft in the air. At the end of July, pilots died in TU-22U and SU-27 aircraft. What has caused the increase in the accident rate: the poor state of the aircraft or the pilots' inability to competently operate in the sky?

[Ponomarenko] You'd be better off talking to an engineer about the technical state of the aircraft fleet. I also think he would have something to say. I am a doctor and I study first of all man.

You understand that the social and economic cataclysms that are shaking society are being reflected, simply must be reflected, in the internal world and in the general emotional, physical and mental state of people. Besides, aviators have begun to fly less. I think that all of that combined became the cause of the loss of the MIG-27 crew: one crew had flown 12 hours in three months and the other had flown eight hours... At a time when the reliability of a professional military aviator is attained with independent flying time of 100-200 hours and with total flying time of 160-180 hours. But in 1992, the average flying time threatens to be reduced to 40.

[Andryushkov] Does it turn out that right now we can anticipate trouble from nearly every flight?

[Ponomarenko] Of course, that isn't so. We simply have to painstakingly prepare flights even more than before and be concerned about the high lack of training of pilots and crew teamwork and coordination. Unfortunately, we are observing the opposite in life.

[Andryushkov] I know for myself that disruptions in the rhythm of flights lead not only to the loss of skills but also psychologically wound...

[Ponomarenko] Undoubtedly. It seems to a pilot that he is losing his profession and his goal in life in the big picture. There is such a concept in aviation medicine as the "disease of not flying". In 1991, 1,500 pilots were disqualified due to nervous system diseases, the number of whom increased by 140 percent as compared to 1990. More than one third of all pilots under 30 years of age have deviations in their state of

health and half of flying personnel are incapable of being restored to the capacity for work after the 8-12 hours allotted for relaxation. Up to 60 percent of aviators are losing the desire to serve in some branches of aviation. The psychological factor is being clearly seen behind all of this.

[Andryushkov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, that is a great misfortune when a serviceman, officer, who has consciously chosen one of the most complicated and dangerous combat specialties, has been subjected to apathy and moral depression!

[Ponomarenko] The main thing—the awareness of one's role and value as an individual in society—is being lost. Try to imagine a pilot's feelings in the sky (he is there by himself!) when he has managed to fly several hours... in a quarter.

Today military pilots fly into the sky more rarely not at all because they don't want to. Right now all of us are prisoners of the shortage of resources. And this captivity threatens an increase in the accident rate.

[Andryushkov] I think that not only socio-psychological and economic factors have made their contribution to the accident rate...

[Ponomarenko] I agree. The introduction of the achievements of science into the aviators' professional activities has slowed down. And, by the way, not in aviation alone. With all of the complexity of the situation, we need to look for and find a solution.

Abroad, the ratio of the introduction of scientific developments in the sphere of the human factor and in the interests of flight safety exceeds 70-80 percent and it totals no more than 15-25 percent in our country. They have shifted our military science to self-financing. That is progressive from the positions of a market economy. But the customer has very limited finances. Today the physical and mental state of many military scientists is comparable to the physical and mental state of the sporadically flying pilots. They themselves need support, albeit moral.

[Andryushkov] We need to admit that our conversation is occurring in a somber background. But there must be a solution to the crisis. How do you see it?

[Ponomarenko] First of all, the government needs to accelerate the resolution of military issues at the state level. The budget for the maintenance of military aviation and its science, like, by the way, for the other services of the Armed Forces, must be precisely defined by law. Not departmental directives but perhaps a law must also define the scientifically-substantiated minimum flying time that guarantees the safe work of a man in the sky.

As for our military interdepartmental solutions for preventing flying accidents, from the psychological point of view we need to support in every possible way the desire to fly among people, and especially among young people. We need to assign a full load of intellectual, professional work to the temporarily non-flying pilots and involve them in the process of acquiring the qualities which will permit them to maintain their flying proficiency and longevity even under these difficult conditions. They must not feel alienated from their favorite profession.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Technical Profile of Cruiser 'Slava'

92UM1368A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Aug 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Pilipchuk: "A Cruiser to 'Destroy Aircraft Carriers'"]

[Text] "Aircraft carrier destroyer"—the Slava cruiser received that definition from the mouths of foreign experts. Of course, it was no accident: the mission of Slava Class missile cruisers (RKR)—is to impart the ability to resist the enemy to Naval forces in remote areas of the World Ocean and to destroy surface ships, including aircraft carriers.

The idea for developing this ship was born in the initial post-Khrushchev era when they began developing the country's ocean shield. The previously disgraced word "cruiser" was already once again in vogue among ship builders.

V. Mutikhin became Slava's chief designer. The ship's conceptual design was ready in 1973 and the detail design was ready in 1974. Industry turned over the head ship to the Black Sea Fleet in 1982, the second hull—the Marshal Ustinov (Northern Fleet)—in 1986, and the Chervona Ukraina (Pacific Ocean Fleet)—in 1989.

According to foreign experts, the Slava Class cruisers are one of the best among ships of that class and with that power plant. During the RKR Marshal Ustinov's visit to the United States, in which the author of these lines participated, the ship and crew received high marks. Former President Kennedy's family members visited the ship and were ecstatic about personnel living conditions. The Slava itself is also famous because it was selected as the site of the meeting between the former president of the USSR and the American president at Malta in 1989.

Today Slava is at Nikolayev for repairs. The repairs are 40-percent complete and have ceased as a result of the termination of financing. Incidentally, the Admiral Lobov, the fourth and last cruiser, is here and is 70-percent complete. It is hard to say how its fate will be resolved.

Slava Class cruisers are one of the navy's most modern ships. They impress you not only by their size and the might of their weaponry but also by the beauty of the ship architecture.

Slava Class Missile Cruiser Technical Specifications

1. Displacement

- standard—more than 9,000 tonnes
- full—more than 11,000 tonnes

2. Dimensions (in meters)

- greatest length—more than 180
- greatest width—more than 20
- mean draft under full displacement—6.27

3. Full speed—approximately 32 knots (approximately 58 kph [kilometers per hour])

Operating-economical speed (OEKh)—approximately 18 knots (approximately 33 kph)

4. OEKh sailing range—approximately 6,000 miles (approximately 11,000 km)

5. Endurance based on provisions—up to 30 days

6. Crew—approximately 500 men, including more than 60 officers.

7. Main power plant, gas-turbine, twin screw, output—more than 100,000 horse power

8. Weaponry

a) strike:

- cruise missiles in single launchers

b) antiaircraft:

- universal missile system;

- missile system;

c) artillery

- twin 130-mm artillery system

- six 30-mm six-barrel automatic guns

d) antisubmarine and anti-torpedo:

- two 53 mm torpedo systems;

- two 12-barrel rocket-propelled depth charge launchers;

e) aircraft

- KA-25 helicopter

f) sonar:

- a sonar system;

g) radio-technical:

- an airborne and surface target detection system;

- a remote surface situation coverage system;

- an information processing system;

- a tactical force element command and control system; and,

- electronic countermeasures systems.

Discussion of Problem of Nuclear Submarine Disposal

92UM1352A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Nagayev under the rubric "The Army and Navy"; "Goldfish With a Nuclear Heart"]

[Text] The little boy Dima is perched on the edge of the pier, fishing for small cod and other minor fish. The fishing is not exactly exciting, but not exactly dull either. An hour or so later close to a dozen inhabitants of the permanently cold sea are flipping their tails in the polyethylene container. The

kid will not catch the goldfish frozen in place on the nearby bottom, though. But then Dima is not interested in it, because the "goldfish" is what local sailors have nicknamed a nuclear-powered submarine. Formerly awesome and powerful, it has now served out its prescribed term and been disarmed. It is now a fantastic floating heap of metal awaiting salvaging along with five other such nuclear-powered monsters at the Belomorsk Naval Base.

First the spent nuclear fuel has to be removed from the reactors. And this is done as it becomes possible, because there is somewhere to send it. Like it or not, they did manage to create some things in the former, now reviled, Soviet Union. In this case they built an enterprise in Chelyabinsk (the only one in the world) for processing spent nuclear fuel. The spent fuel is sent from the Northern Fleet to Chelyabinsk, where it goes through some sort of processes and is rendered suitable to be used again. The operation is extremely expensive—to the navy, which has to pay the enterprise tens of millions of rubles.

With respect to the nuclear reactors themselves, which are taken out of operation and unloaded, this is a more complicated matter. At one time, when the leadership of the USSR had assigned the military-industrial complex the mission of catching up with the nuclear adversary in numbers of nuclear-powered submarines, nuclear charges and so forth, submarines were being built at an extremely rapid pace. And almost no one gave any thought to the consequences, to what would be done with the reactors when they had ended their service life.

The fuel poses the greatest potential danger to the environment, of course. The emptied reactors—more precisely, the various parts and mechanisms inside the reactors—have so-called induced radioactivity. In addition to a reactor's protective shell, made of a super-high-strength alloy, the heart of a nuclear-powered submarine is insulated from the surrounding air by a double metal plating on the compartment, which forms a solid hull three fingers thick, plus an outer hull, which, by the way, are extremely reliable. According to military specialists, these shells are safe from corrosion for more than a hundred years. Nonetheless, radiation is a phenomenon extremely adverse to all forms of life, and the storage of the compartments (with the reactors inside) must be completely safe.

Suitable storage facilities have now been found, but they must be brought up to standards. Additional construction is also required. Just the outlays for capital construction at various installations for the safe handling of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel should amount to 600 million rubles (at 1990 prices). The state program for salvaging nuclear-powered submarines signed by Pavlov was not begun in 1991. This was prevented first by the putsch, then by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. What now? Today (for the present at any rate) the sailors are being asked to seek internal reserves, so to speak. This means that the navy faces a simple and at the same time, complex, choice: either to maintain the existing ships in a normal state of battleworthiness or spend a considerable amount

of money to salvage the written-off nuclear-powered submarines at the expense of repair work on the operating fleet.

The developing situation is at the very least absurd. The navy has only one purpose, to guard the homeland. And with exactly those means which Russia can provide for it. Everything else should be the concern of the state.

The construction of on-shore technical bases and the outfitting of storage facilities for the reactor compartments and other items from the salvaged nuclear-powered submarines with monitoring and other equipment will cost the meager Russian coffers a pretty penny, of course. In the first place, however, it costs to have a powerful, modern navy. In the second place, the salvaging of nuclear submarines is not such an unprofitable undertaking. A nuclear submarine minus its reactor compartment is nothing other than thousands of tonnes of metal of magnificent quality. The hulls of submarines are made of steel. There are submarines (the Goldfish, for example—it was given this name because of its great cost) made entirely of a titanium alloy.

There are around 80 nuclear submarines which have served out their service term and been written off in Russia right now. They stand at the wharfs, interfering (once again) with the operating ships. The gratifying thing is that the reactors have been reliably taken out of action. The possibility of spontaneous start-up has been eliminated.

The government of Russia (the nation tangibly affected by the Chernobyl accident) should probably demonstrate greater ingenuity in this matter. It took the leadership of the former USSR several years to recognize the importance of this problem (the first written-off nuclear submarines were parked at the piers in the mid-80s. How much time will this process take for the current leadership?

'Mutiny' Aboard Black Sea Fleet Destroyer Detailed

92UM1321A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 25 Jul 92 p 4

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Special Correspondent V. Polyakov, Sevastopol, 24 July, under the rubric: "Chronicle of the Black Sea Escape": "There Is no Agreement on Board"]

[Text] Right now the Black Sea Fleet's SKR-112 coastal escort vessel is standing near Potapovskiy Breakwater in Odessa. That is not its basing area. It is deployed at Donuzlav near Sevastopol. It found itself many miles from home on Tuesday toward evening. It sailed there without the authorization of the fleet command authorities. Ship Captain Captain-Lieutenant Nastenko who is on board and former Fleet Crimea Base 17th Water Area Defense Brigade Chief of Staff Captain 2nd Rank Zhibarev are giving interviews to television, radio, and to the newspapers, and not only to the Ukrainian media. Reports on the "mutinous" escort vessel have even reached remote areas of the former USSR.

Meanwhile, a SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent had the opportunity to learn these details at the very headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet.

The plan and scenario of the pirate transfer were compiled beforehand. They began to execute them early in the morning of the designated day. Under the pretext of training in connection with its participation in the naval review on the occasion of Black Sea Fleet Day, Nastenko and Zhibarev sailed the vessel from its basing area out into the open sea. The former brigade chief of staff got on board illegally. At first, the personnel did not know why the vessel had put to sea or its destination. Everything was decided in front of the subordinates. They twisted the arm of the senior on board, Battalion Chief of Staff Captain 3rd Rank Semenov. Thus, he was isolated.

When they passed by the boom defense, Zhibarev began to command the ship, although he had been removed from his position the day before for losing four pistols at another post. Instead of the glorious naval flag, they stealthily hoisted the Ukrainian State Flag. Let's recall: seamen in the entire world await the order of the country's President alone to do this.

The number 12 is in the escort vessel's number. A surprising coincidence but servicemen of 12 nationalities are serving on it right now. Did all of them take the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine six months ago? Of the 61 members of the crew, half stated a preference for it, 15 sailors have been loyal to the previous oath, eight men to the CIS oath, and four have not made any decision at all.

There's one more important detail. Despite the second oath, none of the vessel's commanders was relieved of his duties after it. They swore that they would not leave the subordination of the Black Sea Fleet command authorities. Commander I.V. Kasatonov visited the escort vessel several times and talked with the people. It turned out that they understand the entire degree of their responsibility. Alas, there was enough will and courage for a short time, already not talking about the holy of holies—the honor of an officer.

As soon as the signal on the ChP [extraordinary situation] on the escort vessel arrived at fleet headquarters, the combat alarm was sounded immediately. But they did not manage to close the channel because SKR-112 left rapidly and by a devious route. The missile ship "Razitelnay", a small antisubmarine warfare vessel 93, a small amphibious assault vessel, and a hovercraft immediately pursued it. The sea space was activated from Mys Khersones to the Romanian border. The deserters did not transmit over the radio for several hours and they did not respond to signals, although they were yelling for them throughout the entire sea at the time, as the fleet commander stated it.

The violator stopped when one of the ships that was pursuing it fired warning shots across its bow. Zhibarev stopped drinking tea on the bridge and made radio contact with the fleet command authorities, having responded: "I'm going to the port of Odessa to issue a political statement." And he explained that he had orders from "above".

They reported the situation to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense from fleet headquarters. Here they are convinced: they received the alarming information in Kiev but they did not react to it. All participants of this action knew: opening fire to destroy the violator was prohibited and therefore he confidently continued to sail while escorted by 18th Border Vessel Brigade border vessel No 626. Having arrived in Odessa, SKR-112 once again did not carry out the orders of the fleet command authorities to stop at the roadstead. It proceeded to Potapovskiy Breakwater under the guardianship of two border vessels. Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Kozhin soon turned up on board the vessel. Not ashamed, he hurried with an interview: he said, here it is—our first combat vessel. The Odessa Military District Commander, the Ukrainian President's Representative for Odessa Oblast, and procuracy and Ukrainian Security Service workers suddenly appeared. They told the representatives of Black Sea Fleet headquarters: they themselves will resolve the issues at the port of Odessa. And on the morning of the next day, they promised the fleet commanders who had arrived that physical force would be used against them if they did not leave the vessel.

Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Kozhin did not provide a legal assessment to what had occurred. Moreover, he thinks that the commanders of SKR-112 could not have acted differently.

The Black Sea Fleet Military Council and 22 ship commanders at the Streletskiy Base demanded that SKR-112 be returned to its basing facility and that everything that occurred be investigated in accordance with the law.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Grachev May House Withdrawn Forces at Training Centers

*PM1808115392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Aug 92 p 1*

[Report by Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Center: "Minister's Trip"]

[Text] Yesterday Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister, visited training centers of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Humanities Academy. The purpose of the trip was to study the possibility of using them to accommodate subunits and units withdrawn from regions outside Russia.

Uncertain Economic Future of R-R Brigade in Belarus

*92UM13114 Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 (Signed to press 3 Mar 92)
pp 40-42*

[Interview with Col A. Stepuk, brigade commander, and Lt Col A. Karachin, chief, Unit Economic Planning Section,

by unofficial TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL correspondent Lt Col V. Keys: "Trapped by Barter: The Railroad Troop Situation"; place and date not given; first paragraph is TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] The market environment, a sign of the times, is becoming an integral part of our lives. This also holds true for railroad troops. This naturally has been the cause of many difficulties and poor coordination. An explanation of how a railroad brigade stationed in Belarus is entering the market is given our unofficial correspondent by Colonel A. Stepuk, brigade commander, and Lieutenant Colonel A. Karachin, chief of the unit Economic Planning Section.

[Keys] Comrade Colonel, the conditions under which the brigade has been operating have undergone radical changes. To what extent has the situation affected the production activity of the personnel?

[Stepuk] The situation has undergone a drastic change. We are now laboring on the soil of the sovereign Republic of Belarus. A number of our partners, primarily general contractors, have declared their independence. However, they at the same time have been badly hurt by the loss of the economic ties that previously united the areas of the former Union. This has brought about chronic interruptions in deliveries of construction materials and of other items required to construct and repair the railroads. Now there is a reign of shortages at the work sites, with the result that relations between requesting officers and contractors can hardly be called civilized.

To be able to operate normally, we now must maintain a considerable reserve of common materials, so that we can offer them in exchange for other items. The name that has come into use for this particular situation is the fashionable word "barter." However, the word itself does not say much about the actual position in which we find ourselves. The fact is that certain firms are misusing the barter arrangement by utilizing it as a way to profit at the expense of the railroad troops. For example, they provide us with a particular material in extremely short supply, receiving in exchange amounts of rails, ties, and cement, the cost of which is much greater than that of their material, after which they sell what they receive on the side at prices three or four times higher.

We in the brigade are well aware that we are being "taken," so we approach barter deals very carefully. In this connection, the unit still possesses adequate amounts of basic materials for railroad construction. But who knows how long our reserves will last? And will it become necessary for us to resort to barter completely? To prevent our falling into a trap, we would like to be provided with the necessary documents that would cover this kind of deal in detail. However, the brigade as yet has no such normative documents.

[Keys] It seems to me that the brigade is feeling the effect of political as well as economic changes that have so suddenly overtaken Belarus. Suffice it to say that you are now working on the soil of a particular sovereign state, while troop headquarters are located in another state.

[Stepuk] The main question here is: What will happen to the Union Armed Forces, including the railroad troops, stationed in Belarus? It is true that the republic Supreme Council has stated that it has nothing against our presence here. We recently complied with a request made by the local parliament, by presenting a detailed report of the brigade's accomplishments made during its deployment on Belarusian soil. I must tell you that the cold figures impressed the people's deputies. Few of them were aware that military railroad troops have built for the republic dozens of vitally important facilities, the cost of which runs in the millions of rubles.

[Keys] That should mean that you have nothing to worry about, being that the republic needs you.

[Stepuk] I do not particularly share your optimism. We still do not know who will finance the brigade. For the time being, we are being supported by the Main Directorate of Railroad Troops. But who knows: The center may find some reason or other to discontinue financing the unit. Then it will become necessary for the republic to provide us with everything we require. Will it be capable of doing that?

[Keys] It is difficult to say. I possess information indicating that the republic—to maintain the Byelorussian Military District alone—allotted from its budget as much as 7 billion rubles! Incoming into the district in addition to that were multimillion amounts from the center. If these amounts are eliminated, Belarus may indeed ask the question: Does it need the number of troops—including railroad troops—presently stationed here?

[Stepuk] You are not alone in thinking that way. That is why the idea of our brigade's dual subordination came into being: to the republic on the one hand, and to the center on the other. Naturally, financing would also be dual.

[Keys] And what about you, Anatoliy Yakovlevich? What is your personal opinion?

[Stepuk] Politicians see things differently, of course, but I as a specialist feel that railroad troops should be unified, with financing coming from a unified center. Splitting everything up, in my view, will not be to our advantage. That holds true for our troops and the Armed Forces as well.

[Keys] I believe that you will agree with me when I say that it will be impossible to escape the market economy, regardless of which way the brigade's subordination will be decided. The market is setting its conditions even now. What does the unit intend to do, to find a steady position in the market?

[Stepuk] I think that you will receive the best answer to that question from Aleksey Pavlovich Karachin. I would like to continue discussing the problems which must be resolved if we are to enter the market. We are working closely with the republic Cabinet of Ministers so that we can employ the compromise route to prevent misunderstandings which have come about in our relations. For example, there is a paradox here. The Ministry of Transportation Construction of Belarus—our partner of many

years' standing—has suddenly become the brigade's competitor. The Ministry of Transportation Construction, feeling that its existence is threatened, has acted the same as a dedicated monopolist. Since that department still enjoys priority status in the republic, it decided to "skim off the cream." For example, it takes on only those projects which are light on labor requirements but which provide large profits. The least profitable jobs are left for us to do. Can the brigade be expected to survive under such conditions? We are attempting to eliminate that kind of unbalance, by requiring that the department's monopoly be cancelled. If indeed this is a matter of competition, then let it be on an equal footing. This will make it possible to not only earn a good income, but also obtain funds for our own construction needs, particularly erection of housing.

[Keys] Now let me ask you a question, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel. The department headed by you has found itself to be at the very crossroads of the market routes. What do you think about the situation?

[Karachin] At first glance, things appear to be in good shape. The brigade steadily fulfills its plan and presents completed facilities on time. It would appear that matters are going quite well, considering the times. However, there are more than enough problems associated with the onslaught of the market economy.

[Keys] What kind of problems?

[Karachin] The market economy is not a matter of the future; it is a present reality. Much can be said about the shortcomings of the market, but that would not help the situation. Whether we wish it or not, the market is something in which we must work and live, meaning that we must rapidly become accustomed to it. However, for the brigade to become a successful part of a market environment, it must in my opinion be granted at least two advantages which—alas!—it does not presently possess. First and foremost, the brigade must be permitted to participate in commercial structures and ties as an equal partner. We want not only to perform episodic barter exchanges, but in addition to sell surplus materials when possible, so that we can use the proceeds to purchase whatever items we require. Now the second advantage. We must be granted the possibility of using some of the proceeds to increase the pay for personnel.

[Keys] What about such qualities as, say, initiative—those required in a market environment? Can it be that they will show up in specialists all of their own accord?

[Karachin] Of course not. Lacking management skills and commercial traits, today's railroad troop officer simply cannot be successful. The trouble is, not many officers possess them.

[Keys] Well then, just how are they to be acquired? Does it not appear to you that this can cause a kind of discordance: On the one hand, there is the rigid military setup, one closely governed by regulations and other guidance documents, and, on the other hand, there would be pure

commerce, a kind of "free flight," one which may lead an officer astray—who knows how far—from the finely delineated military way?

[Karachin] That is life, and not much can be done about it. We do not intend to act like an ostrich hiding its head in the sand. Yes, some kind of procedures must be produced in guidance documents. Regarding the "free flight" as you put it, I feel that commerce, if honorably conducted, is extremely respectable. And if someone wishes to engage in machinations, then that will be on his conscience.

Concerning training, you do have a valid point. It is high time to organize specialized management courses for officers. The Leningrad School of Railroad Troops and Military Transport Communications must do some thinking about changing its program, so that it can start as early as this year to provide the troops with military engineers possessing commercial training.

[Keys] Aleksey Pavlovich, what else do you believe stands in the way of railroad troops as far as their operating effectively in a market environment is concerned?

[Karachin] For our main worker—the sergeant, the enlisted man—there plainly is no monetary incentive at present. You may come back at me and say that the men do receive a bonus for overfulfilling a plan task or for timely delivery of a facility. Yes, that is true. Nonetheless, you know as well as I that the amount of this reward often does not exceed 10 rubles a month. Do you not agree that this is not the kind of money that will prompt someone to "go all out" on the job?

I believe that the amounts of bonus for conscripts should be 10 or 12 times larger. I am convinced that this would show up in the results. We would also obtain another advantage, one just as important. The soldiers, knowing that larger bonuses are in the offing, will do their best to accomplish each job with the least amount of personnel. That is something onto which we can fall back in the light of reduction in personnel, of whom there is a chronic shortage in railroad troops.

[Keys] That is well and good. But how to obtain monies for bonuses, and on what basis will the amounts be determined?

[Karachin] We can earn the money. The market economy will make that possible. And a determination of who is to receive how much is quite simple. It would be necessary to calculate what each man actually produces, and use this to pay him for the amount of labor he contributed to achieve above-plan results.

The matter is more complicated in the case of men in extended service, who have finally been permitted to fill key specialist slots previously assigned to conscripts. I tell you that this would be a good start. This would mean that the controls of excavators and bulldozers would be taken over by real professionals. However, even they must be offered a monetary incentive. Otherwise, they will not remain long in the military; they will go wherever the pay is higher.

Unfortunately, we still can offer nothing other than the usual pay due men on extended service and the small bonuses. This being the case, we cannot expect a large inflow of professionals into the unit. It is a shame, to tell the truth. The point is that accomplished specialists constitute in my opinion a condition basic to the brigade's successful survival in a market environment.

[Keys] Are not freedom of action, independence, and absence of a dictate from higher levels just as important?

[Karachin] You are right. A market economy above all else means independence, the opportunity for a person to select those ways and means that will bring him success in pursuing a goal. In spite of the numerous declarations relative to granting lower-level organizations complete independence, are hands are still tied, so to speak. Judge for yourself. Rigid plans are still handed down from above. It is not we but someone else who establishes the size of a job or the delivery date of a facility. Incidentally, the last item often renders a negative influence on all aspects of the unit's activities, especially if it is not projected on a realistic basis.

Lets us say that the battalion is building some kind of facility. After taking everything into account, the subunit sets a realistic completion time, say eight months. Then an order arrives from above: all work to be completed in six months. This sets everyone off to rushing to complete the job, without regard for acceptability in a market economy.

[Keys] Aleksey Pavlovich, do you think that the difficulties and poor coordination of which you speak can be overcome, or will it be necessary to learn to live with them in a market environment?

[Karachin] Of course they can be overcome. However, for this to become possible, the Main Directorate of Railroad Troops and other higher-level departments must listen to what is being said at the job sites, take a closer look at our problems, and, finally, make decisions that are acceptable to everyone. Otherwise we will be late every time, and our transition to a market economy will stretch out over a period of many years.

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Current Priorities of Military Procuracy

92UM1318A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Valentin Nikolayevich Panichev, chief of the Russian Federation Main Directorate of the General Procuracy for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces: "The Military Procuracy: We Need To Wash the Barracks' Linen in Public"]

[Text] For the first time, a purely civilian person—Valentin Nikolayevich Panichev—has been appointed leader of all Russian military procurators and investigators. He has worked as deputy rayon procurator and as Rostov Oblast procurator. Today, he is chief of the Russian Federation Main Directorate of the General Procuracy for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces.

Until the recent past, the military procurator did not know what fate had prepared for it: would it remain or would they eliminate it? Three thousand officers—military procurators and investigators were in the dark.

Right now it is customary to turn to the experience of the developed countries and to reform and create structures according to the type "over there". So, "there" in the majority of Western democratic states, the military procuracy... exists. Moreover, in contrast to ours, it is subordinate to the military command authorities.

Since February 1992, all military procurators on Russian territory, in the groups of forces, and in a number of countries that have entered the Commonwealth of Independent States, have been placed under its jurisdiction. The Main Military Procuracy has been transformed into the Russian Federation Main Directorate of the General Procuracy for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces. After the Tashkent Meeting of the Heads of the Commonwealth States, the military procuracy, just like the military courts, has been preserved in all CIS states.

During the course of several decades, army cases, especially criminal cases, were wrapped in total secrecy. The activities of the military procuracy were not subjected to special publicity. Practically until the end of the 1980's, no one knew, for example, that the procurator had to obtain the commander's concurrence to institute criminal proceedings against a serviceman. Military organs of inquiry—that is once again unit commanders, that is, people who do not have any legal training whatsoever, and their investigators were line officers. It is they who are the first to arrive at the scene of the crime where they need to work skillfully and while using technical devices. What kind of quality and efficiency of investigation can this be a question of? A total of from 2,000-3,000 procurators had to deal with an army into which at times both previously convicted people, the sick, and drug addicts were being conscripted. This is a rather insignificant number. It's no wonder that the investigations workload kept procuracy workers from fulfilling supervisory functions.

Today Russia is creating its own army. And its leadership has immediately been faced by the acute problems of ensuring legality in the Armed Forces. A multitude of legislative acts are not in force, others are only partially operating, and some spheres of relations are in general still not being regulated by law.

Meanwhile, servicemen of the Russian troops who are in Moldova, the Transcaucasus, and other locations are being subjected to attacks, they are being killed, and equipment is being stolen, including arms. The law enforcement organs of these states, citing the lack of appropriate treaties and agreements, are not investigating cases of attacks against Russian military units and servicemen and they are not bringing the accused to justice. In 1991-1992, more than 10 soldiers and officers were killed and many were wounded as a result of such attacks (and there were over 70 of them) on the territory of the three Transcaucasus states alone. So far the fates of servicemen who were seized at various locations as hostages is not known...

But even aside from this, the level of crime in the army is increasing. Crime has significantly spread, especially abuse and bribery among officers.

Just like in the Russian Army, a new page is also beginning in the history of the military procuracy. The decision on the subordination of the system of military procuracy organs to the Russian General Procurator has eliminated in the future any possibility of any influence whatsoever of the military command authorities on military procurators. Next is the reorganization of all military procuracy structures.

Today what can the military procurator do to consolidate legality and law and order in the troops? We have been compelled to act selectively under conditions of a catastrophic shortage of personnel and the incredible investigations workload. Protection of the rights of a specific individual person—the serviceman and his family members—has become the first priority.

Another direction of activity is popular goodwill. Arms, ammunition, and other military equipment are being blatantly stolen. Last year, the amount of the material damage caused by the accused based on the demand of the military procurators increased by a factor of 1.5 and exceeded 40 million rubles and the number of servicemen who had legal proceedings initiated against them approached 50,000.

We also need more effective procuratorial supervision in the sphere of the ecology. By way of illustration, a large number of written-off submarines has accumulated in the Northern Fleet alone, at Severodvinsk. Any disruption in their servicing could result in a serious ecological catastrophe. But how many military garrisons are there where the territory is saturated with fuel and oils! A heightened radioactive background and electromagnetic radiation...

Unfortunately, the procuracy itself for well-known reasons is incapable of encompassing all military units with its surveillance: Only 10-15 percent of them are inspected in a year. And violations of the law are being discovered practically everywhere.

Right now we are taking urgent steps to increase the prestige of investigatory work and to man procuracies. We have significantly increased salaries and the authorized category of garrison investigator has been increased to "lieutenant colonel of justice". But even that is insufficient. The problem of fighting crime that threatens to sweep over the troops will not be solved without the creation of authorized inquiry and operational-investigatory services in the army.

Both close, businesslike cooperation with state and public organizations and associations which place before themselves precisely the task of protecting the rights of servicemen will help to increase procuratorial supervision in the army and the timely protection of the rights and freedoms of servicemen. Local military procurators have already received appropriate instructions on that score. It is quite correct that, for example, many organizations of the movement of soldiers' mothers have already begun to

occupy a constructive position in mutual relations with the organs of the military procuracy and to shift from confrontation to cooperation. I would like for the committees of soldiers' mothers to finally attempt to look at the organs of the military procuracy not as opponents but as allies.

The number of thefts of especially large sums has increased by a factor of three and the number of criminal encroachments of arms and ammunition has increased by a factor of 2.5. Forty percent more general criminal violations of the law have been registered of which nearly 90 percent are armed robberies and robberies. And all of that is in our army. For the first six months of 1992...

An expanded session with the participation of local agents has been created in the Russian Federation Main Directorate of the General Procuracy for Supervision of the Execution of Laws in the Armed Forces in order to discuss the cheerless criminal situation and of course to note ways to effectively fight crime.

Military Procuracy Leader, State Advisor of Justice 3rd Class V. Panichev noted that right now we need to use the entire force of the law to prevent violations of human rights based on ethnic origin or political convictions and also any other discrimination against servicemen and their family members. Military procurators must devote particularly rapt attention to the supervision of the execution of laws in cases of the receipt of trauma and serious injuries, and the deaths of soldiers and officers. To do this, first of all we need to increase control over inquiry and preliminary investigation organs during the investigation of tragic cases.

Moscow MD Chief of Staff on Role of Computers in Military

*92UM1354A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Aug 92 First edition p 2*

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Leonid Sergeyevich Zolotov, chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, by Feliks Semyanovskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The Army Under the New Conditions": "Electronic Computers in Staff Work"]

[Text] Do you recall how, during the first years of *perestryoka*, a campaign was launched for large-scale computerization of all aspects of our life? At that time many newspapers, including ours, carried numerous articles demonstrating the need for the intensive adoption and use of automated control systems and computers in the functioning of the forces. The highly promising undertakings came up against economic problems, however, and the campaign itself declined perceptibly due to a lack of funds for the development and purchase of the expensive equipment.

Is anything at all being done in this area right now? Have there been any advances? Is it being felt directly in the forces? Our correspondent met with Lieutenant-General L. Zolotov, chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, for answers to these questions.

[Semyanovskiy] Leonid Sergeyevich, what is your opinion of the importance and the role of automated command and control systems (ASUV), including computers, in the performance of the missions involved in maintaining the combat readiness and in the command and control of the units and formations in the contemporary situation?

[Zolotov] The theoretical work "Fourth-Generation War," published in the USA, and the conduct of Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf area permit us to consider possible future wars as wars which will be executed predominantly with new weaponry.

It would consist primarily of highly accurate traditional weapons and weapons based on new principles of destruction: guided energy, laser and beam weapons, and so forth. Space-based weapons, unmanned aircraft, robotized military equipment and reconnaissance-and-strike systems should undergo further development. There will be remote-control systems with artificial intelligence. Incidentally, so-called special forces were used extensively in Operation Desert Storm. Small groups (detachments) armed with modern weapons and capable of inflicting perceptible damage from within were infiltrated onto enemy territory. These forces and weapons were designated for destroying facilities and targets in the defensive depth, which would result in a breakdown of control of the nation, the economy and the armed forces, and the entire nation would become a single battlefield. It is believed that concentrating a strike of enormous force on the other nation's entire territory will achieve not just the operational-tactical objective, but the strategic objective as well. All of this is altering the nature of military operations and making it necessary to find new methods of executing command and control missions in the complex combat situation.

This also makes demands of the time factor. The combination of such qualities of weaponry as speed, drastically increased mobility, precision, the possibility of massive employment and the enormous power involved "constrict" the process of controlling the troops, reconnaissance and weapons to an extraordinary degree in terms of time. A minimum amount of time, sometimes a matter of seconds, can elapse between the time of detection of a target and its destruction. Naturally, it is essential to forestall the enemy in deploying troops and executing strikes. When one compares the amount of time involved in operations employing ASUVs and those conducted without them, it is not difficult to see that man's psychological capacities fall far short of the capabilities of technical equipment.

Combat experience has shown that the effective operation of all levels of command and control in the modern situation is possible only with technical coordination of the new automated systems of command and control, reconnaissance and destruction. In addition, it is necessary to find ways of reducing to the maximum the time required for processing the information obtained and reporting it to headquarters in good time. This is practically impossible without the comprehensive employment of reconnaissance, communication and automation. The USA, for

example, has set out on a course of automating the command control processes, all the way from reconnaissance, the gathering and processing of data on the situation, target distribution and the assignment of missions to the assessment of their results. In the opinion of the American experts this is the most rapid and economical way, one which makes it possible to enhance the combat capabilities of the armed forces several times over and to increase the effectiveness of all types of weapons with the same number of personnel.

This route is also preferable for us, since it provides for preserving the existing combat capability despite the continuing reduction of the armed forces.

[Semyanovskiy] To what extent, in your opinion, is it possible to compensate for the reduction of the command and control system by introducing modern technical equipment, including electronic equipment, in all of the staff structures?

[Zolotov] The opinion that automating command and control significantly reduces the size of the system is erroneous.

In fact, the system itself is not reduced but is actually enlarged or, at best, remains at its former level. Why does this happen? After all, the time involved in receiving, transmitting and processing information, writing up the documents, communicating the orders and signals is reduced—significantly, at that—and one would expect this to entail a reduction also in the command and control system. But it takes such elements as an automated information exchange system, computer centers, complex software and other kinds of support to ensure the viability of the automation systems. This involves large outlays of financial and, most important, human resources.

[Semyanovskiy] To what extent are the district staff and its subunits provided with technical equipment today? Does this equipment meet contemporary requirements for troop command and control, compared with similar equipment in the command and control structures of armies of the USA and other states?

[Zolotov] The district staffs, command and control posts are being provided with automation equipment according to plan. There are disruptions in the delivery of special equipment, to be sure, due to the overall economic problems. The basic trend toward outfitting the forces with command and control systems is being maintained, however.

Unfortunately, the quality of the special equipment still does not measure up to that of its foreign counterparts. Progress is being made in this matter, however. The enormous scientific and technological capability of our military-industrial complex has already begun to be materialized, and we should achieve a system satisfying the great demands.

[Semyanovskiy] What needs to be done to enhance staff operations by employing electronic computers? Will the cost be great?

[Zolotov] The quality of staff work has always depended upon its organization and the professional preparation of the staff officers. As of today we have these qualities.

The officers master computers and programs in their officer training. And it does not take so very long for an officer to master and be able to use computers on his own, to perform complex operational-tactical calculations and process information. It is more difficult to train junior ASUV specialists, officers at the operational-tactical and tactical levels of command and control, to operate ASUs [automated control systems] within an integrated system of command and control, reconnaissance and weaponry. The training of officers in the combined-arms area is still inadequate. In my opinion, this has to be achieved on a comprehensive basis, at the level of the armed forces and the state, by working out and adopting a targeted program of specialist training, setting up this training at absolutely all military educational institutions and, of course, perfecting the knowledge and skills acquired. Without a solid approach to this extremely important matter, we shall remain at the level of the calculator and the slide rule.

It will unquestionably cost a lot, in the billions, to set up a unified, state automated system of command and control. Clearly, though, we shall not achieve a good automated command and control system without substantial investments. We shall regret it if we are unable to come up with adequate funds for developing, perfecting and introducing command and control systems and training ASUV specialists, for we shall acquire, simply put, just a gold-plated gadget.

Future Prospects of Officers' Reserve, Academies Viewed

92UM1376A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Aug 92 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Yegorov: "The Officer Reserve: Will Russia Have One With the Students' Current Attitude Toward Military Training?"]

[Text] I recall: in the USSR, the first studies at military departments began in 1944. The civilian-environment reserve lieutenant military training system totaled 244 universities and institutes and it grew over the years and in 1987 combined within itself 497 departments. Meanwhile, the quality of reserve officer training has not improved from year to year. After the memorable 1989 student forum and the "strikes" of students who demanded the "demilitarization" of higher education, the USSR Supreme Soviet was compelled to review the draft for improving civilian-environment training. Developed by the Ministry of Defense, it provided for the reduction of the number of departments to 250 over the course of 5-6 years, determined the priority of development of VUZ [higher educational institution] departments of the basic science, pedagogical, and engineering-technical profile. However, at that time, halfway decisions were made that were directed only at liberalizing the very process of training: voluntary attendance, releasing women from

training, and so forth. Reform did not occur and the "sore points" of civilian-environment training were driven deeper.

And now the question is already being raised about closing departments. They talked about this in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main VUZ Directorate. There are also concrete decisions. By way of illustration, Minister of Public Health Vorobyev's 16 July 1992 Order No 264 which terminates the activities of military departments at 12 Russian medical institutes. The arguments are not new: they say, military departments graduate specialists that are good for nothing.

Yes, according to the big picture, the quality of reserve officer training at the departments has actually declined. But has it really increased at military schools? Furthermore, the military skills of civilian VUZ graduates are not that low. The results of the comprehensive sociological research conducted by teachers of Ufimskiy Aviation Institute by Candidate of Sociological Sciences Lieutenant Colonel G. Kabakovich prove that, according to many indicators (general engineering, theoretical, and practical training in a specialty, etc.), graduates of military VUZs do not exceed by much their colleagues from institutes and universities. Moreover, we know that thanks to the more thorough general theoretical engineering training received at the institute, after a year to a year and a half of active military service, the "civilian" lieutenant, as a rule, catches up to a cadre lieutenant and later also frequently surpasses him.

Some specialists—opponents of the departments, think that reserve officers can be replenished from officers who are being released from cadres and also by those who have gone through special courses at military schools. Let's assume that. But is will the outflow of officers from the Armed Forces which totaled 80,000 in 1991 really be endless? Right now it is largely associated with the reduction of the army. Someday, it will be reduced. And what then? With whom will we fill out the reserve? With graduates of special courses?

As we all know, civilian-environment training is totally absent only in Germany but reserve officers are trained at special courses at military schools. However, according to the assessments of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] military themselves, as their statements to the press attest, this system is far from ideal and suffers from a whole series of deficiencies. One of them—is the excessively compressed periods of training which can in no way facilitate the formation of a full-fledged officer. Three four-week training assemblies are adequate, in the opinion of specialists, just for a quite superficial mastery of purely military disciplines. It is impossible to increase the duration of training assemblies because of the flow of trainees whose numbers are regulated by mobilization plans. It is also impossible to expand the network of schools due to a shortage of funds.

So, is it worthwhile to recklessly transfer foreign experience to our Armed Forces?

Of course, we can operate using the "trial and error method" as it has already frequently occurred—to open these same courses at the schools and become convinced of their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) over a 2-3 year period. But we can also act in a different way. To calculate beforehand, by way of illustration, how many reserve officers the Russian Army needs. In so doing, if we follow the calculations of Main Cadre Directorate Deputy Section Chief Colonel V. Bocharov, who dares take as initial numbers those that are recognized in the world—if necessary, a highly developed state places 10 percent of the population under arms, a less developed state—five percent, so for Russia, with a population of 160 million people, even five percent will signify an 8,000,000-man wartime army. From the calculation of one officer per 8-10 soldiers, which is also accepted in world practice, it turns out that the required number of officers in the event of war is 1,000,000 men. Let one third of them be cadre officers. Therefore, 750,000 are in the permanent reserve.

How do we train that mass at the previously mentioned courses? And how much will the construction of barracks, mess halls, and expansion of training facilities, feeding, clothing, and salaries of reserve cadets cost if the courses open at only half of the existing military schools in Russia? And there are a total of 115 of them. And will half of the VUZs be able to handle this task if up to 160,000 reservists are removed from the military rolls each year due to age? If you calculate, it turns out that just to compensate for the natural loss of the reserve, not half but all 115 military educational institutions will each have to train 347 people every three months. Are those courses? In my opinion, here we already need to talk about wartime schools. Because their "productivity" is a little less than 1,500 cadets per year.

For information: in the years of the USSR's participation in the Afghan War when the need for motorized rifle officers was especially great, one of the country's major schools—Novosibirsk—trained nearly 700 men per year.

It's understandable that expenditures for such special courses cannot compare in any way with the expenditures for training reserve officers by military departments. In a word, if we look at the West, wouldn't it be better to turn to the experience of the United States and England—countries where primary significance has always been devoted to civilian-environment reserve officer training? Their schools have historically been the hallmark (in Great Britain, by way of illustration, public education has participated in military force structure development since the 17th century, and in the United States, since the beginning of the 19th century); they use the principle of manning to which we are aspiring—contract, large-scale, and comprehensive. In England, they have even created training squadrons, so-called university squadrons (there are 16 of them), that encompass the students of 56 universities and specialized technical colleges to train Air Force reserve officers. In the United States, there are even more—600—educational institutions that "work" for the Air Force. Furthermore, 300 that graduate army reservists, 65 for naval reservists and 60 for marine reservists. A total of

1,025 foreign universities and colleges are active in the civilian-environment training system. In the United States, it is called ROTC.

More than half of its graduates voluntarily become cadre officers after their studies. And that certainly is an indicator of the prestige of the military profession. But obviously that is also an indicator of the high quality of civilian-environment training. It satisfies not only the students but, what is quite important, the requirements for becoming a cadre officer.

How do we utilize that experience? In the United States, they have the units of military schools and the more than 1,000 VUZs with the ROTC program and we have, as has already been said, over one hundred military schools and a little more than four times fewer military departments than in the United States. So, is it advisable to create in our country, by way of illustration, university squadrons when many lieutenants are going directly into the reserve from flying schools? But today the army does not have enough engineers because the lion's share of military VUZs of that profile have been left outside of Russia's borders. Why not attempt to eliminate that shortage with the help of institutes and universities?

In the Main VUZ Directorate when we began talking about this, they had their doubts: they said, none of the students will enter the army after the institute. However, the results of an anonymous survey that was recently conducted by Moscow State University [MGU] military department officers (there are five such departments at MGU) convince us of the groundlessness of that pessimism. Of the students surveyed who are undergoing military training, 54.6 percent considered it possible for themselves for some reason or other to put on an officer's uniform upon graduation from the university. I understand surveys at other Russian VUZs hardly provide those indicators because the high effectiveness of MGU officers' labor is the result of many years of effort directed at restructuring their departments and bringing military job specialties closer to the profile of the primary future work of VUZ graduates. But doesn't this really prove for the umpteenth time that we need to solve the problem and that we can solve the problem? Even without including material incentives. When the country has totally shifted to market relations, education will become expensive and only the Ministry of Defense (which, moreover, will pay tuition and books, and pay stipends and salaries during the period of flying camp training assemblies) can provide guaranteed job placement to VUZ graduates, I think that the percentage of those desiring to conclude a contact with the military department will be much higher.

Until recently, an entire system for the formation of the Armed Forces military trained reserve functioned in our country. The disintegration of the USSR and the drastic reduction of the army destroyed that system. There aren't enough conscripts—the "deliveries" of reserve personnel have been reduced. Hundreds of thousands of already trained reservists "have been excluded" from the general system as a result of the sovereignization of the former republics of the USSR. Finally, already since 1989, a

General Staff special directive practically halted the functioning of training assemblies for people with military obligations. Thus, nearly all reserve officer training channels have turned out to be blocked. Only civilian VUZ military departments, which, despite the storm clouds that have thickened over them, remain "alive" and continue to train up to 100,000 reserve officers each year. It is easy to close them. Because Colonel A. Silkin's 8-man department, that is being "punted" from one directorate to another, is all that remains of the once powerful civilian-environment training directorate that functioned in the Ministry of Defense under the leadership of the Ground Forces deputy commander. Yes, having closed the departments, we can receive some money for the construction of those special courses. Only, will that be of some benefit to the cause?

Russian Military Housing Chief Views on Housing Shortages, Cites Statistics

92UM1392A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Aug 92 p 2

[Interview with Major-General Dmitriy Danilovich Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ivan Ivanyuk: "Apartments for the Army: Old Debts and New Possibilities"]

[Text] Major-General D. Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of Russia's Ministry of Defense answers questions posed by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Ivanyuk] Dmitriy Danilovich, let us try to describe the housing problem in terms of numbers. Perhaps you would also explain why there are such divergent estimates of the number of personnel without apartments in the army and navy.

[Yarmak] A truly accurate figure can actually be given only for the beginning of the year, when all the statistical data are summed up. According to our calculations, there are presently 201,000 families of servicemen in Russia in need of housing, 121,900 of which do not have apartments. The figure was 104,600 as of 1 January 1992.

With respect to forecasts for January of 1993, they are not at this time encouraging. We are counting mainly on our own construction efforts. By the end of the year the military construction workers are supposed to have completed 41,000 apartments. They completed 12,000 during the first half of the year. It is planned to build 5,300 apartments on a shared basis, 2,200 of which will be built by foreign companies with funds allocated by Germany for settling units and formations withdrawn from the ZGV [Southern Group of Forces]. More than 40,000 apartments will be acquired as a result of vacated housing area and buildings of ZHSKs [housing construction cooperatives].

The growth rate for those without apartments will be even greater, though, mainly because troops will be returning to Russia from near and far. We calculate that there will be 130,000-140,000 servicemen without a roof over their head by the beginning of the year.

[Ivanyuk] Is this why there are such great hopes that, under the decree issued by the President of Russia, the housing debts to the Ministry of Defense will be repaid by local authorities?

[Yarmak] Naturally. The matter of liquidating the debt was brought up with great urgency at the meeting recently conducted by the President of Russia with heads of administrations and commanders of military districts and fleets. Only 1,343 of 20,700 apartments, of which there is such a shortage right now, have been turned over to us. Only 144 families have been moved out of closed and separate posts. The situation with respect to housing for servicemen released into the reserve is even worse. Only 2,000 apartments were allocated in Russia for 141,000 individuals during the first six months.

The situation is perhaps at its worst in Moscow and St Petersburg. The city on the Neva took a very simple route. They recalculated the new cost of construction a couple of times based on the "old" money, and it turned out that they had paid off their debt. The fact that by this method only a single apartment is received instead of an entire row does not concern the mayor's office. This kind of arithmetic was not approved at the meeting, of course.

One of our problems in Moscow is the fact that we cannot find a common denominator for determining Moscow's total debt under the decrees passed by the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR on 9 January 1980 and 24 October 1984. Two years ago the control figures were coordinated with Glavmoszhiluchet [Main Housing Registry for the City of Moscow]. In 1990-1991 attempts were made to count housing turned over to the Ministry of Defense which had been constructed on a shared basis toward liquidation of the debt. On the other hand, liquidation of the debts has practically come to a halt. Only 6,200 square meters of housing out of a total of 110,000 was allocated in 1990, for example, and nothing was allocated for 1991-1992. This means that for all practical purposes in Moscow we receive at our disposal only that which is built by military construction workers. Civilian construction organizations released only two buildings for occupancy this year.

The military are treated entirely differently in Moscow Oblast, a fact demonstrated above all by Aleksandr Tyazhlov, head of the administration. It has paid off a total of 52% of its housing debt.

[Ivanyuk] Dmitriy Danilovich, taking Russia as a whole, when do you think the military can realistically expect to receive the overdue apartments?

[Yarmak] The decree signed by the president on 21 July and arrangements made for its implementation are creating a solid foundation for expanding housing construction. I believe that the additional tens of millions of rubles allocated will make it realistically possible to resolve the problem of the housing debts within a year. In the days immediately ahead the president of Russia is to approve a plan for implementing proposals put forth at the July conference. The means of implementing the decisions adopted have also been specified. A joint directive from

the head of the president's monitoring agency and the minister of defense has been sent to the executive agencies and to the commanders of districts and fleets. It calls for the collation of figures for the indebtedness as of 15 August and establishes a monthly reporting procedure.

We have become involved in this work ourselves. The housing debts accumulated over a period of approximately 15 years, and no records were kept. We are sometimes appalled by our own data, which now seem more reliable not just to us.

[Ivanyuk] What proposals put forth at the conference do you consider worthy of special attention?

[Yarmak] First of all I would mention proposals which have also been presented in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. We need a state program for housing servicemen, and it should be compiled in the immediate future. Among other things, it must contain a provision specifying a certain percentage of apartments to be allocated to the military regardless of the source of financing for their construction. This rule has been in effect lately but has been enforced poorly and far from universally. There must also be a precisely defined program for removing from closed posts those who are no longer affiliated with the armed forces, and the deadlines and procedure must be specified for housing troops withdrawn from other countries. In short, we need a comprehensive approach to the housing problem, which can be described without exaggeration as the most acute problem in the social area today.

[Ivanyuk] Many officers and warrant officers are ready to resolve it themselves by building individuals homes, if they can obtain land and financial assistance from the Ministry of Defense and local authorities.

[Yarmak] It is no problem to find the land for this, but the construction will be very costly. A small, four-room house cost 300,000 rubles at 1991 prices. The cost has now risen

to several million. These prices are beyond the reach not just of individual builders but even of the Ministry of Defense.

It is far more realistic today for an officer to join a housing construction combine, although the prices will hurt even then. Considering the fact that in accordance with the president's decree 75% of the cost of apartments in buildings of housing combines and housing-construction combines is absorbed and that a joint document from the GlavKEU [Main Billeting Directorate] and the TsFU [Central Finance Directorate] authorizes loans to pay the first installment, a serviceman can afford an apartment in a cooperative.

[Ivanyuk] And what is the situation with respect to privatizing housing for servicemen?

[Yarmak] A special directive, D-20, was issued this year by the commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces on this matter. Our main guideline here is that the privatization of apartments for servicemen must conform to the procedure specified locally.

We went to the government with proposals for exempting regular military personnel from taxes on privatized apartments. They are now passing through the various levels of authority, creakingly but gradually. We hope that such a decision will be adopted.

[Ivanyuk] Dmitriy Danilovich, in your opinion how should the long-term housing problem in the army and navy be resolved?

[Yarmak] Ideally, of course, the serviceman should have his own, military housing. We would furnish it, and the serviceman would not have to drag his household goods along every time he is transferred. All of these moves cost the state a pretty penny, you know. When the serviceman is released into the reserve or retirement, he would be provided with a comfortable apartment. I feel it should be the rule that no general, officer or warrant officer is released from the army without receiving an apartment. Such a provision does not yet exist in the draft law on the status of and social guarantees for servicemen, and I think it would not be a bad thing to insert one. This would be a considerable incentive for the man in shoulder boards.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Accord on Caspian Naval Assets Evaluated

924C2123B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 33, 12 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Elmira Akhundova: "They Have Parted Without Shots, Although They Did Not Manage To Sell the Officers' Club"]

[Text] Baku—In contrast to the noisy scandal heard round the world on the subject of dividing up the Black Sea Fleet, the sharing of the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla (KKF) has passed off as an everyday affair, calmly. Not wishing to spoil relations with the powerful northern neighbor, Azerbaijan has agreed to 30 percent of the total assets of the KKF. All the rest has gone to Russia.

The peaceful and civilized divorce is not, however, to everyone's liking. Individual representatives of the command of the former Caspian Flotilla are apparently doing everything possible to create ill feelings following their departure. At a news conference given recently in the republic Ministry of Defense, workers from the information and analysis center talked about numerous instances of misappropriation, resale, and damage to military property and technical facilities that were to have been transferred to the Azerbaijan Navy. Those material assets that are impossible to take out of the republic are as a rule being put out of commission, for example, the radiotelecontrol post on the island of Sangi Mugan, and the well-known Narginiskiy lighthouse. And on the eve of the transfer to the republic Navy of the property and installations of the chemical battalion, the headquarters building "accidentally" burned down.

It recently became known that the former command of the KKF had made unprecedented attempts to sell flotilla property to commercial organizations, in particular the fleet officers' club and the museum of the Caspian Flotilla. Those who are leaving the republic forever also had a hankering for the library at the officers' club, where many rarities on the history of the fleet, shipping, and naval affairs had been collected.

"Such actions do not bring honor to the uniform of the naval officer," says the acting commander of the Azerbaijan Navy, Captain 1st Rank R. Askerov. "We lived for a long time as one family and now, even when they are leaving, we are obligated to maintain our respect for each other. Azerbaijan, for example, is prepared to give CIS countries—Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Turkmenia—help in training naval personnel. We have enormous experience in this field because the school in Baku (incidentally, it will soon be transformed into a naval academy) has trained specialists for 30 foreign states. As you leave you should not slam the door shut. Especially if this door is the door of your own common home."

Overview of Combat Actions in CIS for 1st Half of Month

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[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under the rubric "Armed Conflicts": "On the Eve of 'Decisive' Engagements"]

[Text] It is quiet on all the fronts right now. But then a real war played out in real time is always more boring than a historical overview and particularly an artist's reproduction. Especially if neither of the warring sides has the crucial superiority to end everything definitely, with victory.

The Azerbaijani Offensive Has Ended. Is it the Armenians' Turn Now?

The Azerbaijani army's offensive begun on 12 June ended on 4 July with the capture of Mardakert, a rayon center. By the morning of 6 July the Azerbaijanis controlled as much as 70% of the territory of Mardakertskiy Rayon. Earlier in the offensive Shaumyanskiy Rayon was occupied completely. The Armenian population (more than 40,000 people) fled the area of the fighting. Most of the refugees are now in the central part of Nagorno-Karabakh, in the Stepanakert-Shusha area.

Stepanokert itself and its outskirts have suffered major damage, however. This is where the main engagements of the Karabakh army previously took place. In the north, however, in Shaumyanskiy and Mardakertskiy rayons, it was previously relatively quiet, the price of meat was considerably lower (according to first-hand reports) in this thickly populated agricultural area than at the bazaar in Yerevan and most of the villages did not feel the war very much in general.

The area is in ruin today, the population has fled and looting by the Azerbaijani army has become so significant that on 15 July President Elchibey was forced to issue a public condemnation of the looting in the "liberated" areas.

The armed confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh has moved to a fundamentally new level as a result of the Azerbaijani offensive. Local self-defense detachments and Armenian Dzhokats (volunteers from Armenia and certain other countries) were not prepared either psychologically or tactically to combat the enemy's large armored assault groupings. All the more, when professional military men (former Soviet servicemen hired under contract, including men of the Slavic nationalities) took over the controls of the vehicles. The guerilla part of the war in Karabakh is over. The "normal" war is now beginning, in which the role of the people's home guard defending their own village against all conceivable enemies with Kalashnikov rifles will become smaller and smaller.

Until now the defense of Karabakh has been based on the "fortified area" principle. Every village has been defended by local, armed members of the people's home guard (all the able-bodied men in the population). In addition, there were as many as 10 companies of "mobile" forces (in each

administrative rayon, plus some subordinate to a central headquarters in Stepanakert). Minefields were laid and field-type fortifications were set up on the axes with the greatest danger from tanks. Most of the fairly small number of pieces of heavy weapons (artillery, armored vehicles and salvo-fire units) were subordinate to the central headquarters.

It is now perfectly clear that Karabakh cannot be held with these light formations. Several motorized-rifle (or armored) brigades are needed for a stable defense.

Given the enemy's significant superiority in fire power and equipment, however, the Armenian formations have not fought poorly at all during the past month. It took the Azerbaijani forces almost a month to take Mardakert and reach the Terter river. The Armenian forces resisted skillfully and in an organized manner, switching to individual counterattacks, striking at the flanks of the enemy's assault groupings and defending fiercely on intermediate lines, which made it possible to remove most of the civilian population and even livestock and other belongings from the area of combat. And this was despite the fact that the central headquarters in Stepanakert never succeeded in transferring most of the "mobile" formations under central command to the north, since it feared a tank breakthrough on the Askeran sector.

If Azerbaijani forces ever succeed in breaking through on the Agdam-Askeran-Stepanakert highway, the entire defense of Nagorno-Karabakh on this axis will collapse.

The Azerbaijani army has broken off its offensive. The troops need to rest and regroup. Furthermore, a continued offensive in the north has no serious strategic prospects following the capture of Mardakert. One should expect the axis of the main thrust to shift (in all probability, to the Askeran sector). The Armenian forces have preserved their combat capability and controllability, however (despite a long string of defeats), and should soon receive major reinforcements.

A NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent was informed at the Russian General Staff that by personal agreement between President Yeltsin and President Ter-Petrosyan, the Yerevan Motorized-Rifle Division was turned over to Armenia at the beginning of the month.

More than 200 tanks and hundreds of other pieces of armored equipment, self-propelled artillery pieces, antiaircraft weapons (Osa, Strela and Igla ZRKs [antiaircraft missile systems] and Shilka antiaircraft artillery systems), salvo-fire guns, mortars, small arms, ammunition and so forth, have been transferred.

Talks on the transfer of other 7th Army units were made more difficult by the incident at Gumri (formerly Leninakan), where Lt Shapovalov, Sgt Yudintsev and pvt Pod-dubnyak, Maslennikov and Karpov of the Kutaisi Airborne Assault Brigade were killed in a clash with a local self-defense detachment. Gen Kondratyev, deputy minister of defense of Russia, continues to conduct talks with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, and the situation in the region is such that most of the heavy weapons of the

former ground troops will inevitably go over to local forces (except the small quantity it will be possible to remove or destroy).

Even if only a part of the Yerevan division's heavy weapons end up on the battlefield in Karabakh, the balance of forces between the two sides should be altered substantially. Within the next few weeks, when both sides are ready (Azerbaijan, to continue the offensive; Armenia, for a counteroffensive), one can expect meeting engagements of tanks in the "classic" style of World War II.

The inevitable Armenian counteroffensive in Karabakh could be completely successful. Most of the lost territory could be regained. It is perfectly likely that Azerbaijani populated areas, primarily Agdam, that extremely important communications center, will also be taken. In an attempt to find additional weapons, the Azerbaijani side is stepping up its pressure on Russian forces on its territory, particularly the last, large "unprivatized" garrison at Gyandzha, where the 104th Airborne Division and the 23rd Motorized-Rifle Division are "dug in."

As soon as some kind of balance is established again in the ground fighting (with combat operations at a greater level of intensity), the potential for making effective use of aviation (combat planes and helicopters) will increase.

General Petr Deynekin, commander in chief of the Air Force, has informed a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that there are no aircraft of the Air Force in Armenia. One Su-25 attack plane operated in Karabakh (flown by an Azerbaijani pilot). The plane was shot down and was parked without an engine at the Yevlakh airfield. According to reports from Armenian sources, it has now been possible to return the Su-25 to action. In addition, 11 Su-24Rs and five MiG-25RBs (the reconnaissance model) have been "privatized" in Azerbaijan. General Deynekin doubts that "the armed forces of Azerbaijan will be able to use them for combat purposes." According to aviation experts (specialists in direct air support of troops from the air), however, combat use of the captured equipment is possible. This could alter the balance of forces once again, particularly since there are no combat aircraft in Armenia.

The Su-25 is a single-seat attack aircraft. Its top speed is eight tenths the speed of sound; maximum operating radius, 300 km; armaments—bombs, NURS [free-flight missiles] (for destroying personnel), URS [guided missiles] (for destroying especially solid targets; these require a ground support system, which Azerbaijan does not have, however); a twin-barrel automatic 30-mm gun. The pilot and vitally important systems on the Su-25 are protected by massive titanium armor against PVO [air defense] weapons. For now the Azerbaijanis are making very inefficient use of it—for bombing populated areas and not for supporting the troops on the battlefield. Considerable skill is required for providing direct support for troops, however, which the Azerbaijani pilot probably lacks. During the recent war with Iraq American A-10A Thunderbolt II attack aircraft (similar to the Su-25) inflicted serious losses upon their allies in the confusion of the ground offensive.

The Su-24 is a powerful, two-seat bomber more than 22 meters in length, with an effective operating radius of up to 1,300 kilometers, a speed twice that of sound, equipped with instruments for high-speed flight at low or ground-hugging altitudes, and capable of penetrating modern PVO systems. It can carry 36 100-kg bombs on external mountings. The reconnaissance version also carries electronic equipment on external mountings, so that it would take the Azerbaijanis much technical effort to convert captured aircraft. The main thing is to find qualified pilots and navigators, however. The Su-24 is also capable (with the proper equipment and chemical agents) of spraying combat and irritating aerosols.

The MiG-25RB is a high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft with a speed of up to 2.8 times the speed of sound and a radius of action of up to 1,450 km, and capable (in principle) of bombing—from horizontal flight, however (which does not provide for very well-aimed delivery).

The Dniester Region: The Clashes Have Ended, but the Level of Armed Confrontation Is Rising

Since Major-General Aleksandr Lebed was appointed commander of the 14th Army at the end of last month, there have been no major battles in the Dniester region. Only artillery duels (or shellings). Furthermore, the withdrawal of heavy equipment of the two sides to a distance of 10-15 km from the front line was begun on 7 July, and the withdrawal of the equipment has now been basically completed. In fact, however, 10-15 km is not a large distance for modern, mobile weapon systems, and the confrontation could be renewed at any time if this decision is made.

The partial separation of the sides is not the only development of the past two weeks, however. The level of military confrontation in the Dniester region has risen most substantially. If combat operations are renewed, they will be of unprecedented intensity. And their renewal is perfectly possible, since the political agreement on the Dniester region by Moldova, Ukraine and Russia about which Aleksandr Rutskoy spoke on 15 July does not in any way include the PMR [Dniester-Moldovan Republic], and from the purely military standpoint it is the situation of the PMR which has recently been strengthened considerably.

Last month the Moldovan army had vast superiority and, if not for its indecisiveness, could have ended the long conflict with a single preemptive strike. What is more, Moldova had the advantage not just in forces and weapons but also in organization. The motley Dniester detachments ("Guardsmen," Cossacks, some local and some from outside, police forces, "special-purpose" forces, Ukrainian detachments and so forth) were essentially subordinate to no one, they frequently shot at their own people and were generally incapable of engaging in real combat operations for any length of time.

The 14th Army was also essentially not battleworthy. With a numerical strength of less than 6,000 men, almost without common soldiers ("cadred"), the army was also

deprived of a number of its important formations, some of which were located on the right bank (having gone over to Moldova) and some were in Ukrainian territory. In addition, the long period of being in the ambiguous status of neutrality (when there was shelling all around) had ultimately demoralized the troops.

General Lebed's arrival put an end to the "guerilla warfare." All of the Dniester region formations, with the agreement of authorities of the PMR, were immediately made strictly subordinate to the 14th Army headquarters. In addition, the 14th Army itself appears to be incomparably more battleworthy. Russian assistance to the 14th Army amounted solely to the appointment of a new and decisive commander, however.

A source in the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense has informed a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that General Lebed has still not been confirmed as supreme commander, and commanders are appointed by the president, after all. Furthermore, his promotion to the next rank (lieutenant general) has been held up. This is apparently because of his well-known statement about "goats" and a "carrot."

Ukrainian assistance to the 14th Army was more substantial. An airborne battalion from the 98th Bolgrad Airborne Division was transferred from Ukrainian territory. The division had not taken the Ukrainian oath, however, so that these reinforcements were not exactly Ukrainian. A NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent has learned from sources close to the Russian Ministry of Defense that two 14th Army regiments (antiaircraft and helicopter) which had previously gone over to Ukraine have been moved to the Dniester region.

The antiaircraft regiment is armed with Osa ZRKs [antiaircraft systems]. Units of the 14th Army already had ZRKs, but the density of the PVO system on the left bank has now been increased substantially. The fire-support helicopter regiment is equipped with 36 Mi-24s. These combat aircraft ("tank killers") are now based at the Tiraspol airfield. These two regiments drastically altered the balance of forces in the Dniester region.

The young Moldovan army no longer has a chance in case of a major armed conflict with the Dniester region. All the more, since the "cadred" status of the 14th Army formations makes it possible to deploy an even more powerful grouping by means of left-bank reserves, should the need arise.

The withdrawal of the 14th Army, which Moldova is trying so hard to achieve, would in reality mean only one thing: the replacement of the Russian colors in units of the Dniester region. Possibly even with Ukrainian colors. This is entirely possible in view of Kiev's increasing influence upon the course of the conflict.

Moldova can only count on help from Romania now. General Lebed, 14th Army commander, reports that Romanian pilots arrived at Marculesti on 4 July. They will fly MiG-29s.

Romania does not have its own MiG-29s, and the Romanian pilots will therefore be unable to help Chisinau. Information was subsequently received, however, that several Romanian volunteers are training to fly the MiG-29 at Marculesti. The experts maintain that an experienced pilot can be rapidly retrained from the MiG-21 to the MiG-29, particularly since the MiG-29 is fairly easy to pilot.

An Armistice in South Ossetia. Thanks to Zviad?

The Dagomys Agreement of 24 June continues to be implemented successfully in South Ossetia. During the first half of July the intensity of combat operations gradually died down. Peacekeeping forces were brought into the conflict area on 15 July. While Russia brought in an airborne regiment (three battalions), however, and the Ossets one battalion (350 men), Georgia moved in only 200 men with small arms.

It is obvious that, following the attempted coup of 24 June and the continues run-ins with "Zviadists" in western Georgia, Kitovani's guardsmen and Ioseliani's "Mkhedroni" have had no time for Ossetia. One might expect this situation to continue for some time yet. In any case, there is every reason to omit (for now) South Ossetia from the survey of combat operations.

Russian Peacekeepers Greeted as Heroes in South Ossetia

92UM1333B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Jul 92 pp 1,3

[Article by Radik Batyrshin under the rubric "South Ossetia": "The Tskhinval Women Cried When Russian Airborne Troops Entered the City"]

[Text] The movement of an airborne regiment of the Russian part of the peacekeeping forces into Tskhinval continued for 14 hours. The group of journalists were placed at the end of the column with the explanation that this was due to the possibility of incidents. The Russian troops were greeted in different ways: in the Ossetian villages, with joy and hope; in Georgian villages, with caution, sometimes even verbal abuse. The nearer we came to the conflict area, the more women we saw crying. This mood infected the soldiers. Colonel-General Georgiy Kondrat'yev, member of the SKK (Joint Monitoring Commission) and deputy defense minister of the Russian Federation, said in an interview following a meeting in Tskhinval's Theater Square: "We shall carry out the order from our homeland to restore peace in this land. We feel that everything is going to be in order. If only we are not hampered." City residents made a holiday of the first night following the arrival of the Russian airborne troops. They could leave the basements where they had been living and not be afraid of shellings or snipers for the first time in a long time. A Georgian battalion of peacekeeping forces numbering 318 men entered Tskhinval that evening. Unlike the Russian regiment, they arrived in Ikarus vehicles. In conversations with a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, the Georgians said that the war had to be stopped and that they would carry out the order. In answer

to the question of how the Georgian separation forces would deal with the so-called "out-of-control bandit formations," Tengiz Kitovani, co-chairman of the SKK, replied that these formations would be destroyed if they refused to carry out an order. Kitovani explained the reduction in the size of the Georgian contingent of peacekeeping forces by saying that the present economic situation in Georgia is very difficult and that the Georgian soldiers were even issued personal gear and equipment out of Russian stocks. The only weapons the Georgians brought were assault rifles and machine guns. The Russian army would supply them with everything else.

The last units of peacekeeping forces, an Ossetian battalion commanded by Major-General Suanov, entered Tskhinval at 17:00 on 15 July. At a briefing attended by members of the SKK, Sergey Shoygu, chairman of the Russian Federation's State Committee for Emergencies, announced that no violations of the agreements had been detected during the previous 24 hours, except for some violations by formations which are not subject to monitoring and do not presently pose any significant threat. The SKK adopted a decision to clear the mines from the northern and southern parts of Tskhinval on 16-17 July and to complete the removal of mines from all roads around Tskhinval and in South Ossetia. In answer to the question of how long the peacekeeping troops would remain, Sergey Shoygu said: "Until normal living conditions have been restored, the refugees have returned from Georgia and Ossetia, and the danger of a repeat of what has occurred is eliminated, we must remain here."

Combined posts were set up at all the main positions on 16 July. They will be assisted by patrol-post services and the police of South Ossetia. The SKK is also working to restore communications, water and energy, and the railways so as to provide normal conditions for everyone who returns to Tskhinval. A large group of Georgians will join the Ossetian specialists on 17 July. The SKK is supposed to complete the removal of explosives—and there are around 500 tons of them in South Ossetia—and armored equipment within a two-day period. With respect to the political aspects of a resolution to the conflict, the SKK is deliberately avoiding these problems in order not to delay its primary mission of halting the bloodshed. At a briefing Mikhail Osongendadi, deputy chairman of the Committee for International Affairs of the Russian Supreme Soviet, stated: "We are in a situation in which two blood brothers are fighting, and it is very difficult to decide what to do. We shall definitely support any decision which the Georgians and Ossets make jointly, even if we do not like it. Russia has no other interests here." However, Torez Kulumbegov, leader of South Ossetia's parliament, announced that the results of a referendum conducted on 9 January 1992, in which 99% of those taking part voted "yes" to independence for South Ossetia and its unification with the Russian Federation, are still the only document which can serve as a basis for determining the status of South Ossetia.

**Composition of South Ossetian Peacekeepers
Viewed**

*92UM1333C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jul 92 pp 1,3*

[Article by Natalya Pachegina with introduction by Yevgeniy Krutikov, representative of the government of South Ossetia in Moscow, under the rubric "South Ossetia": "The Separation Forces Have Been Introduced, the Consequences Are Unclear"]

[Text] **Yevgeniy Krutikov, representative of the South Ossetian government in Moscow:**

The introduction of a contingent of joint armed forces of Russia, Georgia and North Ossetia into the South Ossetian Republic has fundamentally altered the situation in the region. There is now an armed force in the political arena of the Central Caucasus designated for and capable of putting an end to the killing. Recent events relating to the deployment, stationing and control of the joint forces in the region, however, have demonstrated that, unfortunately, far from all of the consequences of this move were considered during the preliminary stage of discussion of the issues involved in the conflict by all of the parties involved.

Among other things, the authority of the Verification and Operations Command set up in South Ossetia on 14 July is not clear. We know that the South Ossetian side (represented by Oleg Teziyev, executive head) has only an advisory voice in this body. At the same time all authority within South Ossetia will most likely be placed into the hands of the Verification and Operations Command. The republic's lawful leadership will thus be deprived of the exercise of its authority. Power in the region will for all practical purposes go into the hands of the military. The blockade of the South Portal of the Rokskiy Tunnel by airborne troops from Russia was the first step in this direction.

The present situation is creating certain fears for Tskhinval. It all happened before, in January 1991. A state of emergency was declared in South Ossetia at that time, and units of the USSR's Internal Troops were supposed to monitor the situation in the areas of conflict. They actively helped to disarm the Ossetian self-defense detachments, however, and ultimately allowed Georgian "militia" into the city. The Soviet troops left, but the "militia" remained.

Furthermore, as South Ossetia's leaders have repeatedly stated, the introduction of joint armed forces into the republic does not resolve the political aspects of the problem. The roots of the problem remain.

Natalya Pachegina

An operational report from the press service of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense contains the information that the 104th Airborne Regiment of the Russian contingent of peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia arrived in Tskhinval toward five o'clock in the afternoon on 15 July in accordance with the plan for the operation. That

evening two of its battalions moved out to positions in the areas of the villages mentioned most frequently in military accounts of the conflict. A third battalion of the 104th took up its position at dawn.

The Georgian portion of the contingent, 250 men with small arms, arrived in Tskhinval on 10 buses that same evening.

The Ossetian group of the separation forces set out for Tskhinval at 05:00 on 15 July. It was expected to arrive in the operating area of the separation forces by the end of the day.

Contrary to information from Tskhinval, where they apparently are not aware of the terms of the Dagomys quadrilateral agreement, which state that a monitoring commission and the joint military command are to assume administrative functions in the region after the mixed forces are brought into the area, the agency of Russian Federation Minister Valeriy Tishkov, chairman of Russia's State Committee for National Policy, has regarded all stages in the process of settling the conflict with dialectical optimism. Minister Tishkov leaves for Vladikavkaz today, from where he will go to Tskhinval. His deputy Shamshurov left for there yesterday. The Ossetian situation is regarded mostly as a politico-psychological problem in Moscow. And it is doubtful, the State Committee for National Policy believes, that anyone from the states, including Russia, will assume responsibility for raising the issue of severing a part of Georgia's territory. The Russian government's main task in this region of the former Union is to see that the problem is resolved on a generally democratic basis. For Russia this means securing the rights of the national minorities within the state formations without violating borders. And if they can manage to get the refugees to return to their homeland, even if South Ossetia retains its autonomous status as part of Georgia, this is a perfectly realistic and—for Russia, humane—goal today. The Russian politicians do not rule out the possibility in the future of considering the matter of South Ossetia and Abkhazia becoming a part of a federated state of Georgia.

The Russian Federation's state committee does not share the concern of South Ossetia's leadership regarding the abolishment of the functions of power structures in South Ossetia for a certain period of time. The actions of the joint military command in the region do not threaten the people of South Ossetia with the loss of any sort of democratic liberties.

Nikolay Medvedev, chairman of the Commission for National-State Organization and International Relations of the Council of Nationalities of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, telephoned Tskhinval at the request of a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. Medvedev described the tone of those at the other end of the line, South Ossetia Supreme Soviet Chairman Kulumbegov and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Khetagurov, as positively exultant. South Ossetia's leaders are in an extremely cheerful mood. According to Medvedev, they

thank Russia for its active stance in the negotiating process. They feel that the deployment of Russian battalions in the "security corridor" is already reliably protecting Tskhinval against possible attacks.

The operational report of the press service of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense for the evening of 15 July, however, contains information on casualties (unspecified) in the Tskhinval area.

NEGA Report

The Georgian peacekeeping formation consists of 200 men, with 150 in reserve. This is fewer than called for by the plan. With respect to the reasons why Minister of Defense Tangiz Kitovani proposed reducing the size of the formation to 200, he has stated that, in addition to other considerations, this is an expensive undertaking. According to the contract each fightingman will be paid at least 8,000 rubles per month. The Georgian side will thus be paying out 1.6 million rubles (if no more than 200 men remain in the buffer zone). "Our economy is in a crisis, and these outlays will be a heavy burden on it," Kitovani said.

UKRAINE

Republican Party Scores Defense Ministry, Cites Diminution of Officer Union Role

92UM1307A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA
in Ukrainian 27 Jun 92 p 1

[Statement of the Leadership of the Ukrainian Republican Party, dated 17 June 1992: "The Position of the Ukrainian Republican Party Regarding the Buildup of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[Text] After studying and analyzing the progress being made in building up the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Republican Party [URP] hereby concludes that the formation and manning of the national army is proceeding with difficulty and at a slow pace. This process is being resisted by some high military officials who have formally taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine but who in practice are sabotaging laws passed by the Supreme Soviet, decrees issued by the president, and orders and instructions from Ukraine's minister of defense.

The fact that the process of adopting a military doctrine for Ukraine is proceeding in an extremely unsatisfactory manner is a source of particular concern.

For an independent state, the army of any neighboring state constitutes a potential enemy. For Ukraine, with her thousand-year-long history of struggle, this means that an attack can be expected from any direction. Hence the concept of a "defense in all directions" is the most suitable. This is especially true of the eastern and northeastern directions. Yet the armed forces stationed in Ukraine are deployed according to the USSR's old military doctrine: they are targeted westward at Europe and southward at the

Balkans and Turkey. A very large concentration of forces is massed in the Prykarpatsky and Odessa military districts. All operational plans for the deployment of forces and the conduct of combat operations are westward oriented, despite the fact that just at this time a threat from this direction is minimal. On the other hand, Left-Bank Ukraine is not protected by military forces. According to the information we have, there are no plans for troop deployment and combat operations in the eastern and northern directions. Even though it is quite clear that the principal threat may come from that direction.

The statements of Ukraine's highest leaders regarding the possibility of reducing Ukraine's armed forces to 225-250 thousand by 1994 demonstrate surprising incompetence. Military practice throughout the world holds that the accepted size of the military force needed to provide an adequate defense is one percent of a country's population. Hence, the optimal size of Ukraine's army lies within the range of between 500 and 520 thousand men.

Cadre policy is a source of particular concern. As we know, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine adopted a decision to staff the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by 9 May 1992. But the heads of some departments have not yet been appointed, and other high military posts have not been filled. Under the slogan of internationalism and with obvious deference to the "older brother," high and middle level posts are being assigned to officers and generals who are not Ukrainian by nationality and who are mostly Moscow-oriented rather than to young Ukrainian officers with potential, who have demonstrated in practice that they are patriots of Ukraine. More than half the staff members of the Ministry of Defense are Russian. Among generals, Russians account for nearly 90 percent. Russians comprise more than half the officer corps. Close to 80 percent of the air force consists of Russians.

The situation in the National Guard of Ukraine is not much better.

We know that there are many patriots of Ukraine among the non-Ukrainian officers, but it is extremely dangerous to retain thousands of officers in the armed forces who have not taken an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people and who cannot be drawn upon for combat duty tours, military instruction, or guard and garrison duty. The promotion boards in military units, subunits, and educational institutions are made up of officers loyal to their command. The Union of Officers of Ukraine [SOU] has no real influence over the promotion process, and, for the most part, SOU members are entirely shut out from the work of the promotion boards.

The traditions of the Ukrainian people and its armed forces (the Cossacks, the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, the Ukrainian National Army, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) are not taken into account when laws, statutes, and legally binding acts on military affairs are drafted.

Russian remains the official language of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense, military staffs, and educational institutions conduct their business exclusively

in Russian. The Directorate of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense is putting off introducing a course in Ukrainian language, history, and culture in military educational institutions. Imperial and communist visual propaganda has not been removed from all military units, educational institutions, and institutions of the Ministry of Defense.

No plans have been made and there is no attempt to introduce qualitative changes in the training of junior command personnel. As a result, the negative traditions of the Armed Forces of the USSR ("dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts by conscripts with more seniority] and the like) are being automatically passed on to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Preconscription training is completely unsatisfactory. The posts of military commissars and military instructors at secondary educational institutions are still held by many officers who are ill-disposed toward the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The call-up for military service and preconscription training are conducted according to the old "orders," "directives," and "programs." In fact, the military registration and enlistment offices are not working as they should with conscripts and their parents. As a result of this, many youths of draft age are shirking military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The number of deserters from military units, in particular from engineering-construction units, has not dropped.

The committee on the social and legal protection of servicemen established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is also not working satisfactorily. There is no evidence of any practical steps being taken to provide material security and jobs for servicemen and members of their families. The problems of building housing and creating vocational retraining centers for servicemen transferred into the reserves are not being solved. The Ministry of Defense is being permitted to destroy educational centers that could serve as a basis on which to organize the retraining of officers in the reserves.

No authorized representatives of the Ministry of Defense have been assigned to individual units for the purpose of preventing the theft and destruction of military equipment, gear, and weapons. Military property has not been inventoried. The Commercial Center formed within the Ministry of Defense is functioning without supervision and is selling off military equipment, gear, and weapons at clearance prices, thereby causing serious losses to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and harming the interests of the state.

The decision to transfer officers who are citizens of Ukraine to their homeland is not being fully implemented. The decision serves as a pretext for transferring citizens of other states to Ukraine rather than Ukrainians, while more than 300,000 Ukrainians, officers and warrant officers, serve outside the borders of Ukraine. There are also generals who under certain conditions (assurance of housing, jobs, and so forth) would be willing to transfer to Ukraine and serve their people. They comprise a whole army of highly qualified specialists. These people have

been placed in disadvantageous conditions and are being pressured by the High Command of the CIS. But the question of transferring them to Ukraine and providing them with the necessities is being dealt with at an extremely slow pace. No personnel transfer committees have been formed at the local level to handle apartment exchanges, job placement, and so on.

These conditions notwithstanding, the Union of Officers of Ukraine is not making full use of its potential to exercise influence on the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the minister of defense in such matters as building up the Armed Forces of Ukraine, resolving issues related to cadres, and ensuring the social protection of military personnel.

All these factors are causing a decline in battle preparedness, military discipline and order in the Ukrainian Army. Consequently, the URP regards the following steps in the sphere of military affairs as the most important:

1. To attain the proper level of battle preparedness as well as strengthen military discipline and order it is essential:
 - that the Supreme Soviet immediately formulate and approve Ukraine's military doctrine based on the concept of "defense in all directions." In accordance with this doctrine, that there be prepared a plan for the disposition of military units and operational plans of troop deployment and combat actions;
 - that the Supreme Soviet formulate and approve a state program of military reform based on the placing of highly qualified specialists from among officers and generals who are patriots of Ukraine into the ranks of command and staff cadres, directors of the military-industrial complex [VPK], teaching personnel at military educational institutions, directors of preconscription military training, and officers of military registration and enlistment offices;
 - that promotion boards are established at military educational institutions in which SOU representatives are voting members;
 - that educational work is organized among military personnel, that officers with anti-Ukrainian sentiments are immediately dismissed from the Armed Forces of Ukraine as unfit for service, and that those who have not taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine are barred from military units;
 - that independent authorized representatives of Ukraine's defense minister are attached to military units for the purpose of preventing the theft, destruction, and squandering of equipment and weapons, and also that all property of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is inventoried in the shortest possible time and officials responsible for its protection are appointed;
 - that the Armed Forces of Ukraine build up its own material and technical supply base;

—that in light of the territorial claims continually being made against the territorial integrity of Ukraine immediate steps be taken to establish borders modelled on those of European states.

2. In order to revive national military traditions, it is essential to accelerate:

- the reform of military education;
- the introduction of the state language in the armed forces, towards which end short-term Ukrainian language courses should commence immediately;
- the introduction of courses for military personnel on Ukrainian culture, the history of the Ukrainian state, and Ukraine's armed forces, and instruction in the traditions of Ukrainian military formations.

3. The URP supports strict compliance with and practical enforcement of the laws of Ukraine aimed at providing social protection for military personnel and the members of their families, as well as the creation of a national program for retraining officers transferred into the reserves in connection with reductions in the army.

4. The URP maintains that the highest leadership of Ukraine must devote particular attention to military affairs.

[signed] LEADERSHIP OF THE URP

17 June 1992

Perils of Combat Training During Unit Reorganization

92UM1316A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Jul 92 p 1

[Interview with Lt Col Yuriy Ivanovich Galushko, commander of an antiaircraft missile regiment, by Capt Sergey Korneyev under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "Lowering of the Combat Capability Is Inadmissible"]

[Text] The summer training period is beginning in the armed forces of Ukraine. One will probably not encounter a soldier, NCO or officer today who has not asked himself the question: Have I done everything possible to engage actively in the training from the very first day? The vast majority of fightingmen have no cause for concern. They have prepared thoroughly for the training and set specific goals for their combat improvement.

Those who are filled with resolve to get off to a good start in the summer combat training include personnel of the antiaircraft missile regiment commanded by Lt Col Yuriy Galushko. How and by what means do the unit fightingmen intend to accomplish the missions facing them and what has been the main focus in the preparations for the exercises? We asked the unit commander to answer these and other questions.

[Korneyev] Yuriy Ivanovich, the last training period was not the best for your men. Tell me, what prevented them from performing their assigned missions well and thoroughly mastering the program?

[Galushko] There were many causes, but I would like to direct attention to the following. We began the winter training as part of one formation and ended it as part of another. During the acceptance procedure for the regiment in January and February we were told: "Organize the combat training according to plan." In mid-April, however, like a bolt from the blue, we received a telegram ordering us to reform from the march, so to speak. As a result far from all of the military collectives were thoroughly prepared for the qualification testing.

[Korneyev] In other words, you attribute it all to organizational changes?

[Galushko] Of course not. There is another reason. Most of the officers had not taken the oath to serve the people of Ukraine. Some of them did subsequently change their decision. The situation changed very little, however. A third of the officers in the unit administration plan to leave for other states of the former Union, for example, and the figures are 82% and 57% respectively for the battalions of Lt Col Varakuta and Maj Voropayev.

In addition to this, we lost more people last training period than we gained. Three people arrived in the regiment from the CIS nations, for example, while 17 left. The latter included the unit chief of staff, the deputy for personnel, the commander of the technical battalion and other people in positions of responsibility. The same thing occurred with the extended-duty personnel. The personnel problem is no longer as acute as it was, but the slowness with which officers are replaced continues to concern me.

Despite all that I have said, the regiment is battleworthy. The missilemen have not missed a single test target lately.

[Korneyev] Now I would like to know what has been done in the unit on the eve of the summer combat training period. Where have the efforts of the missilemen been directed during the preparatory period?

[Galushko] For one thing, all of the errors and deficiencies have been studied in depth and thoroughly, many of which have now been rectified.

In the second place, the individual assignments for the officers have been revised (they were previously made up in accordance with the requirements of the Minsk PVO [Air Defense] Army, and the daily schedule has been defined more specifically. It now calls for all of the exercises to be conducted before noon, for example. Previously only 5 training hours were designated for this period. The last class was scheduled after the noon mess, and, to be honest, it frequently was not held.

Another innovation involves allocating 2 hours for the NCOs to prepare for the classes on vehicle maintenance days. It is difficult to say at this point how this will work out in the unit. We do, however, hope that this move will make it possible not only to improve the training of the junior commanders but also to enhance their authority in the collectives.

In the third place, we devoted a lot of effort to studying the personnel and tried to distribute them so as to benefit the combat training.

[Korneyev] I assume that you have not neglected the physical facilities for the training?

[Galushko] Certainly not. There are numerous difficulties in this respect, however. There is no money, and not enough materials. We succeeded only with great difficulty in obtaining 100 sheets of Whatman paper, for example. How far will that go for a regiment? We have therefore attempted to renew and improve the training base with the old supplies. Even they are greatly diminished, however.

Despite this, we set up firing zones and grenade-tossing areas in each battalion, put the athletic grounds and the classrooms into proper order and replaced the visual agitation. We put a lot of effort into creating "peoples' reading rooms".

[Korneyev] The innovators no doubt took an active part in improving the physical plant for the training, as always, did they not?

[Galushko] They certainly did. We have something to brag about here. Last year, for example, our military handymen worked out and introduced more than 40 proposals for improving efficiency. The most valuable were an Instrument for Defining Target Types developed by Maj Levchenko; An HF-line meter, Sr Lt Bashkevich; a Logic Probe, Capt Yudin; an Electrical Assembly Probe, Capt Novitskiy. Many of these innovations can already be found in other military collectives.

Our handymen are working hard this year as well. They have already introduced 21 proposals. I am forced to say, though, that there has been a perceptible drop in the quest for innovations lately. The reason, I believe, lies in the fact that we use an order from almost 20 years ago for organizing the rationalization movement. It allows for a maximum of only 100 rubles as an incentive. What kind of money is that at today's standards?

We need a new document today, new incentive rates. And that is not all. We must set up a special stock of scarce radio parts and microcircuits for inventions and rationalization work.

[Korneyev] Then it would not be truthful to say that the summer training is proceeding without difficulties. Are the missilemen prepared to overcome them and do a good job on the missions facing them?

[Galushko] We do not rule out the possibility of difficulties at all. There will apparently be even more of them than there were during the first half of the year. The personnel will make every effort to see that the combat readiness and military discipline are maintained at the proper level, however, and to complete all of the plans and programs well.

Ukraine Appoints Air Army Commander

*92UM1339E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Jul 92 p 1*

[Text of "Decree of the Ukrainian President 'On the Commander of the 17th Air Army'"]

[Text] To appoint Major General of Aviation Gennadiy Vasilyevich Kolodiy to the post of commander of the 17th Air Army.

[Signed] *L. Kravchuk, president of Ukraine
Kiev
13 July 1992*

Sevastopol Garrison Commander On Hunger Strike

*92UM1339D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Jul 92 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "Hunger Strike Declared"]

[Text] The grounds of the military commandant's office of the Sevastopol garrison, whose personnel took the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people, and the military commandant's office itself, which, by decision of the Defense Minister, was incorporated into the independent state's Armed Forces, have been illegally occupied by a platoon of naval infantrymen. The operation was carried out by order of Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Kasatonov has also forbidden the delivery of food to the grounds of the military commandant's office and prohibited its servicemen from carrying out their functional duties. In response to these actions, the military commandant of the Sevastopol garrison, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Sverev, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative, Colonel Vladimir Indilo, have declared a hunger strike.

Development Of Sufficiency Doctrine Viewed

*92UM1339C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Jul 92 pp 2, 3*

[Article by Colonel Viktor Vakolyuk and professor and Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Trusov: "View of a Problem: Defensive Sufficiency for Ukraine"]

[Text] Sovereign Ukraine, as a subject of international relations, strives for cooperation with all countries and peoples and has no territorial claims against them. At the same time, Ukraine, in order to safeguard its national security, sovereignty, and independence and the territorial integrity of the state, maintains its defensive capability at a level of defensive sufficiency to defend against potential aggression. In this connection, the chief objective of the young state's military policy can be characterized as one of bringing its military potential into conformity with the concept of defensive sufficiency.

Embracing the principle of defensive sufficiency as one of the basic conceptual foundations of Ukraine's military doctrine, which has a strictly defensive character, constitutes an important step in conceptualizing the present-day military-political situation in the world and in Europe.

This attests to the peace-loving essence of the sovereign state and its domestic and foreign policy, which is codified in legal acts on defense issues. For example, article one of the law "On Ukraine's Defense" explicitly states that its military doctrine is determined by the principle of defensive sufficiency in building its Armed Forces and is based on the premise that Ukraine:

- does not recognize war as a means of resolving international problems;
- strives for neutrality and implementation of the non-nuclear principles of not accepting, not producing, and not acquiring nuclear weapons;
- does not have territorial claims against any state and does not see an enemy image in any people;
- will never be the first to initiate combat operations against any country first, unless Ukraine itself is a target of aggression.

This approach to ensuring the state's defense is necessary and timely, since any delay in solving military problems will not promote Ukraine's rapid integration in the international community. It is clear that the grouping of forces that came under Ukraine's jurisdiction on January 3, 1992, is in need of serious reform. The first steps in this direction are already being taken, although this is a very complex problem that affects the interests and fates of many servicemen and members of their families. The basic cause of these difficulties lies in the underdeveloped nature of the conceptual basis of defensive sufficiency and its criteria, levels, and concrete methods of implementation. On one hand, the notion of defensive sufficiency of a state (or coalition of states) has firmly entered the political and scholarly lexicon; on the other hand, this issue—a simple and understandable one at first glance—has proved very complex from a scientific and practical standpoint.

It should be borne in mind that sufficiency, in some scholars' view, is not simply a specific level of the military potential and defensive might of a given state, but above all a certain state of mind, a psychological and political orientation toward ever-decreasing arsenals that are sufficient for defense but insufficient for attack. Sufficiency is something that was inconceivable during the years of the "cold war," which forced everyone to arm without limit. **Sufficiency is something that today can and must be viewed as the sole possible path for all countries to peace and the security of their peoples. Sufficiency is a concept of security as a derivative of collective actions by all the states of the world community.**

The domestic and foreign periodical press confirm the growing urgency of maintaining the defensive might of individual states (or coalitions of them) at a level sufficient for defense and have attempted to validate its conceptual essence. The list of notions used in this process is very broad: "sufficiency," "military sufficiency," "defensive sufficiency" (or "sufficiency for defense"), "reasonable weapons sufficiency," "strategic defense initiative," and others.

In this debate, the following question is often raised: Is there any difference between the aforementioned notions? Different viewpoints have been expressed on this score. It seems that there are no fundamental differences here. For two aspects of sufficiency are essentially at issue. On one hand, it must be reasonable in determining the minimum dimensions of essential military potential; on the other hand, this sufficiency must be unequivocally defensive from the standpoint of its character and purpose. The ideal of reasonable (defensive) sufficiency is the lowest possible level of armed forces having a nonoffensive structure.

The advantages of defense over offense was highly regarded by the prominent military theoretician Karl von Clausewitz, who considered defense to be the strongest form of waging war. He saw the meaning of defense as holding, not conquering. It is easier to hold than to acquire, he wrote in his book "On War," for every mistake by the attacking side works to the advantage of the defending side. In discussing this, he made an important observation from the standpoint of formulating, on a mutual basis, approaches to the prevention of war and the ensuring of peace and security of peoples with conventional (nonnuclear) forces and weapons. Clausewitz wrote: "Absolute defense is in complete contradiction with the concept of war." Hence it follows that if all states strictly adhere to a defensive strategy, the potential for waging large-scale war disappears. But this conclusion applies only to general-purpose forces and to conventional arms. As for nuclear weapons, here other laws are at work.

Consequently, "sufficiency" as an index of a correlation of forces has a multifunctional meaning. It can be both defensive and reasonable, as well as offensive—which is to say that it can be understood as military superiority. This is precisely how political and military officials of various states interpreted sufficiently until recently.

In contrast to this understanding of sufficiency, some authors, in particular Colonel General N. Chervov, believe that for strategic nuclear forces, sufficiency is a function of the capability to prevent a nuclear attack on our country (i.e., the former Soviet Union) with impunity in any situation. For conventional arms, on the other hand, sufficiency calls for a quantity and quality of armed forces and weapons that are capable of reliably ensuring the country's defense.

This approach, although it deals with one important aspect of this phenomenon, fails to fully reveal the latter's essence. In our view, the essence of defensive sufficiency is more correctly reflected by a definition in which it is seen as a level and character of military potential and defensive might of a given state that guarantee its security and does not, at the same time, pose a real and potential threat to the security of other countries.

Other researchers, in analyzing these definitions, have rightly called attention to two very important indications: the dependence of the level of the military power of the former USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies on the level of military power of the US and the NATO member countries, and its limitation to the requirements essential to

ensuring the security of each state. However, these definitions have two vulnerable points that do not enable them to fully illustrate the underlying connections of the phenomenon under consideration and the basic features and trends of its development.

On one hand, they fail to fully reflect the dialectics of defensive sufficiency. In particular, they fail to deal with such an important point as the trend toward reducing the minimum level of arms and armed forces of the former USSR, the US, NATO, and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. This is especially important today, now that a real process of disarmament has gotten under way.

Reductions in armed forces are taking on an irreversible character. Moreover, military-strategic parity in and of itself cannot guarantee the defensive sufficiency and reliable security of the CIS. Parity is ceasing to be a factor that deters war on account of the numerical buildup and modernization of conventional and nuclear weapons and their qualitative improvement, as well as on account of the increased possibility of an accidental or unauthorized outbreak of war resulting from the absence of political solutions for the problems of dividing the property of the former Soviet Armed Forces—something that has prompted serious concern in the world. For this reason, strengthening strategic stability in the world at lower and less burdensome levels of military confrontation is the only solution to the present situation.

On the other hand, defining the level of reasonable sufficiency through the level of a state's defensive might is too broad. When we talk about sufficiency for defense, we have in mind the combat might of the Armed Forces and their combat assets and strength. However, in addition to these components, sufficiency includes military-economic, scientific-technical, sociopolitical, and psychological potentials. We should also stress one other important indication of defensive sufficiency. Its basic content and political orientation consist in preventing both nuclear and conventional war and ensuring international security. This followed directly from the military doctrines of the former USSR and Warsaw Treaty, of which reasonable sufficiency for defense was an important component.

In view of these statements, defensive sufficiency can be defined as a military-political concept based on a striving to prevent the threat of war through the radical lessening of military confrontation and maintenance of the Armed Forces' combat might within limits that are commensurate with the level of military danger and are a function of the requirements of ensuring the security of the CIS and of each of the states that comprise it.

As regards the political and military realities of Ukraine, the concept of defensive sufficiency presupposes a condition of the state in which it is able to defend the people's independence and democratic gains by maintaining the combat might of the Armed Forces and reducing their size and weapons within limits determined by the level of military danger, to prevent possible armed conflicts, and to thereby ensure its national security, as well as to influence efforts to strengthen peace on our planet. The

essence of the principle of defensive sufficiency in Ukraine consists in having a quantitative and qualitative composition and structure of Armed Forces that are sufficient to accomplish defensive tasks and to repel potential aggression but insufficient for offensive operations.

In other words, defensive (reasonable) sufficiency means providing for the country's effective defense with minimal forces and weapons and at the lowest possible cost. Needless to say, Ukraine's defensive sufficiency, in keeping with its nonnuclear status, presupposes a character and level of defensive might and especially of military potential that guarantee peaceful conditions for constructive labor and do not pose any threat to the security of other peoples. From the standpoint of reasonable sufficiency, the qualitative indices of nonnuclear forces are by no means of least significance.

For example, it is by no means mandatory that 1,000 aircraft and helicopters on one side be countered, for defensive purposes, with an equal number of similar hardware on the other side. It is possible to have a fixed number of warplanes and helicopters. Moreover, it should be remembered—especially in view of the economic capabilities of the newly independent states that emerged following the USSR's collapse—that defensive weapons are much cheaper than offensive weapons. For example, a modern tank or bomber can be destroyed by a defensive weapon that costs only 0.5 to 5 percent as much as the tank or bomber. This attests to the great economic advantages of a defensive potential.

In this regard, identifying the basic criteria that define reasonable sufficiency is especially urgent. The following can serve as such criteria: a relative quantitative and qualitative assessment of the levels of strategic forces of other states that do not exceed the limits required for defense; an assessment of the state of international relations and the level of tension of the military-political situation and the probability of the outbreak of wars and military conflicts of varying scope and intensity; a determination of the degree of military danger posed by individual states on a global and regional scale; the realization of a state's socioeconomic capability to meet military requirements at a level needed for defense; and the identification of partners and allies that are prepared to pool defensive efforts in the event they are attacked by other states.

As concerns Ukraine's level of defensive sufficiency, it should be said that its magnitude is variable and characterizes the composition and state of not just the army and navy, but also of the state as a whole. The scientific substantiation of such minimum and maximum levels should be the point of departure in determining the reasonable composition and groupings of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the scale of military production in peacetime, and the required level of mobilizational readiness that guarantees the repulsion of potential aggression and the defense of the state's independence and territorial integrity.

It is clear that these theoretical provisions should be embodied in definite qualitative and quantitative values for these criteria. In a given concrete situation, they can be

insufficient or excessive. In order to arrive at precise values, it is expedient, in our view, to use the methods of expert questioning of military commanders and leading scientists; the results of seminars, symposiums, conferences, and special scientific studies, as well as mathematical modeling of defensive operations with due regard for actual military danger; the potential for pooling efforts in the field of defense with other states; and so on. It would be desirable to have under the President and the Ukrainian Defense Council special analytical groups or centers whose basic task would be to analyze military-economic, economic, and intelligence information and scientific research in these fields and to draw up, when necessary, practical recommendations for decision-making at the highest state level.

The end state of readiness for the conduct of defensive operations should be the basic criterion of a methodology for assessing the qualitative state of army and naval forces in solving the problems of defensive sufficiency. This criterion makes it possible, on the basis of individual indices (defensive might, combat potential, combat readiness, etc.) to draw conclusions about the combat strength of specific groupings of forces at a specific moment in time.

Ensuring the defensive sufficiency of Ukraine consists in implementing its nonnuclear status, bringing about the lowest possible level of troops and armaments, adopting a defensive military strategy and doctrine, bringing all military development into conformity with their requirements, and reducing military spending and defensive potential to the level of reasonable defensive sufficiency, with due regard for the military-strategic situation and the character of military danger.

Implementing the principles of defensive sufficiency presupposes the scientific substantiation of military policy, minimal military-economic, military-scientific, and military-technical outlays, the reasonable conversion of defense production, the greatest possible stability and predictability of military-political relations with other states, and a high level of combat readiness on the part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The proposed criteria and ways of implementing the concept of defensive sufficiency of states can be viewed as one of the analytical tools for moving forward in efforts to solve the problems of stabilizing world political relations and ensuring peace in general and the national security of Ukraine in particular.

Ukraine Cadres Chief on Officers Who Have not Taken Oath

*92UM1298A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Jul 92 p 7*

[Article by Major Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "From the Army of Ukraine to the Ukrainian Army"]

[Text] The recent "Ostankino-1" information service report, that they are planning to just about deport officers who have not taken the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, forced more than one heart to skip a beat. Mine,

too. First of all I am among those very officers and, secondly, I was ready for such a development of events. I was ready and I knew: It will move down that track and you can't stop it...

The man who is involved with cadre issues at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense poured oil on the fire with this short-lived homegrown sensation. It is a question of L. Kravchuk's recent appointment of General A. Ignatenko as Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel. The two interviews which he gave with a three-day interval, first to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and then to NAR-ODNAYA ARMIYA, a Ukrainian newspaper with the same status, confused everyone even more.

Naturally, it was a question not of deportation but of the unilateral cessation of payment of all types of monetary allowances to officers who have not taken a second oath in their lives. In General Ignatenko's words, there are 9,500 of them and 3,500 of them have already been released voluntarily. Six thousand still remain on the army's rolls but, according to the general's comment, it is impossible "to say that they all are diligently carrying out their duties. At the same time, they are receiving full salaries in a timely manner from Ukraine..."

It has long been the custom to reproach us for a piece of bread, that is, for the same thing that you cannot have for the miserly salary in the army. At that, the trend is clearly seen: The "higher" a military man climbs, the more often he uses that method. And I have heard this general's thought, but expressed more simply, already in the last several months in Kiev in various situations and from various people: they say, you gobble up the fat but you don't want to serve Ukraine. A quick conclusion follows after that: Get! Get out of here!

Already in January "crusty" colonels from various departments were insistently suggesting to me personally in the presence of many witnesses to leave the state and to look for service or work on my own. The motivation for their demands toward me went along approximately at that same narrow-minded level: How can this be? You haven't taken the oath and you receive money?

However for the 6,000 officers and for many who sympathize with them, right now there is one main thing: no one intends to evict the officers. The order on the cessation of payment of coupons to them is not ready and, if you believe Ministry of Defense Legal Services Chief Lieutenant Colonel P. Kozyr, it will not be signed. But if it is, then that is a violation of the agreements achieved within the CIS (Indeed, how many of them have there already been?!).

There have already been many incidents that show that contradictions have flared up between the two most powerful armies in the CIS from the very beginning of their generation. It's possible that it's a childhood disease, maybe even with a nationalistic tinge. But still one can relate the manning system for the officer ranks to what century of our common history and their promotion in service in direct connection with the response to the

question: "Will you fight against Russia?" And there it is—the most modern history!

I personally, having refused to take the oath, although I am also de facto a Ukrainian, have been left without a pension or work for that reason, and I have a full right to be ironic on that score. If I had not already left the editorial staff of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense newspaper six months ago, if I had waited—albeit from a sporting interest—for that hour when "my former friends" took the oath altogether under the warm glances of representatives of the republican party (just who other than they got it good quite recently from the current editor and from his deputies), then at the certification board I would answer that provocative question in that same spirit (indeed, having initially sent them something further about myself): "I will fight, my invaluable friends, if I am so ordered. But only after all the Ukrainians have left Russia and all Russians have left Ukraine. When Ukrainians are divorced from all of the Russians, and they in turn abandon all the little Russians. When the sons-conscripts decide without wavering on whose side they will fight: fathers—Russians or mothers—Ukrainians. When all of the Orthodox Church members in Ukraine "vote" for the Autocephalous Church, and all clergymen stand shoulder to shoulder with Filaret..."

Obviously, it's too bad that General Kuznetsov—the army commander from Simferopol—did not say that. Maybe the system would have come to its senses. Although there's hardly a chance of that happening.

This question is being posed during the countless certification boards to officers as the key issue until the very last moment in Ukraine. This is a fact. This has caused almost no doubt among the authors of this Jesuit test "decoy". From well-informed sources, we have learned that it was born in the bowels of the Ministry of Defense Socio-Psychological Directorate. This department in the Ministry of Defense staff is already of great interest right now. In the future, its role will certainly grow since we are talking about the actual successor of the former party political structures in the army. Can you doubt that many officers from the Kiev, Odessa and Carpathian Military District political directorate staffs have not settled precisely here (and how many yet dream and will fight for their place in the sun!). Already right now the majority Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov's orders only see the light after they have received the stamp of approval from the head of that same service Colonel V. Mulyava.

To what times are we returning if reserve sergeants are immediately promoted not to captain but to colonel in the Ukrainian Army?! Let's be more precise: V. Mulyava, a reserve sergeant and children's writer, is currently heading that which was previously called GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy] in the USSR. It is worthwhile to remember that Mulyava has recently played not the last role in Rukh structures where, incidentally, many of the leadership have a "literary" ancestry...

So, a reserve sergeant is becoming the third or fourth (maybe I am mistaken, second?) man on the staff. Some of

those who are now continuing their service think that the department of the "socio-psychological service" is the most odious of all of the Ministry of Defense structures. The trend of the impatient transformation of the Army of Ukraine into the Ukrainian Army that has been noted in recent weeks is linked with its activities. With all of their similarity, two of these concepts are quite separate in essence.

This will be new for Russians but the practically mandatory study of the Ukrainian language with the goal of a subsequent shift to it totally has already become the standard for officers of the Ukrainian Army. There is also an appropriate Minister of Defense order. Here is General Ignatenko's opinion on this issue: "Today we must conduct all of our state and official negotiations and conversations in our native Ukrainian language."

The main thing is clearly seen beyond the bombast of the sentence: tens of thousands of Russian-speaking officers who have found themselves in the ranks of the Ukrainian Army through the whims of fate have been consigned to oblivion.

The transformation of the army of an independent state into a purely national army—this is not a theme of today. General Ignatenko, along with the minister, maybe cannot even figure out that the term "tube effect" had already appeared in the terminology of the most radical politicians during the summer of 1991. Its authorship most likely belongs to Ukrainian Republican Party [URP] Head L. Lukyanenko. Servicemen have found themselves to be toothpaste in this tube. URP Analysts have calculated without too much difficulty that those who do not agree with the strict policy being conducted with the army after the declaration of independence will be pressured, like toothpaste from the tube, by the force of purely living circumstances. You will not take the oath, you will not respond affirmatively to the questions which we will pose to you (and our people will pose them), you will not rapidly master the state language (just like in the Baltic States), therefore you will be left without service, without a pension, money, an apartment, or benefits. Well, but so that officers do not feel unduly pressured, real trumps—promises were thrown into the game. They promised and continue to promise all conceivable social guarantees, first of all housing and the opportunity to quietly continue to serve. Officers have already long ago stopped dreaming about more. But for the sake of whom was blood spilled, for whose ideas, and whose people? This is already after Afghanistan, the Baltic Region, Tbilisi, Baku, and Dubossar have become a foggy and insignificant matter.

He who pays also calls the tune. And the fact that a couple of sour notes are being played on the black sixes of thousands of officers and generals for whom one short word "oath" for some reason has not changed either their real or imagined benefits. In any case, they at least will not be deceived here in their ordinary human expectations.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has promulgated a law on the national minorities of Ukraine. The first article of the law guarantees the citizens of the republic, regardless of

their national origin, equal political, social, economic, and cultural rights and freedoms and supports the development of national self-consciousness and self-expression. The following is written in the document: all citizens of Ukraine enjoy the protection of the state on equal grounds.

Permanent committees on the issues of interethnic relations operate in the Ukrainian Supreme Council and, if necessary, in the local Councils of people's deputies. The Ukrainian Ministry for Nationality Affairs is the central agency of state executive power in the sphere of interethnic relations. The council of public association representatives of national minorities of Ukraine functions as a consultative organ under the ministry.

In accordance with the law, citizens of Ukraine, who belong to ethnic minorities, have the right to be elected or appointed on an equal basis to any positions in the organs of the legislative, executive, judicial, local, or regional self-rule, in the army, at enterprises, and at institutions and organizations.

The state guarantees all ethnic minorities the rights to national-cultural autonomy: the use and study in the native language or the study of native speech at state educational institutions or through national cultural societies, and also the development of ethnic cultural traditions, the use of ethnic symbols, celebration of ethnic holidays, and the propagation of their religion. Ethnic minorities' historical and cultural monuments on the territory of Ukraine are protected by law.

Henceforth, citizens of Ukraine have the right to freely select and restore their nationality and to restore their ethnic first, patronymic, and family names in the prescribed manner.

One of the articles of the law provides for special appropriations in the state budget of Ukraine for the development of ethnic minorities.

Relief From Hot Spot Duty, Alternative Service Aids Call-Up

92UM1339B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
17 Jul 92 p 1

[Major General Yu. Yashtakov, Donetsk Oblast military commissariat chief, interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Vasiliy Donskoy: "Call-Up Results: Prepared to Serve the Ukrainian People"]

[Text] Odessa Military District—The call-up for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is nearing completion. How has it gone in Donetsk Oblast? That is the subject of our nonstaff correspondent's interview with Major General Yu. Yashtakov, the oblast's military commissar.

[Donskoy] Yuriy Alekseyevich, what was different about this year's call-up campaign?

[Yashtakov] Without a doubt, each year and period has added its own special features to the work of the military commissariat in our oblast—which is one of the largest, incidentally. But this year's call-up has been special in that it has taken place amid the establishment of the young

Ukrainian state and its Armed Forces. And we are at the beginning of this difficult path. With the promulgation of the new military legislation, our military commissariats are operating at an intensive pace. Whereas in the past our oblast, given its human resources, was able to cope with the call-ups easily, today, in light of the numerous deferments and the introduction of various restrictions having to do with conscripts' health, we are having to restructure our work literally on the run. And although preparations for the call-up campaign were careful and consistent, we were unable to predict and anticipate everything. After all, the Ukrainian laws "On Universal Military Duty and Military Service" and "On Alternative (Nontroop) Service" reached us literally on the eve of the call-up. By that time, our contingent had already been carefully selected and distributed among the various commands. But when some of these people got deferments, we had to use our reserve. It's a good thing we had thought about this beforehand.

Of course, even today there are aspects of our work that require prompt and effective action. But the high professionalism and accumulated experience of the military commissariat officers are enabling them to avoid any serious disruptions in their work.

Important assistance in conducting the call-up and enlisting broad circles of the Donetsk basin public in the cause of building the Ukrainian Armed Forces was provided by the promotional efforts of the mobile "Ukrainian Youth" center. Representatives of the Defense Ministry, Deputies, the Ukrainian Officers' Union, and the committee of soldiers' mothers met with and spoke before youths of preconscription age and to their parents and loved ones. Answers to the most vital questions came straight from the horse's mouth, as they say. The meetings were also attended by representatives of the local administration. The promotional campaign's participants must be given due credit. They did not confine themselves to propaganda and cultural-educational measures, but rather took an understanding approach toward our problems, many of which were solved on the spot. The reaction to the call-up situation in the oblast was thus an objective one.

[Donskoy] How were your relations with local authorities in the course of the call-up?

[Yashtakov] The oblast administration's attitude was one of the greatest concern. And this has now become a good tradition. Complete mutual understanding was reached with Yuriy Konstantinovich Smirnov, the President's representative in Donetsk Oblast. He is constantly abreast of all our problems and provides prompt, effective, and comprehensive assistance. The oblast administration had promptly prepared all the necessary documents for the call-up and allocated technical staff, transportation, gasoline, and food. Even though it has now become difficult to deal with all these matters at both the local level and in Donetsk itself, we have had no difficulties in this regard. A great contribution to this was made by Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Shvidchenko and Nikolay Grigoryevich Yeremkin. The same atmosphere of mutual understanding

and support existed throughout the oblast, which is helping rayon military commissariats to successfully carry out their tasks.

[Donskoy] Only recently, the military commissariats faced a difficult problem with evaders. Does that problem still exist?

[Yashtakov] Young men used to be afraid of "trouble spots," and this was one of the main causes of evasion of military duty. Now that the fundamental cause has been eliminated, people are coming to serve with peace of mind, since they know for certain that they are going to serve in Ukraine. The law "On Alternative Service" has also made a contribution to this.

Of course, it cannot be said that we have no evaders at all. There have been instances in which conscripts have failed to promptly report to assembly points. But they are isolated instances. You couldn't call them a phenomenon. Inertia and the legacy of our recent past are also involved here. Legal nihilism among the public is taking a toll here, as is the absence of certain legislative acts. For example, we are waiting impatiently for confirmation of the new law on criminal liability for military crimes and for evading service. In conjunction with the oblast internal affairs directorate, we have drafted a document on assisting military commissariats at the local level and on holding people liable for failing to report to conscription centers.

We are more concerned by the problem of servicemen leaving their units without authorization. And here too the police are helping us in searching for and detaining deserters. In this regard, we are conducting extensive explanatory work at the local level and enlisting the mass media in this effort.

[Donkoy] It is hard to be successful in this regard without support from various public organizations, in particular the committee of soldiers' mothers.

[Yashtakov] I share your view completely. I would point out that we are making active use of that committee's potential. We recently held our first joint oblast conference. The conference examined problems dealing with both the call-up and with evasion of military service. We found a common language with the committee and devised tactics for joint actions. In the future we plan to arrange trips by oblast delegations to places where youths from our area are serving. Analytical work will be improved with both young people of preconscription age and Donetsk Oblast youths who are already serving.

The current call-up campaign has shown that emissaries from our mining region are prepared to serve the Ukrainian people.

Kiev Commissar Cites Statistics On Call-Up

92UM1339A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
17 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel Konstantin Khrol, Kiev city military commissar: "We're Maintaining Our Reputation"]

[Text] We gave one conscript a deferment three years ago on account of illness. And he recently came to us and asked us to take him into the army. He had already graduated from a technicum and mastered several construction specialties. He said he was ready to serve in any branch of service, in any corner of Ukraine.

During the call-up process, we encounter similar patriots all the time. (Although I should note in parentheses that we also have evaders.) This proves once again that young men from Kiev have been and remain the most well-prepared contingent entering the army. We can rightfully be proud of them.

We fulfilled the plan for the just-concluded call-up at a rate of 101 percent. It wasn't easy to do that, since the situation in Kiev is to a significant extent unique. Most of our conscripts are graduates of rural vocational-technical schools and technicums. And they had just finished their exams. There was a catastrophic shortage of time left for assembling them. Nevertheless, we met the deadline. After all, we do have some experience in this. I especially want to point out that we sensed comprehensive support from the city administration, lead by Ivan Salij, the president's representative in Kiev. He personally visited the assembly point, where he talked with the future soldiers and delivered a speech to them. At Ivan Nikolayevich's suggestion, local administration representatives and rayon military commissariats sponsored conferences devoted to call-up issues with officials of enterprises, organizations, and institutions in various rayons. And since the subject of joint efforts has come up, I want to say that we held draftee days in the rayons and receptions in honor of the parents whose sons had joined the army's ranks first.

There is another unique aspect to the call-up in Kiev, also a traditional one. We provide more fellows for the special commands, such as the border troops and navy, than any other military commissariat. And this time we provided the most conscripts for the National Guard as well. Here too we fulfilled the plan completely. A couple of words about the navy—to be more precise, the Black Sea Fleet. Contrary to the predictions of certain "specialists," there were more boys who wanted to serve in it than we were able to send. In other words, we had our pick. We choose fellows who were strong both physically and mentally.

It will be recalled that after last year's well-known order, more demanding requirements were instituted with respect to conscripts' physical condition. Last fall, we were unable to put many under arms, as they say, on account of poor physical condition. During this call-up, we paid special attention to the young men's health. Virtually everyone was carefully examined. In addition, every third youth underwent additional examination. So we hope we won't get any complaints from the services that we sent them young men in poor health.

We also did a more careful job of psychological and physiological screening this time. Incidentally, we welcome the establishment of the socio-psychological offices at the military commissariats. This will help us in many

ways to avoid the same mistakes in deciding which conscript should be sent to which branch of service.

As in past years, we conducted anonymous surveys. The youths answered over 20 questions. We are now generalizing all this data. But on the whole, we can already say exactly who is joining our Armed Forces. More than 50 percent of the conscripts are from workers' families. And most of the boys themselves have already worked. There was an increase in the percentage of those who had graduated from rural vocational-technical schools and technicums. We drafted more youths with a higher education than last fall. But here is a distressing statistic. There was a marked increase in the number of conscripts from broken families (in which there is only a mother or only a father). Virtually every fifth conscript came from such a family. And this means that some have grown up without a father's supervision, while others have been reared without a mother's affection. There were also more orphans in this call-up. I hope that troop commanders and psychologist-officers will take this into account in training and educational work.

I said earlier that the majority of the young men are prepared in all respects. Nevertheless, to be honest, their level of general-educational training is not as high as one would like. I was repeatedly convinced of this in both personal conversations with them and in studying the overall statistics. You read the autobiographical sketches of some conscripts and there are several mistakes in every line. Especially troubling is the fact that not all of them have a sufficient command of Ukrainian.

And yet 93 percent of the conscripts are Ukrainians. (For purposes of comparison, the figure for last fall was 60 percent.)

We had new laws in place before the call-up got under way. And it was interesting for us to see in practice the extent to which our parliamentarians had done a thorough job and whether they had taken everything into account—above all in drafting the Ukrainian law "On Universal Military Duty and Military Service." Incidentally, our military commissariat had submitted proposals to the parliamentary commission charged with drafting the law. Some of them were taken into account. In general, the adopted acts created a good foundation for our work. But there were unexpected moments—and more than a few—that could hardly have been anticipated by anyone. For example, draft deferments are now being granted to fathers with children under the age of three, to young men whose older brothers are already serving, and so on. But few people took advantage of these deferments. Because they know that they will have to serve in any case, and there's no sense in putting it off.

And another point where the laws are concerned. The Ukrainian law "On Alternative (Nontroop) Service" was adopted long ago. But there is still no mechanism for implementing it. We hope to have one in time for the fall call-up.

I mentioned evaders only in passing. But not because I want to close my eyes to the truth. It's just that this is a

subject for a separate, more thorough discussion. But there were some evaders. And we would hardly have succeeded in taking them in hand, so to speak, and putting them in the ranks on our own were it not for the support we had from the chief of the Kiev Internal Affairs Directorate, Police Colonel Vladimir Starovoyt, and his entire staff.

The call-up went best of all in Vatutinskiy, Leningradskiy, and Starokievskiy rayons, where the military commissariats are headed by Colonel Valeriy Vasilchenko, Colonel Konstantin Potapov, and Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Zavalishin. By contrast, the situation was not all that good in Podolskiy, Pecherskiy, and Radyanskiy rayons. On the whole, I repeat, the call-up—the first call-up exclusively for the Ukrainian Armed Forces—was successful. But the fall call-up is not that far off. And we're already planning for it.

BALTIC STATES

Newly Formed Special Forces Unit Short on Training, Equipment

92UN1873A Riga RIGAS BALSS in Latvian 16 Jul 92
p 1

[Article by Maris Kaspars: "We Can Feel a Little Safer"]

[Text] A new Latvian military formation has come to life—the assault reconnaissance battalion. Yesterday, the young men of this formation took their oaths of allegiance to the Republic of Latvia. Among the guests of honor were Talavs Jundzis, Dainis Turlais, Juris Dobelis, and members of the Latvian Officers Association and the Home Guard [Zemessardze]. There was a large turnout of friends, relatives, and fiancées of the new recruits. After the solemn ceremony and congratulatory speeches, Pastor Ilars Plume of the Dole, Baldone, and Bulduri congregations conducted a devotional. He reminded those present of the significance of the word of God in times when soldiers so very often find the going tough. He wished the lads have a brotherly attitude toward one another.

An unprecedented occurrence made the event notable—the heads of the Ministry of Defense were happy to chat with the soldiers' parents and take questions from them. For the most part, these were concerned with problems in the supply of uniforms, underwear, and quality footwear. "Those boots are only good for elephants!" decided a father in a very aggressive tone. "The boys don't even have a second pair of underwear!" remarked another. Of course, there are grounds for a certain degree of dissatisfaction. There is also the general lack of money in the budget of the defense ministry; there is the general economic crisis in the Republic. Mr. Jundzis diplomatically and empathetically explained the true situation to the concerned parents. The minister promised that the situation will soon change for the better—contracts have been concluded with respectable firms producing footwear. But one father was still not satisfied with the minister's promise, and demanded that his son's tender footsies be shod in U.S. Army boots, like the ones worn by the special unit's commander, Vectirans. Defense Forces commander

Dainis Turlais' polite yet firm response apparently succeeded in convincing this and other like-minded fathers: Not even all the money at the defense ministry's disposal could provide for such boots. Once and for all people must understand that, as difficult as it may be to get used to the idea, we cannot yet afford a lifestyle characteristic of the civilized world or as fulfilling. The same goes for the army.

Gunars Dilevka, the battalion commander, told our correspondent a little about the battalion itself: "The young men selected to serve in this battalion are the best of the best in terms of both health and physical fitness. Their mission in an extreme situation is no military secret, of course. Nevertheless, I'd rather not go into much detail on the subject, but I will say this: These boys will be 'where the action is.' They have to be much better prepared than border troops or other military formations. Therefore, special emphasis is placed on general military preparedness, marksmanship, tactics, and formal drill. A significant part of their training will be devoted to such activities as parachute jumping and honing their professional skills both on and under water. Anyone here could see for himself that on this day of their swearing-in, the men were not able to march smartly or sing resoundly. There are objective reasons for this. Our unit was established on 1 July, and the very next day we went into battle against the forest fires. Today we have come for the sole purpose of taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of Latvia; tomorrow, it's back to the forests. Once the fire-fighting is over with, we will be able to seriously undertake our primary duties. But in the mean time, there are still plenty of long trenches to be dug in the forests."

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan Law on Pensions for Servicemen

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[Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan: "On the Provision of Pensions to Servicemen"]

[Text] The present law establishes in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan a unified system of state pensions for officer personnel, warrant officers, and servicemen in extended military service for the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of National Security, the Committee for the Guarding of the State Border, and also the enlisted and command personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the service of the presidential guard, and for their families (Subsequently the enumerated categories will be called servicemen).

The law guarantees the social protection of pensioners by means of the regular review of the size of pensions in accordance with changes in the cost of living.

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Right to a Pension.

Officer personnel, warrant officers, and servicemen of the extended military service in the armed forces, agencies of

the Ministry of National Security, Committee for the Guarding of the State Border, and other military formations, enlisted and command personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the service of the presidential guard of the Republic of Azerbaijan have the right to a lifetime pension if they have served in the military service and in the agencies the time stipulated by the present law.

Servicemen who become disabled under conditions foreseen by the present law obtain the right to a disability pension.

In the event of the loss or death of servicemen, their families have a right to a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner.

The system for the provision of pensions to servicemen of extended military service and their family members is established by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens."

Servicemen of other states permanently living in the territory of Azerbaijan have the right to a pension if they performed two-thirds of the necessary service time for the obtaining of a pension in the territory of Azerbaijan. The time of service in the territory of the republics of the former USSR through 1 January 1992 is thereby taken into account.

Article 2. Conditions for the Provision of Pensions

In accordance with the present law, pensions are granted to servicemen with the right to them and are paid out after their discharge from military service.

In the event of the loss of the principal wage earner, disability pensions to servicemen and their families are granted regardless of the length of service.

Article 3. Persons With a Right to a Pension on an Equal Basis With Servicemen and Their Families

Pensions are provided to persons who held command positions corresponding to those of officer personnel in partisan detachments and large units and to their families on the bases stipulated by the present law for officer personnel and their families.

Pensions are provided to servicewomen performing their service on a contractual basis on the bases stipulated by the present law for servicemen in extended military service and their family members.

Article 4. Granting of Pensions to Servicemen and Their Families

Servicemen and their families may (at their wish) be granted pensions under the conditions and standards stipulated by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens." Not only wages but also all kinds of monetary allowances obtained by the serviceman prior to discharge from service are thereby considered in the computation of the pensions.

In regard to servicemen who performed their service in places for which coefficients are determined against the

wage, preferential conditions established for persons working in these places are applied for the granting of pensions according to age.

Under the bases specified by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens," pensions are also granted to servicemen deprived of military or special ranks.

Article 5. Pensions to Families of Deceased Pensioners

The families of deceased pensioners from among servicemen have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner on the same bases as the families of servicemen.

Article 6. Right to Choose the Pension

Servicemen and their families with the simultaneous right to various state pensions are granted one pension of their choice.

Article 7. Means for the Payment of Pensions. Exemption of Pensions from Taxes

Pensions are paid to servicemen and their families through the means of the republic budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Pensions are not subject to taxation.

Article 8. Agencies Providing Pensions

Under the present law, pensions are provided to servicemen by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Committee for the Guarding of the State Border of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Article 9. Pension Supplements for Special Merits

A supplement amounting to 100 percent of the minimum pension for age is added to the pensions of servicemen honored with the title of National Hero of Azerbaijan and a supplement amounting to 50 percent of the minimum pension for age is added to the pensions of servicemen honored with the titles of Hero of the Soviet Union or Hero of Socialist Labor, of those granted the order Glory in all three steps, the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" in all three steps, and also of those receiving honorable titles for service to the Republic of Azerbaijan, including the titles "Honored Worker of the Ministry of Internal Affairs" and "Honored Employee of the Extraordinary Commission."

Article 10. Payment of Aid

Financial aid is paid to servicemen discharged from service, to the families of servicemen of the corresponding categories, and to the families of servicemen who have lost the principal wage earner in the manner and amount specified by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Article 11. Social Assistance to Pensioners

By legislation of Nakhichevanskaya Autonomous Republic, decisions of rayon (city) bodies of executive authority, the administration and labor collectives of

enterprises, institutions, and organizations within the limits of the rights granted them by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens, through the budget of the autonomous republic and local budgets as well the resources of wage funds, it is possible to set payments in addition to pensions designated in accordance with the present law and supplemental kinds of material assistance and privileges for pensioners from among servicemen and for their families.

II. PENSIONS FOR LONG SERVICE

Article 12. Conditions for the Granting of Pensions

The following persons have the right to a pension for long service:

- a) servicemen who served 20 years or more in the military or agencies prior to being discharged from service;
- b) persons discharged from service on account of their age, having reached the age of 50 as of the day of their discharge, and having a total length of service of 25 calendar years or more, of which no less than 12 years and 6 months constitute military service or service in the agencies;
- c) persons discharged from service for reason of illness or a limited state of health and also on account of personnel cuts, having reached the age of 45 as of the day of their discharge, and having a total length of service of 25 calendar years, of which no less than 12 years and 6 months constitute military service or service in the agencies;
- d) servicemen with 15 years of military service or service in the agencies and having participated in the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in the zone of alienation.

Article 13. Size of Pensions

Pensions for long service are granted in the following amounts:

- a) 50 percent of the corresponding monetary allowance (Article 40) to servicemen who served 20 years or more (Point "a" of Article 12) for having served 20 years, 55 percent to those discharged from service for age or on account of illness, and 3 percent for each year of service beyond 20 years;
- b) 50 percent of the corresponding monetary allowance to persons discharged from service for age, reaching the age of 50 as of the day of their discharge, and having a total length of service of 25 calendar years or more, including no less than 12 years and 6 months of military service or service in the agencies (Point "b" of Article 12) and 1 percent for each year of service beyond 25 years;
- c) 55 percent of the corresponding monetary allowance to persons discharged from service for illness or a limited state of health and also as a result of personnel cuts, reaching the age of 45 as of the date of their discharge, and having a total length of service of 25 calendar years or more, of which no less than 12 years and 6 months

constitute military service or service in the agencies and 1 percent for each year of service beyond 25 years;

d) 50 percent of the corresponding monetary allowance to servicemen having 15 years of military service or service in the agencies who took part in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station (Point "d" of Article 12) and 3 percent for each year of service beyond 15 years.

Article 14. Minimum Amount of the Pension

The minimum amount of the pension for military service or service in the agencies for 20 years or more (for long service) is set at the amount of 150 percent of the minimum wage specified by legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Article 15. Supplements to the Pension for Long Service

Supplements are added to the pensions of servicemen for years of service (including to pensions in the minimum amount):

a) 50 percent of the minimum pension for age set by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens" for each nonable-bodied family member to nonworking pensioners who support nonable-bodied family members belonging to the group of persons provided a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner; in so doing, the supplement is added only for those family members who do not receive a labor or social pension; if there is simultaneously a right to a social pension and to a supplement to a pension for long service for a nonable-bodied family member, at the choice of the pensioner the family member may be given a social pension or a supplement may be added for this family member;

b) 50 percent of the minimum pension for age to lone pensioners having reached the age of 75, for their care;

c) to the disabled and veterans of war:

—to the disabled of the first group—300 percent of the minimum pension for age,

—to the disabled of the second group—250 percent of the minimum pension for age,

—to the disabled of the third group—150 percent of the minimum pension for age;

d) 100 percent of the minimum pension for age to veterans of war from among servicemen who served in the active army or in partisan detachments that took part in military actions in the performance of an international duty.

The supplements foreseen in points "a," "b," and "c" of the present article may be applied simultaneously.

Article 16. Calculation of Years of Service

The procedure for the calculation of years of service for the granting of pensions for servicemen in accordance with the present law is specified by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

III. DISABILITY PENSIONS

Article 17. Conditions for the Granting of Pensions

Pensions for disability are granted to servicemen who have become disabled if the disability occurred during the time when they were in service or no later than three months after their discharge from service or if the disability occurred after this period but as the result of an injury, contusion, mutilation, or illness taking place during the period of service.

Article 18. Ascertainment of Disability

The groups and reasons of disability as well as the time of its occurrence are determined by medical-labor commissions of experts operating in accordance with the statute confirmed by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The disabled persons are subdivided into three groups depending upon the degree of loss of capacity for work.

Article 19. Reasons for Disability

Disabled persons from among servicemen are subdivided into the following categories depending upon the reason for the disability:

a) disabled from war—in the case of the occurrence of a disability as a result of an injury, contusion, or mutilation received while performing the obligations of military service (service obligations), or illness having to do with a stay at the front or performance of an international duty in countries engaged in combat operations;

b) other disabled persons from among servicemen—in the case of the occurrence of a disability as a result of a mutilation received in an accident not related to the performance of the obligations of military service (service obligations) or illness not related to a stay at the front or performance of an international duty in countries engaged in combat operations.

Article 20. Amounts of Pensions

Pensions for disability are granted to servicemen in the following amounts:

a) 100 percent of the sum of the monetary allowance to the disabled from war Group I (including those becoming disabled in the performance of their service obligations), 80 percent to the disabled from war Group II, and 55 percent to the disabled from war Group III;

b) 60 percent of the sum of the monetary allowance to other disabled persons of Group I (including those disabled without relation to the performance of their service obligations), 55 percent to the disabled of Group II, and 35 percent to the disabled of Group III.

Article 21. Minimum Amounts of Pensions

The minimum amounts of disability pensions are set at:

a) 200 percent of the minimum pension for age to the disabled from war of groups I and II and servicemen of groups I and II who became disabled in the performance of

their service obligations and 150 percent of the minimum pension for age to the disabled to Group III;

b) to other disabled persons, including those whose disability occurred as a result of an event not related to the performance of their service obligations:

—100 percent of the minimum pension for age to the disabled of groups I and II;

—50 percent of the minimum pension for age to the disabled of Group III.

Article 22. Granting of the Pension for Disability in the Amount of the Pension for Age or for Long Service

For disabled persons of groups I and II from among servicemen having the length of service for the granting of a pension for age set by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens" (including under preferential conditions), the pension for disability may be granted in the amount of the pension for age foreseen by this law for the corresponding work record.

If disabled persons of groups I and II from among servicemen have the length of service necessary for the granting of a pension for long service, the pension for disability may be granted to them in the amount of the pension for long service with the corresponding years of service.

Article 23. Supplements to the Pension for Disability

Supplements are added to the disability pensions granted to servicemen (including to pensions calculated in the corresponding minimum amount):

a) 50 percent of the minimum pension for age set by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens" for each nonable-bodied family member to nonworking disabled persons of groups I and II who support nonable-bodied family members belonging to the group of persons provided with a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner; in so doing, the supplement is added only for those family members who do not receive a labor or social pension; if there is simultaneously a right to a social pension and to a supplement to the pension for disability for a nonable-bodied family member, at the choice of the disabled person the family member may be given a social pension or a supplement may be added for this family member;

b) 100 percent of the minimum pension for age to the disabled from war of Group I for their care;

c) 50 percent of the minimum pension for age to the disabled of Group I (except for the disabled from war) and to the disabled from war of Group II for their care;

d) 100 percent of the minimum pension for age to veterans of war receiving a pension for disability (except for those receiving a pension for disability as a result of war).

Article 24. Time for the Granting and Payment of Disability Pensions

Disability pensions to servicemen are granted for the entire time of the disability ascertained by a medical-labor

commission of experts, whereas it is for life for disabled men over 60 years of age and disabled women over 55 with recertification of these disabled persons at their request only.

In the event that a pensioner who has not reached pension age is found to be able-bodied, the pension is paid to him until the end of the month in which he was found to be able-bodied but no longer than to the day to which the disability is specified.

Article 25. Recalculation of the Pension when There Is a Change in the Disability Group

With a change in the disability group occurring after the granting of the pension, the amount of the pension also changes accordingly. In so doing, if the disability of a veteran of war worsens in connection with a general illness, labor injury, or professional illness, the pension is recalculated according to the new disability group while retaining its reason.

Article 26. Renewal of Payment of the Pension in the Event of Interruptions in the Disability

In the event that a disabled person from among servicemen fails to have himself recertified by a medical-labor commission of experts, the payment of his pension is stopped and in the event that he is again found to be disabled it is renewed from the day on which he was again acknowledged to be disabled. If the time of the certification is missed for a valid reason, the pension is paid for the entire period for which the medical-labor commission of experts finds him to be disabled. In so doing, if in the recertification another disability group is ascertained for the disabled person, the pension for the indicated time is paid under the previous disability group.

Article 27. Restoration of a Previously Granted Pension and Its Redesignation

A previously granted disability pension as a result of a general illness is restored if no more than five years have passed from the day when it ceased to be paid on account of the expiration of the time for which the disability was set. There is no limit on the time for the restoration of a previously granted pension for disability on account of other reasons.

In the event of the recurrence of the disability after a break, the disability pension may (at the wish of the pensioner) be granted on a general basis.

IV. PENSIONS IN THE EVENT OF THE LOSS OF THE PRINCIPAL WAGE EARNER

Article 28. Conditions for the Granting of Pensions

Pensions for the loss of the principal wage earner are granted to the families of servicemen if the principal wage earner died during the period of service or no later than 3 months after being discharged from service or later than this period but as a result of an injury, contusion, mutilation, or illness taking place in the period of service and to the families of pensioners from among servicemen if the principal wage earner died in the period of the receipt of

the pension or no later than 5 years after the cessation of the payment of the pension. And families of servicemen missing without a trace in the time of combat operations are equated to the families of those who died at the front.

Article 29. Family Members With a Right to a Pension

The right to receive a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner belongs to nonable-bodied family members of deceased (killed) servicemen who supported them.

Regardless of whether supported by the principal wage earner, a pension is granted: to nonable-bodied children; to nonable-bodied parents and wife (husband) if after the death of the principal wage earner they have lost their source of the means of subsistence; to nonable-bodied parents and wives of servicemen killed at the front or in the performance of an international duty in countries engaged in combat operations and also of those killed in the defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In defining the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner, the following persons are recognized as nonable-bodied family members:

- a) children, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren who have not reached the age of 18 or who are older than this age, if they became disabled prior to reaching the age of 18 and are students at vocational-technical schools or intermediate special and higher educational institutions, until they finish these educational institutions but only until they reach the age of 23; brothers, sisters, and grandchildren have a right to a pension if they do not have able-bodied parents;
- b) father, mother, and husband (wife) if they have reached the pension age of 60 years for men and 55 for women or if they are disabled;
- c) husband (wife) or one of the parents or the grandfather, grandmother, brother or sister regardless of age and capacity for work, if they are caring for children, brothers, sisters, or grandchildren of the deceased or killed principal wage earner under 8 years of age and if they do not work;
- d) grandfather and grandmother in the absence of persons who are required by law to support them.

For the parents and wives of individual categories of fallen servicemen, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan may establish other conditions for the granting of a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner.

Article 30. Family Members Who Are Dependents

Family members of the deceased are considered to have been dependent upon him if they were fully supported by him or if they received assistance from him that was the steady and primary source of subsistence for them.

The family members of the deceased for whom his assistance was a steady and primary source of subsistence but who themselves received some pension have the right to be transferred to a new pension.

Article 31. Payment of Pensions to Children Who Are Fully Supported by the State

Children who have lost both parents (orphans) are paid full pensions during the period in which they are fully supported by the state.

Other children fully supported by the state are paid 25 percent of the designated pension.

Article 32. Right to a Pension of Adopters and Adopted, Stepfather, Stepmother, Stepson, and Stepdaughter

Adopters have a right to a pension on an equal basis with parents and adopted children on an equal basis with natural children.

Minor children who have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner retain this right even after adoption.

If a stepfather and stepmother raised or supported a deceased stepson or stepdaughter for no less than 5 years, they have the right to a pension on an equal basis with the natural father and mother.

A stepson and stepdaughter have the same right to a pension as do natural children.

Article 33. Preservation of a Pension After Remarriage

A pension granted in the event of the death of the husband (wife) is also retained if the pensioner remarries.

Article 34. Amounts of Pensions

Pensions in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner are granted in the following amounts:

a) 50 percent of the wage of the principal wage earner for each nonable-bodied family member to the families of servicemen who died as a result of an injury, contusion, or mutilation received in the defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and also in the performance of other obligations of military service (service obligations) or as a result of an illness related to a stay at the front, the defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, or the performance of an international duty in countries engaged in combat operations; a pension of the same amount regardless of the cause of death of the principal wage earner is calculated for the families of deceased pensioners from among the disabled from war and to the families that include children who have lost both parents (orphans);

b) 35 percent of the wage of the principal wage earner for each nonable-bodied family member to the families of servicemen who died as a result of an accident not related to the performance of the obligations of military service (service obligations) or an illness not related to a stay at the front, the defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, or the performance of an international duty in countries engaged in combat operations.

Article 35. Minimum Amounts of Pensions

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

Pensions in the event of the loss of a principal wage earner that are granted to families of servicemen taking into account each nonable-bodied family member may not be lower than:

75 percent of the minimum pension for age for each nonable-bodied family member,

100 percent of the minimum pension for age for each child that has lost both parents and also for each nonable-bodied family member of a serviceman killed during combat operations or the performance of service obligations.

Article 36. Period for Which the Pension Is Granted

In the event of the loss of the primary wage earner, the pension is specified for the entire period in the course of which the family member of the deceased is considered to be nonable-bodied (Article 29) and for life for family members reaching the age of 60 in the case of men and 55 in the case of women.

Article 37. Designation of One Pension for All Family Members. Separation of the Share of the Pension

One overall pension is designated for all members of a family with a right to a pension.

At the request of a family member, his share of the pension is detached and paid to him separately. This share is separated out prior to the first day of the month following the month in which the request for the separation of the pension share was made.

Article 38. Change in the Amount of the Pension and Cessation of Its Payment

If there was a change in the composition of a family to which a pension was granted in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner and if as a result of this change individual family members or the family as a whole lost their right to a pension, then the pension is recalculated or its payment is stopped from the first day of the month following the month in which the change occurred.

Article 39. Procedure and Time for the Ascertainment of the Disability of Family Members

The rules on the procedure and time for the ascertainment of the disability set forth in articles 18, 24, and 26 of the present law extend accordingly to family members that are disabled.

V. CALCULATION OF PENSIONS

Article 40. Monetary Allowance for the Calculation of Pensions

The pension of servicemen and their families is calculated from the monetary allowance of these servicemen. In calculating their pensions, consideration is thereby given to the corresponding pay for duty assignments (including all kinds of raises and supplements constituting the new duty pay), the military or special rank, percent supplements for long service (uninterrupted work), and monetary compensation for the food rations.

For servicemen who are transferred to positions with smaller pay in the interests of the service for reasons of health or age and who on the date of their transfer had a right to a pension for long service, with their subsequent discharge from service the pension is calculated from the pay for the position that they occupied for no less than 1 year immediately prior to the indicated transfer.

Article 41. Calculation of Pensions to Families of Pensioners

Pensions to families of pensioners from among servicemen in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner are calculated from the same monetary allowance that was used to calculate the pension of the principal wage earner.

Article 42. Application of Coefficients to the Amounts of the Pensions

For pensioners from among servicemen and their families living in localities where coefficients have been applied to the wages of workers and employees, including for those living in high-mountain localities of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the pensions granted in accordance with the present law (including in the minimum amounts) are calculated for the period in which they live in these localities applying the corresponding coefficient set in the particular locality for workers and employees for nonproduction branches but not more than a coefficient of 1.5. The present article is applied in the event that the indicated coefficient is not incorporated in the monetary allowance on the basis of which the pension of servicemen is granted.

VI. GRANTING OF PENSIONS

Article 43. Appeal for the Granting of Pensions

Servicemen and their family members submit their requests for the granting of a pension to the pension agencies of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Committee for the Guarding of the State Border of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Article 44. Agencies Granting a Pension and Time for the Review of the Documents on the Granting of a Pension

Pensions are granted to servicemen and their family members by the pension agencies of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Committee for the Guarding of the State Border of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The agencies granting pensions examine the documents on the granting of pensions not later than 10 days after their receipt.

Article 45. Time for the Granting of Pensions

In accordance with the present law, pensions are granted to servicemen from the day of their discharge from service but no earlier than the day through which the monetary allowance was paid to them and to the families of these servicemen and pensioners from among their number from the day of the death of the principal wage earner but no earlier than the day through which he was paid the

monetary allowance or pension, except for the following cases of the granting of pensions beginning at later times:

- to the indicated servicemen recognized as disabled within 3 months from the day of discharge from service either as a result of an accident or an illness taking place after discharge, from the day of the ascertainment of disability, and to those sentenced to prison, from the day of their application for a pension after release from their place of imprisonment;
- to the family members of the indicated servicemen and pensioners from among their number who obtained the right to a pension after the death of the primary wage earner, from the day of the beginning of the right to a pension, and to the parents or wife (husband) who obtained the right to a pension in connection with the loss of their source of the means of subsistence, from the day that they apply for the pension.

In the event of the untimely request for a pension for past time, the pension is granted from the day of the beginning of the right to the pension but no more than 12 months before the request for the pension.

Article 46. Time for the Recalculation of Granted Pensions

The recalculation of pensions granted to servicemen and their families takes place from the first day of the month following the month in which the circumstances occurred that led to a change in the amount of the pension. In so doing, if the pensioner obtained the right to an increase in the pension, the difference in the pension for past time may be paid to him for no more than 12 months.

VII. PAYMENT OF PENSIONS

Article 47. Agencies Paying Pensions

Pensions are paid to servicemen and their family members by institutions of the savings bank at the place of the actual residence of the pensioner, regardless of registration, on the basis of the corresponding documents drawn up by the pension agencies of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Committee for the Guarding of the State Border of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Article 48. Payment of the Pension When There Is a Wage or Other Income

Pensions granted in accordance with the present law are paid in full regardless of the existence of a wage or other income of the pensioners.

Article 49. Payment of Pensions for Past Time

The amounts of a pension entered for servicemen and their family members and not requested by them in time are paid for past time no more than 3 years prior to the request for receipt of the pension.

The amounts of a pension not received by the pensioner in time at the fault of the agency granting the pension are paid for past time with no restriction to any period.

Article 50. Payment of a Pension to Pensioners Living in Boarding Homes

Lone pensioners from among servicemen living in boarding homes for the elderly or disabled are paid the difference between the pension and the cost of their upkeep in the boarding home but no less than 25 percent of the designated pension and no less than 20 percent of the minimum amount of the pension for age. If the pensioner living in a boarding home for the elderly or disabled has nonable-bodied family members that he supports and that belong to the group of persons provided a pension in the event of the loss of the principal wage earner, the pension is subject to payment in the following manner: 25 percent of the pension but no less than 20 percent of the minimum amount of the pension for age is paid to the pensioner himself and the remaining part, but no more than 50 percent of the designated amount, is paid to the indicated family members.

While living in boarding homes for the elderly or disabled, pensioners from among the family members of servicemen are paid 10 percent of the designated pension but no less than 20 percent of the minimum amount of the pension for age. In those cases in which the amount of their pension exceeds the cost of their upkeep in the boarding home, they are paid the difference between the pension and the cost of their upkeep but no less than 10 percent of the designated pension and no less than 20 percent of the minimum amount of the pension for age.

Article 51. Payment of the Pension During the Period of Inpatient Treatment

During the time of inpatient treatment of the pensioner (in a hospital, clinic, military hospital, or other medical institutions) or treatment in a leper colony, the pension is paid in full.

Article 52. Cessation of Payment of a Pension During the Time of Imprisonment

In the event of imprisonment, the payment of the pension is stopped during the time of imprisonment.

Article 53. Withholding from Pensions

Withholding from pensions granted to servicemen and their family members is performed in the manner specified by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the Provision of Pensions to Citizens." In so doing, the amounts of pensions overpaid to pensioners and their family members as a result of abuse on their part are withheld on the basis of a decision by the pension agencies indicated in Article 47.

Article 54. Payment of a Pension in the Event of the Death of the Pensioner

The amounts of a pension due to a pensioner from among servicemen and to his family and remaining unreceived in connection with his death are not included in the inheritance and are paid to those members of his family provided a pension in the event of the death of the principal wage earner.

The parents and wife (husband) as well as other family members living with the pensioner on the day of his death, however, have the right to receive these sums even if they

are not included in the group of persons provided a pension in the even of the loss of the principal wage earner.

If several family members apply, the amount of the pension due them is divided equally among them.

The sums indicated above are paid out if the application for them is made no later than 6 months after the death of the pensioner.

In the event of the death of the pensioner, his family is paid burial assistance in the amount of a 3-month's pension.

If the burial of the pensioner is taken care of by persons who are not members of his family, the assistance is paid to them in an amount not to exceed the actual expenditures incurred for the burial within the limits of the indicated amount of assistance.

Article 55. Payment of a Pension When the Pensioner Goes Abroad

Servicemen and members of their families who leave the confines of the Republic of Azerbaijan for permanent residence in other states included in the former USSR are granted and paid pensions on a general basis.

The Republic of Azerbaijan does not grant pensions to servicemen and members of their families who go to other foreign states for permanent residence.

Before leaving, pensioners from among servicemen and members of their families going abroad for permanent residence are paid in advance the amount of a 6-month pension specified in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

VIII. RECALCULATION OF PENSIONS

Article 56. Recalculation of Previously Designated Pensions

In connection with the putting of the present law into effect, pensions previously granted to servicemen and members of their families are recalculated in accordance with the documents available in the pension cases.

If the pensioner subsequently presents supplemental documents giving the right to a further increase in the pension, the recalculation is made for the past time but for no more than 12 months from the day of the presentation of additional documents and no sooner than the day on which the present law goes into effect.

Article 57. Recalculation of Pensions in Connection With an Increase in the Monetary Allowance of Servicemen

The pensions of servicemen and their family members calculated from the monetary allowance in accordance with articles 13, 14, 20-22, 34, and 35 of the present law are recalculated in connection with an increase in the average level of the monetary allowance of servicemen.

Article 58. Recalculation of Pensions in Connection With a Change in the Index of the Cost of Living

The pensions of servicemen and members of their families are recalculated in connection with a change in the index of the cost of living in the manner specified by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

[Signed] Acting President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ya. Mamedov
Baku, 29 April 1992

DECREE

OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

ON THE PUTTING INTO EFFECT OF THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

“ON THE PROVISION OF PENSIONS FOR SERVICEMEN”

The National Council of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan decrees:

1. That the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On the Provision of Pensions for Servicemen” should be put into effect beginning 1 January 1992.
2. That the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan:
 - within 1 month should pass the necessary enforceable acts on questions that the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On the Provision of Pensions for Servicemen” relates to the authority of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan;
 - should take measures in accordance with the law guaranteeing the timely performance of the work for the recalculation, granting, and payment of pensions.
3. That pensions granted to servicemen and members of their families should be recalculated prior to the going into effect of the present law. In recalculating the pensions, it should take as a basis the norms and kinds of monetary allowances foreseen for the corresponding categories of servicemen in effect on the day that the law is passed.

[Signed] First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan Z. Samed-Zade
Baku, 29 April 1991

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Turkmenistan Sees Growing Lack of Discipline Among Troops

*92UM1329A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 1 Jul 92 p 1*

[Article by A. Kurbanova, Turkmen Press: “Increase Discipline in Military Units”]

[Text] The numerous violations of discipline in military units located in Turkmenistan dictate the need to increase administrative and criminal liability for military crimes. At the present time, the Republic Procuracy, the Ministry

for Defense Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice are carefully studying legal acts that precisely regulate the procedures for performing military service and that reaffirm the inevitability of punishment for violations of regulations.

The Turkmenistan Procuracy has reported that they have recently noted an increase in the number of servicemen who are avoiding military service. Absence without leave has become the main violation of military regulations. But if last year the majority of servicemen who desire to serve in the homeland left units deployed in the CIS countries, today conscripts—citizens of Turkmenistan—are becoming absent without leave from units deployed in the republic. They explain their illegal deeds through a desire to perform military service at units that are located in close proximity to their parents' homes. The republic military commissariat's mail is filled with petitions from the latter. It sometimes occurs that the parents themselves are hiding their sons while seeking the possibility of their transfer closer to home. Garrison military procuracy workers, local procuracies, and military unit commanders are conducting explanatory work on criminal liability for this military crime.

Unfortunately, in many cases after conducting an investigation and declaration of investigation, they have to send the case to a military court. Today more than 100 cases have been brought against compulsory service military personnel who were absent without leave.

Insubordination and failure to carry out an order have also become frequent violations of regulations.

Fall in Level of "Preparedness" Seen In Turkmen Draftees

92UM1329B *Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA*
in Russian 1 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Ashkhabad Military Commissariat Assistant to the Military Commissar A. Laskov: "The Spring Draft into the Army"]

[Text] The spring draft into the army has been completed. And we can already predict the performance of duty by the conscripts. Unfortunately, many things disturb us because the facts attest that the level of the conscripts' preparedness for army life did not increase but, on the contrary, fell in comparison with past years. What is the cause of that?

Right now many people are inclined to unconditionally disparage everyone and everything on the wave of the political situation, including with regard to army problems. And I recall that about 8-10 years ago more than half of the conscripts went to serve in the army with sports ranks, work experience, and education at the level of a professional technical school or technicum. Now the picture is more prosaic. Nearly 80 percent of the conscripts smoke or use alcoholic beverages and frequently do both. During the current survey, we learned that nearly 50 percent of the conscripts had neither worked nor studied during the year prior to being drafted. Far from always is this fact explained by a lack of opportunity to find a job, although we must not rule out that problem. "Relaxation"

in "civilian life" is nothing other than idly spending time which frequently results in a lack of moral discipline and a loss of physical training albeit through a school program. It will certainly be extremely difficult for these lads to adapt to army discipline.

But we will not only blame the young men. Much has changed in our lives and some things have been utterly rejected, however, it would hardly be rational to cross out the importance of military-patriotic education and pre-conscription training. I think that this work has slackened. And the problem is not the lack of sports facilities and fields. The delimitation of physical culture and patriotic education of the individual would be the most major mistake. And that trend has already become visible. First of all that issue has more frequently begun to fall from the field of view of local management organs. If there is no conductor, the entire orchestra is disrupted. Meetings between conscripts and creative collectives have become extremely rare right now. During the entire Spring draft, representatives of institutions of culture, creative unions, and sports organizations did not once meet with the young men. How much easier it is to complain with regard to the negative manifestations in the army than to help it with its cause and, first of all, to not demean its prestige before the people.

Civilian patriotism is a spiritual state which is not provided to man by nature. They educate with patriots. The army is developing the educational process in that direction. But to do that, there must be a foundation, that educational start that instills into the consciousness of the young conscript the conviction of his own personal need as a defender of a sovereign state, its freedom and independence.

At the same time, we frequently have the opportunity to encounter the complaints of commanders and educators in the army about the negative attitude of conscripts and about the artificially created wall of lack of understanding in mutual relations of soldiers and officers. Frequently the exactingness of regulations is perceived by young soldiers as degradation of their human dignity. Parents and older relatives who have served in the army are beginning to more actively affect the sentiments of conscripts and not for the better. Mamas and Papas think it is their duty to interfere in official relations and only on behalf of their sons. But there are no nursemaids in the army and quite mature lads are being conscripted to serve who are capable of answering for their actions.

Army service is closely tied to a soldier's mastery of combat vehicles and combat training. And the weak mastery of the Russian language by some conscripts prevents us from getting off to a better start. It's understandable that Turkmenistan, that recently adopted a new Constitution, established Turkmen as the state language in it. But we have come to the reorganizational processes in the republic army, having no more than five percent of the officers of the native nationality in the officer corps. It is also sad that attempts to select candidates for entry into military schools are encountering a negative reaction associated with the officer's standard of living. I am confident that the

situation will correct itself with time but today the fact remains fact. Many young men openly talk about the lack of prestige of the officer profession at the present time. Where, they say, can it be more advantageous to be involved than with commerce or to work in sales.

Be that as it may, the state needs to be defended and service in the army has been consolidated in the new Constitution for each republic citizen who is obligated to serve. Therefore, I repeat, military-patriotic education needs to be not slackened but, on the contrary, improved.

Just what would we like to have in that context? More effective utilization of the capabilities, say, of the units that are deployed within the city. This could be both the conduct of open house days and youngsters' visits to a combat vehicle pool or firing range.

Museums could also do their share through the beneficial utilization of private collections for educational purposes. I have had the opportunity to see young soldiers on sightseeing trips at the home of Ashkhabad Resident B. Berdyliev, in which he has created a museum in memory of his brother Nura, a hero-scout who fell during the Great Patriotic War. The emotional impact of such trips is very great.

Maybe we ended the "Zarnitsa" [heat lightning] militarized game in vain? Schoolboys played it with great enthusiasm. If we reject without long reflection that which was previously useful and is useful until now, it will become very difficult to restore what has been lost.

Uzbekistan Military Prosecutor Discusses Theft of Military Property, Desertion

92UM1306A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Col Justice A.P. Kim, military prosecutor of the Republic of Uzbekistan, by L. Saveliev under the rubric "Man, Society, Law": "Our Interviews: The Prosecutor in the Military Service"]

[Text] In order to maintain legality, law and order in the armed forces of Uzbekistan, President I.A. Karimov has issued a decree establishing the Military Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan out of the Military Tribunal of the abolished Turkestan Military District, and the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Col Justice A.P. Kim, former military prosecutor and now military prosecutor of the republic, has assumed new duties. He is 44 years old and has worn the shoulder boards of the military legal expert for 22 of them. He was born in Akkurganskiy Rayon in Tashkent Oblast. He graduated from the Saratov Law Institute and returned to his native parts. He served in the administration of the district military prosecutor's office. During the Afghan events he served as military prosecutor at the Kunduz Garrison and then headed the prosecutor's office at the Samarkand Garrison. From there he was transferred to the district prosecutor's office. He was awarded the title "Honored Legal Expert of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

Today Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Uzbekistan A.P. Kim talks with PRAVDA VOSTOKA observer L. Saveliev.

[Saveliev] And so, the military prosecutor's office has a new status. Does that change its functions?

[Kim] No. It is structurally linked to the republic prosecutor's office for purposes of exercising prosecutorial surveillance in all military units, at military educational institutions and establishments and other military formations within Uzbekistan. Subunits similar to the military prosecutor's office, by the way, are being set up in all the republics with units and formations of the Turkestan Military District, which no longer exists.

[Saveliev] How are the military legal experts dependent upon the Ministry of Defense Affairs?

[Kim] The latter is charged with providing the necessary financing, materials and technical support for military courts and agencies of the military prosecutor's office and with retaining for the personnel the legal status of military personnel, all kinds of pay, food and other allowances.

[Saveliev] Once again, dependent upon the department which you are charged with overseeing.... So many angry words have been uttered by the mothers of soldiers, whose sons were not protected against humiliation. Many people believe that this is because the cases were investigated by the "departmental" Main Military Prosecutor's Office and its agencies in the forces.

It would be fitting to recall an interview which you gave us a year and a half or so ago. It was not to the liking of the former district chief of staff, a generally intelligent person. The lieutenant general expressed his displeasure and immediately informed the editors. The two-star general apparently felt that it was possible to instruct the prosecutor as he would, for example, the chief of a communications center or the commander of a support battalion.

And there were grounds for this. You wear the military uniform, receive your pay out of the military budget and buy train and plane tickets at military ticket offices with military money.

In addition, the procedure for awarding military ranks to the legal experts did not depend upon them at all. They received their stars at the order of the district commander. Incidentally, without the agreement of the latter they did not even have the right to bring criminal charges against an officer. The stars were for some reason issued by the former chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

[Kim] Yes, there was a lot of discussion surrounding our military uniform. The complaints were without basis in most cases, however. As a rule, our relations with the command element were based on the spirit and letter of the law. We know of cases, of course, in which certain commanders and chiefs tried to "assign us our work" as a result of their inferior legal culture.

It is still early to judge what our relations with the Ministry of Defense Affairs will be like. I can say with full responsibility, however, that while we continue to wear the military shoulder boards, we serve only the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

With respect to military ranks, ranks up to colonel will in the near future begin to be awarded by agencies of the republic prosecutor's office located within Uzbekistan and subordinate to it. In any case, this proposal is contained in the draft Statute on Class Ranks for Workers in the Prosecutor's Office.

[Savelyev] What will you be guided by until the new military laws are enacted?

[Kim] By the laws of the republic and legal standards of the former USSR, when these are not in conflict with the laws of Uzbekistan.

[Savelyev] The decree states: "Agencies of the military prosecutor's office are subordinate to the Prosecutor of the Republic of Uzbekistan...." Are the garrison prosecutor's offices subordinate to the oblast prosecutor's offices?

[Kim] Never.

[Savelyev] What garrisons have military prosecutor's offices?

[Kim] Tashkent, Samarkand, Nukus, Termez and Fergana. In some places the staff of military legal experts is going to have to be enlarged. It is planned to establish a prosecutor's office in Chirchik.

[Savelyev] In one case you are requesting an increase in the prosecutor's staff. In another you want a new prosecutor's office. Does this mean that the volume of work performed by prosecutors and investigators is constantly increasing?

[Kim] It is not becoming any smaller in any case.

[Savelyev] How many criminal cases are presently in process?

[Kim] More than 100 just for the republic military prosecutor's office. First, though, I would like to talk about cases in which no action has been brought—about unauthorized absences from the unit. There are thousands of these.

Most frequently our countrymen do not want to serve in hot spots. And this is understandable. Young Uzbeks should not fire upon Moldovan, Armenian, Georgian or Azerbaijani youth, and attempts are being made by various kinds of political groupings to draw troops into international conflicts. An Uzbek should also not become the victim of provocation.

The Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet has passed a decree on the recall of our countrymen from those sites where there is fire. The young men return to their native parts to continue serving on a legal basis.

Some of them could not wait to abandon their unit, however. We have no argument with those who have reported to agencies of Uzbekistan's military directorate and been sent to a military unit located within the republic.

Be that as it may, not all of the deserters wanted to serve out their term on native soil. And then, not all of them were serving in hot spots. This kind of desertion entails criminal liability.

The president of the republic made it possible to avoid punishment with his Decree on Amnesty Resulting From Joining the World Community of Nations, however, extending the humanitarian enactment also to this category of lawbreakers.

But does the pardon apply only to those servicemen who evaded military service prior to the date of the decree's promulgation (10 April of this year) and who report to local offices of the military directorate by 6 June to continue their military service under the terms specified by the Ministry for Defense Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan? Or will they be assigned to military units or choose alternative service?

I want those servicemen who exchanged their uniforms for civilian dress ahead of schedule to read these lines carefully. They have an opportunity to avoid criminal punishment for an act disgraceful to any man, desertion. I ask the parents and relatives of these soldiers to heed the magnanimous decree. A conviction of a son, brother or grandson will not elevate the families in the eyes of neighbors and acquaintances.

[Savelyev] It is also true, however, that many individuals left the unit because of intolerable service conditions. Their military superiors ridiculed and belittled them, and the commanders said nothing. Incidentally, do you have any ongoing cases involving hooliganism in the barracks?

[Kim] We do. They do not account for a large portion of the work of investigators, however. Theft of military property—most frightening is the theft of weapons, ammunition and explosives—is now a common thing. Human greed knows no bounds. The assault rifles, pistols, grenades and bullets are not being stolen for museum collections. They are taken to be sold.

Warrant Officer Kenik of the Tver Garrison was recently sentenced to 6 years of incarceration in a corrective labor colony and had his property confiscated. He stole weapons and ammunition.

The investigation of a case involving the theft of a set of pistols and bullets for them was recently completed and submitted to the court. And just who stole them? People in positions of authority: a major in the district missile and artillery section, the chief of the unit weapons storage section and the chief of the artillery dump.

At a time when criminals and extremists stalk sentries to capture their organic weapons, there were no barriers to scoundrels with authority.

[Savelyev] Do they stalk sentries here too?

[Kim] Yes, but the soldiers posted to guard military property ordinarily perform like true fightingmen. Private Mirzabekov, who serves in Surkhandarya Oblast, deserves great praise. A raid was made on his post. Acting in strict accordance with military regulations, he tried to stop the

uninvited guests with a shout. This did not work. He fired into the air. Again, no effect. He then fired to wound.

The prosecutor's office found nothing criminal in the soldier's actions. I believe the command element will honor him fittingly.

[Savelyev] Comrade Colonel, the district is living out its final days. Is the military property, combat equipment and gear which should belong to the armed forces of the republic being reliably protected?

[Kim] Agencies of the military prosecutor's office are keeping a close eye on the situation to see that things of value are not squandered on the sly. The prosecutor's office has had to issue warnings on the matter to district staff officials, however.

[Savelyev] Incidentally, what is the procedure for the legal experts when a case involves a citizen of another republic?

[Kim] Until recently this would have ended with an incomplete investigation. We recently had such a case. The criminal case of an officer transferred to Byelarus was left in limbo. We requested the military prosecutor there to extradite the individual to us. The reply: If you like, we shall complete the investigation begun in Tashkent, but we shall not permit a citizen of Byelarus to be mistreated.

The military legal experts will have a good word to say about the Tashkent meeting of heads of the independent states. Among other important documents they signed the Agreement on Law-Enforcement Agencies of the Joint Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It calls for a co-ordinated legal policy and law-enforcement praxis. We now have one less problem.

Only one less, though, unfortunately. The new military prosecutor's office has so many problems to resolve, not the least of which is the personnel problem. In the past

vacancies were filled by transferring officers from one district to another. Now we can only count on Uzbek legal experts serving in other republics at best. And there are only a few of them.

Military legal experts were previously trained for the army by the military institute. It provided cadres for all the armed forces of the former USSR. It has now come under Russian jurisdiction. We shall receive four young legal experts this year, to be sure. They were sent from Uzbekistan for training. After that we shall establish ties with the Tashkent Law Institute.

[Savelyev] Does no one in the territorial agencies want to don the shoulder boards?

[Kim] Love for the uniform has begun to fade in recent years. For various reasons. Furthermore, for a rayon investigator putting on the shoulder boards would be like turning a dentist into an oculist. Our work is too specific.

[Savelyev] Afanasiy Pavlovich, the prosecutor's range of jobs includes protecting the interests of the servicemen. Do the republic laws include social legal standards?

[Kim] I know that a package of such bills is ready for consideration in the Supreme Soviet. Their passage will serve as a good incentive to strengthen the defense capability of the armed forces of sovereign Uzbekistan.

[Savelyev] To conclude our interview, Comrade Colonel, permit me to congratulate you and all the workers in your agency with a glorious date, your 70th anniversary, which agencies of the prosecutor's office commemorated just recently.

[Kim] Thank you. All of us are finding it hard to live and work today. There are even more difficulties in the prosecutorial and investigative work. We are putting forth a noble effort, however, and making a perceptible contribution to the building of a law-based state.

ARMS TRADE

Role of Arms Sales in Social Protection of Servicemen

92UM1290A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Jul 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Military Commentator Pavel Feigengauer: "Arms Sales: How Much Are We Selling, To Whom, and How Much?: Contradictions within the Russian Government—The Opinions of the Parties Involved"]

[Text]

Conflict

An interview with Aleksandr Temerko, chairman of the Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, titled "Kvartira v obmen na oruzhiye" [An Apartment in Exchange for Weapons], was published in the 23 June issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. That article revealed the well-known contradictions at the very highest levels of government. Expert Council under the President Member Academician Petr Korotkevich in principle supported Temerko's position. At the same time, a quite uncomplimentary analytical note was composed at the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate].

New Vice Premier Georgiy Khizha also thought that this interview "disorients foreign and domestic business circles on the issues of Russian Federation military-technical cooperation." It was recommended that a disclaimer be published and that steps be taken to prevent such articles from now on.

Senior representatives of the departments concerned agreed to meet with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's military commentator and to express their opinions on the problems of arms sales.

THE POSITION OF RUSSIA'S MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations]

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) Deputy Minister Vladimir Shibayev commented on A. Temerko's interview. At MVES, he tracks operational-commercial issues, specifically, military-technical cooperation (arms sales). His comments reflect MVES's point of view.

There have been no agreements whatsoever with Aleksandr Temerko on the issues of coordinating arms sales. Temerko does not understand very well what arms sales are but he dares to discuss them, as a result of which Russian state policy in this sphere was discredited to a significant degree.

The government has authorized the Russian Ministry of Defense (in a 6 June regulation) to use only ruble resources obtained from the sale of freed up military equipment within the country (two of our departments are closely cooperating in this sphere) "to finance state programs for the social protection of servicemen".

Not one senior specialist associated with MVES could assess the possible cost of real exports of excess military equipment (above that which has already been offered for sale at the present time), not at \$20 billion or even at \$9 billion. Such numbers are utopia since they exceed by many times the current volume of "military-technical cooperation". MVES did not have any agreements whatsoever with anyone "to mutually respect each other's markets". That contradicts the state concept of "military-technical cooperation" which consists not of mutual respect of markets but in the unification of efforts and the coordination of activities on the single world market.

We consider it necessary to increase steps for the social protection of servicemen. That is our duty. We advocate earning a little more money and directing it toward social protection. We have reached an agreement on utilizing part of the foreign credit resources for social protection (for example, based on Spanish credit, several tens of millions of dollars). MVES has created a special commercial structure in "Tekhintorg" Association to coordinate with the Ministry of Defense. There have been no other agreements whatsoever.

The Republic of South Africa [RSA] and Taiwan were mentioned in the interview—Russia will not supply arms to them. UN sanctions still have not been lifted from the RSA; Russia does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the issue on "military-technical cooperation" with it is not on the agenda. The development of relations with the PRC is the official priority direction and any mentions of Taiwan could damage Russia's state interests.

Negotiations are being conducted with Pakistan but we must not violate a definite parity that has developed in this region through our arms deliveries and all activities must be coordinated with our traditional partners (first of all with India).

MVES knows nothing about the decisions made by legitimate state organs on the creation of a "special economic structure within the armed forces" with certain foreign trade rights for arms exports. So, today the Ministry of Defense simply does not have the right to conclude contracts for the sale of arms and MVES is not fighting for a monopoly on arms sales but for state benefit. Too many saviors have appeared in the Fatherland. They are attempting to solve social, agricultural and food issues through arms sales. So soon they will sell narcotics with those same "noble" goals.

MVES DOES NOT LIKE DILETTANTES

Serious pressure is actually being applied to MVES in favor of greater liberalization of arms sales. Recently President Yeltsin visited Omsk Oblast and once again reaffirmed (he had also previously expressed his opinion on this subject) that he advocates authorizing Omsk residents to sell some of the tanks that have accumulated in the oblast on the external market. "Send a request to the government—let's consider it".

A request addressed to Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar has actually arrived. Omsk residents are

requesting authorization to sell 2,000 tanks (of the 4,000 in the oblast). The tanks' types and modifications have not been indicated (simply "tanks") and also aircraft engines. But then again, this is what is written on one of the pages of the document that was submitted to the government: "2,000 thousand tanks", that is two million tanks. That is certainly a typographical error. "Most" [Bridge] Business Cooperation Association and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Revival] Fund must certainly be involved with the arms sale.

Furthermore, at the present time no official agreements whatsoever on the regulation of the production and sales of arms exist between the former republics of the USSR. An extremely difficult situation has developed with the sale of Soviet tanks (we have an especially large excess of that type of weapon). At one time, the USSR insisted that production of licensed T-72 tanks be initiated in Poland and Czechoslovakia (Soviet industry could not deal with the state order). Now their tanks, that are being sold at dumping prices, are competing with Russian tanks on the world market.

Furthermore, Ukraine is becoming actively involved in world arms sales (primarily tanks). All the more so that the primary specialized port from which Soviet tanks are shipped is located near Nikolayev, on Ukrainian territory. We have learned that Ukraine is conducting negotiations with Iran and with other countries. At the same time, this information is indirect since the Ukrainian authorities are officially refusing to respond in any way to requests from Moscow. There is also information that several hundred tanks have already been shipped abroad.

MVES is attempting to maintain the price for a T-72 at \$2 million (the market price of an American Abrams tank is \$5,200,000 and the market price for a British Challenger II is \$4,500,000). Now the price for a T-72 can be reduced to \$500,000, or even somewhat less—it will still be profitable for the producers to sell them. But when the T-80 comes out on the market which MVES would like to sell for \$3 million, it would be senseless—its technical specifications are so much better than the T-72's that they can request 5-10 times more.

An enormous number of people (based on data obtained at MVES) are attempting to become involved in arms sales: individuals and even some foreign trade associations: "Aviaeksport", "Promeksport", "Elektroorgtehnika", "Mashpriborintorg", "Sudoeksport", and so forth. MVES representatives told the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that Institute of Evolutionary Morphology and Ecology of Animals imeni A.N. Severtsov Associate V.V. Berezin offered an Australian firm (as an intermediary) tanks (T-72's and T-80's), fighters (MIG-29's, MIG-31's, and SU-27's), Kilo Class submarines, other combat ships, small arms, etc., during a recent trip to Australia. Just recently, offers have been received from the Sculptor Eurab Tsereteli (for the Disneyland organization), Yuriy Luzhkov, the Union of Children Without Parents, and

others. But they do not have the authorization and so far the matter is not proceeding beyond preliminary contacts.

MVES experts assert that it is impossible to sell more than several billion dollars worth of arms per year on the world arms market. You can drastically increase the volume of sales but prices will decrease accordingly. And it is impossible to sell to the RSA, Taiwan, etc., then they would take advantage of the opportunity to totally exclude Russia from the market.

Several major contracts on the sale of naval, aircraft and armored equipment are in the process of preparation at MVES. Negotiations are being concluded with Malaysia on a major deal for the delivery of aircraft. The most varied native intermediaries, including one very famous vaudeville singer, have attempted to interfere in the Malaysian contract.

Judging by the certain escalation of interethnic and regional conflicts, arms sales are proceeding much better on the domestic "black" market.

THE ARMS "BLACK" MARKET—POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES

"Official" arms merchants in general refuse to seriously discuss the problem of illegal arms sales. The argument is simple—right now no one in Russia issues official arms export licenses to private "firms" or individuals and it is impossible to pass through customs without the appropriate documents... But there are no real customs agents along a large part of Russia's borders. The unofficial export through third countries ("the nearer abroad") is quite real (there is indirect information that some deliveries have already reached a foreign "end" user through Central Asia). However, secret arm dealers are incapable of providing service and spare parts. But then again, the proposed "simplification" of the authorization for service and sales of spare parts can largely solve this problem.

The frequent promises of "freedom and independence" which President Yeltsin lavishly issues to the arms manufacturers have resulted in the fact that many domestic arms dealers have established adequately close contacts with foreign intermediaries for the preparation of contracts on the threshold of a "final solution of the issue at the highest level". Now, contacts will obviously be maintained even if the issue is not resolved positively, certainly including with those countries with which arms sales are banned right now.

But still the primary stream of illegal arms flows not onto the world but onto the domestic "black" market, especially in the Transcaucasus. While they attempt to deal with the problems of conversion in Russia, they are doing everything possible in Azerbaijan and especially in Armenia to develop their military-industrial potential and they are attempting to purchase production lines, and so forth. Local military depots are hardly bottomless and the intensity of combat operations increases with each passing day.

THE POSITION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET SPECIAL GROUP ON THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION

A small in number (nine people) parliamentary group has been formed in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, in which four permanent parliamentary committees and commissions are represented: on international affairs, on industry and energy, on defense and security, and on plans, budget, taxes and prices. This group will monitor arms exports. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium has already approved its operating procedures. Deputy Vitaliy Vitebskiy heads the group—he is a member of the parliamentary committee on industry (he worked as chief designer of a defense plant, later an association for 20 years—the production of “radiotechnical assemblies for aircraft and missiles”; primary civilian product—the “Aelita” Magnitola [a radio and tape recorder unit]).

We will prepare our conclusions for the Supreme Soviet Presidium on an annual military-technical cooperation plan and also on individual deals that were not included in the plan beforehand (I have in mind major deals for sums more than \$15,000,000, deliveries on credit and nonreimbursable aid, on certain types of weapons, the list of which we have yet to compile). The Group on Military-Technical Cooperation considers itself to be a presidium working organ and in contrast to the latter will not have the right to a “veto” in the sphere of arms sales. But we have already developed a climate of good working relations with MVES, KVTS [Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation], and other organizations that are associated with military-technical cooperation, so I think that we can resolve all issues at an early stage without open confrontation. On the issue with Libya, we were sooner unanimous with the entire system of military-technical cooperation but not with MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. (The sanctions for which we voted at the UN are directed not against Libya but only against Russia. Total losses from uncompleted contracts and as a result of the cessation of payments on existing contracts total billions of dollars).

However, there are well-known contradictions with MVES. Right now several foreign economic companies that will have the same rights as “Oboroneksport” “Spetsvneshtekhnika”, and GUSK [Main Directorate for Collaboration and Cooperation] are still in the process of review: “Aviaeksport”, “Promeksport”, “Obshchemasheksport”, “Mashpri-borintorg”, “Radioeksport”, “Sudoeksport”, and others. They are all former defense ministries export companies. Many enterprises have sought this (and justifiably sought this) for a long time—the reduction of ties to intermediaries. MVES has furiously insisted on its exclusivity. But a rational compromise on demonopolization and on increasing the independence of enterprises while maintaining reliable control was found under colossal pressure from above and below in favor of the total bacchanalia of overall arms sales “right and left”. All the more so that the “new” companies are closer to enterprises and have foreign trade experience in the sphere of “civilian” exports.

There was one other fundamental disagreement with MVES: on servicing delivered equipment. We think that we

need to grant enterprises the right to directly carry out servicing and supply spare parts for equipment that has already been sold. So far this has still not been adopted although the diagram of export controls for spare parts has been significantly eased as compared to normal procedures. But I think that we need to give major enterprises that are thirsting for the world market a chance to prove themselves.

With regard to A. Temerko's interview:

Serious problems were mixed up in the interview and, on the whole, the interview was not too competent. One mention, even in passing, of Taiwan could disrupt negotiations with the PRC, where right now we are looking at sums that are many times greater than we could ever get from Taiwan. Of course, we need to sell excess military equipment but it belongs to the state and the military themselves must not sell it although they (the military) should receive a large part of any possible profit. At the present time, the army authorities are stubbornly sabotaging the transfer of military equipment to industry for reprocessing. Military property is simply being stolen. A state program is needed but we don't know when there will be one. We are totally incapable of realizing a multitude of private, quite interesting proposals in the absence of a general solution.

Furthermore, too much power has been granted to the Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Yesterday, I received the text of the corresponding order of Russian Federation Minister of Defense General Grachev (No 23, 1 June 1992). The order clearly contradicts existing legislation and we will seek its repeal or amendment.”

THE MID'S [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS] OPINION

As a result of the publication of Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Chairman A.V. Temerko's interview in the 23 June 1992 issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, the content of which was disseminated through NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA agency channels and transmitted on the evening edition of the Russian Television program “VESTI”, the Russian Federation MID considers it necessary to state that, while carrying out arms exports to foreign countries, Russia is strictly guided by UN decisions, including on the embargo on deliveries of military equipment to individual states and by the international obligations it has assumed, including “Guiding Principles of Conventional Arms Deliveries” that was signed at the London Meeting of UN Security Council Permanent Members. The nature of bilateral relations with specific states and the situation in some region or other is also taken into account. In light of that, Russia specifically is not supplying arms to the Republic of South Africa, Taiwan, and so forth.

Russia also reaffirmed its adherence to its obligations in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Aleksandr Viktorovich was a minimum of two years late with his proposal to ship the most modern military equipment beyond the Urals: As we all know, in 1989-1990, the USSR made these airlift cargo movements and later undertook certain obligations with regard to these arms for their reduction and reconfiguration for

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national economic purposes, within the framework of the treaty and at the insistence of its participants.

A.V. Temerko permitted one more inaccuracy in his interview: he asserted that, in the UN, arms exporting countries have decided to declare the sums of contracts and the nomenclature of the manufactured items. In fact, a nondiscriminating Register of Conventional Arms is being created in the UN. In the event of its creation, weapons exporting and importing states will submit information to the UN on the physical amounts of primary types of weapons on the seven agreed categories that have been supplied or received by them. No agreements on declaration of the sums of contracts exist.

A MINISTRY OF DEFENSE EXPERT'S OPINION

Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Funtikov, Ministry of Defense first deputy chief for arms. He is a doctor of sciences, professor, and IAN [News of the Academy of Sciences] academician.

Funds are needed for the social protection of officers and for the construction of housing for those officers without apartments. If we don't manage to find these resources, social tension in the army and in society will inevitably increase.

Arms sales can certainly provide significant resources, if not immediately, then over the course of several years. Aleksandr Temerko and the Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense headed by him have undertaken to organize a special commercial structure which could organize the export of military equipment (commercial activity is not altogether appropriate for the armed forces themselves). This structure will be manned with specialists from the armed forces and also from MVES.

But this proposal originates not only from Temerko and he should not be blamed for it: Russian Federation Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev and Presidential Advisor Dmitriy Volkogonov also signed the representation to the president. And the president supported it.

There are inaccuracies in Temerko's NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA interview. Specifically, the RSA and Taiwan are mentioned. Official requests for arms actually have arrived from these countries but no one has made any decisions whatsoever about them. And, naturally, no one will supply arms to the planet's 'hot spots'. But then again, the most varied countries are turning to us: for example, recently a request arrived from South Korea for two old Scud rockets for \$3,000,000 (North Korea has many Scuds and the South would like to study them a bit better).

MVES sells arms quite professionally, including that which remains on the Ministry of Defense balance sheet, and not a single kopek from this activity comes our department's way. Although it is precisely we who allocate the equipment, we train foreign crews, pilots and tank crewmen, we send our specialists to other countries, we repair equipment, etc. MVES and its specialized structures are not interested in helping us but the Ministry of Defense cannot affect these bureaucratic structures. Furthermore, they

often just scare off potential buyers. MVES maintains the price of the MIG-29 at a level of \$24,000,000 but few countries are buying from them. We could sell them for \$20,000,000—our airfields are overflowing with these aircraft. (They were purchased from industry for 8,000,000 "wooden rubles").

We have gigantic supplies of arms and we will sell them ourselves. We have high class specialists. The KVTS (see the diagram) has been created and it is headed by Vice Premier Georgiy Khizha. Now we will be able to coordinate everything directly with KVTS where all interested departments are represented. The president and the government are supporting us.

A. TEMERKO: OUR GOAL IS SOCIAL PROTECTION OF INDIGENT OFFICERS

In my interview, nothing was said about an intention to begin supplying weapons to the RSA, Taiwan or Pakistan. The Ministry of Defense has actually received official requests for our equipment from these countries. These proposals are being systematized and studied but no official negotiations whatsoever are being conducted to conclude contracts. In any case, only the government (KVTS) can issue an authorization for military-technical cooperation with some country or other.

At the same time many times less budget resources are being allocated for the social infrastructure development of servicemen and this could result in a social upheaval in the army. In 1992-1993, they plan to build 2,000,000 square meters of housing which requires R22 billion. However, so far only R6.1 billion has been allocated (all figures are in 1991 prices—without considering the repeated price increases). One of the possible sources for making up the R15.9 billion deficit is arms sales, which I also talked about in my NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA interview.

However, that was not through an official statement, although I am an official. The sale of arms is not an end in itself for the army. The professional military and the officer corps are simply attempting to survive and preserve the army as the bulwark of the Russian State. But the majority of the military themselves do not know how to (and should not) engage in commerce. Therefore, they plan to form a new structure under the Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen.

In our activities, we will strictly adhere to Russian laws and fulfill all existing international treaties and UN requirements. Incidentally, this was also discussed in my interview and only those who see us just as competitors and who would like to preserve their monopoly rights through any means would note that statement. Unfortunately, our bureaucracy too often confuses state interests with departmental interests.

Our goal is not to take away commissions from someone but that the money that is received from the sale of army equipment returns to the army to resolve social problems. There is a specific address: Ministry of Defense Central

Finance Directorate (Lieutenant-General Vasiliy Vorobyev) that, along with the Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen, is fighting to obtain funds for maintaining social stability in the army.

Right now we are just beginning to form a commercial structure. You don't need to think that we will immediately (tomorrow) begin to sell arms. We intend to operate gradually, while coordinating our activities with all interested departments, with KVTS, and also with the Supreme Soviet (in the first stage, we plan to submit all deals for approval of the VTS group under the Supreme Soviet Presidium, regardless of the sum of the contract). And as for Russian MVES, capable and highly-professional specialists work there with whom we can always come to an agreement and work out mutually advantageous forms of cooperation in a state context.

CONCLUSION

Disputes about to whom and how to sell the excess arms that have accumulated over the long years of building developed socialism can appear to be ordinary squabbles which, incidentally, are quite frequent in the highest Russian bureaucracy. There's just one difference: only a few initiated were able to track the course of the struggle in previous Party times, but now a free press constantly brings something to the surface, since the very participants of the bureaucratic internecine warfare have rapidly adapted to living in an uncensored world and constantly use the press organs to propagandize some "opinion" or other.

Our departments learned long ago to fight for scarce resources but now all the more seriously: entire social groups are fighting for physical survival.

Obviously, diplomats from MID would like for there to be no arms sales at all—they get only unpleasantness and no profits whatsoever from it. This certainly is one of the reasons why Andrey Kozyrev's department enjoys a general dislike.


The rest would like to sell arms, but the external market is narrow and incomparable with the former internal market, when Goszakaz [State Order] swept out from plants practically everything that they could produce there. In better times, the USSR sold no more than \$14 billion worth of arms per year but of them \$10 billion were shipped practically at no charge. Now, when shipments at no charge have ceased, exports have been reduced by approximately that same sum. Hence, the contradictions between the army, the VPK [military-industrial complex], and MVES. If the army actually drops on a sufficiently narrow market just part of the reserves of modern weapons that have accumulated, many defense plants will finally have to come to an end.

But then again, it is the loss of the latter dollar hope that can finally prompt obstinate military-industrial complex directors toward genuine conversion which they are so far essentially avoiding (I have in mind not the production of consumer goods but the profound structural restructuring of production). Or the enterprises will become bankrupt and the directors along with them.

Russian industry will still not be able to develop without the closest cooperation with the "capitalist" countries (even in Turkey, the fundamental facilities of the radio electronics industry are better than in the native "space", "missile", and "nuclear" sectors). But for genuine conversion to be even somewhat conceivable, a no less conceivable defense doctrine is needed.

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Arms Sales: How Much Are We Selling, To Whom, and How Much? The Structure of the "Military-Technical Cooperation" System In Accordance with the Decree Dated 12 May



Key:

1. The President
2. The Government
3. Parliament, the Group on "VTS" ["Military-Technical Cooperation"] (leader—Vitaliy Vitebskiy)
4. The Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation (KVTS); Chairman—Vice Premier Georgiy Khizha; Commission Members: Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Petr Aven, Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, Minister of Industry Aleksandr Titkin, State Property Committee Chairman Anatoliy Chubays, Russian Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev, Foreign Intelligence Services General Director Yevgeniy Primakov, Minister of the Economy Andrey Nechayev, Minister of Finances Vasiliy Barchuk, Minister of Security Viktor Barannikov.
5. Working Organ under KVTS (Executive Secretary—Vladimir Shibayev)
6. Interdepartmental Working Group of Experts
7. Commission for Export Control Inspectorate (Chairman—Vladimir Sementsov)
8. MVES (Responsible—Deputy Minister Vladimir Shibayev)
9. Main Directorate for "VTS" (GUVTs) in MVES (Chief—Colonel Valeriy Mironov)
10. Commercial Structures for Arms Sales
11. "Oboroneksport (former GIU [main engineering directorate]) (Chairman—Sergey Karaoglanov)
12. "Spetsvneshtekhnika" (former GTU [main technical directorate]) (Chairman—General Valeriy Braylovskiy)
13. GUSK [main Directorate for Collaboration and Cooperation] (Chief—Valentin Trofimov)
14. New VT/O's [foreign trade associations]

EXPLANATION OF THE DIAGRAM

USSR MVES's specialized directorates were created in the 1950's. The situation in 1991 was as follows: Main Engineering Directorate (GIU)—deliveries of arms and military equipment; Main Technical Directorate (GTU)—construction of military facilities and also plants and organizations of licensed military production abroad, repair of military equipment, and construction of special facilities (for example, mausoleums in Angola); Main Directorate for Collaboration and Cooperation (GUSK)—the transfer of licenses and cooperation in the production of military equipment (primarily with socialist countries).

GTU and GIU have already been transformed into commercial associations. A joint-stock company, with the involvement of the league of defense enterprises, is being created based on GUSK and also with individual major producers. They are also proposing making "Spets-vneshtekhnika" a joint-stock company.

All fundamental decisions on deliveries of military equipment are reviewed in KVTS. The "first" individuals of the primary interested departments meet in this commission. All appeals from regional and administrative structures, and individual enterprises ultimately come to KVTS. KVTS has a small working organ which prepares sessions jointly with the interdepartmental group of experts (all of these same nine interested departments are represented in it). The government makes a decision and the issue comes down for execution based on KVTS's recommendations.

KVTS has been convened two times altogether (from the moment the decree was signed) since it has been difficult to bring together these so-busy men. Obviously, in the future KVTS will function like a politburo—through the method of polling through a "small valve" where each will be able to sign on.

Right now three commercial trade structures exist under the aegis of MVES and a precise delineation of rights and obligations, mandatory under the previous regime, is not being complied with too much in the current "market" times. Furthermore, in the near future, other foreign trade associations may obtain the right to participate in military-technical cooperation with foreign countries along with MVES "firms". Therefore, a coordinating and controlling organ—GUVTS—has been created in the MVES structure. It is GUVTS that issues export licenses (for some deal or other) which the customs service accepts for execution. The Ministry of the Economy Export Control Commission monitors the transfer of new technologies, know-how, and licenses.

Soviet Weapons Supplies to ANC Detailed

924C2130A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Aug 92 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Abarinov under the rubric "Investigation": "The ANC's Secret Arms Caches: Will the Rifle Hanging on the Wall Fire? Soviet Tanks in Southern Africa Will Crush the Attempt at National Reconciliation Instead of Apartheid"]

[Text] The whole world knows that the military units of the African National Congress [ANC] were being supplied from Moscow, as well as the fact that the deliveries have now been curtailed. Quite recently, however, this topic has again come into the limelight: It came out that the ANC continues to keep considerable supplies of Soviet arms on the territories of Angola and perhaps some other countries.

On 9 June Duncan Sellars, chairman of the International Freedom Foundation [IFF] (a nongovernmental organization headquartered in Washington, DC), sent a letter to Brent Scowcroft, the U.S. President's national security adviser, in which he relayed his suspicions in this respect; he provided a quite detailed list of arms stored in Angola and named five geographic points within a 200-mile radius of Luanda where, in his opinion, these arms are kept. According to IFF data, the Angolan Government demanded that the ANC take the arms out of the country so they would not fall into the hands of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in the event the latter wins the September elections. Sellars maintains that the ANC has already appealed to the Governments of Zambia and Namibia with a request to permit the storage or transit of the arms on the territory of these countries, and that Zambia has already denied the request. Sellars drew the attention of the Washington administration to the point that if this fact is confirmed (the author of the letter refers to "reliable sources in Angola"), it represents a gross violation of the 22 December 1988 trilateral agreement between Angola, Cuba, and the RSA [Republic of South Africa], as well as the peace accords signed by the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA on 31 May 1991. Sellars proposed that as one way to ensure compliance with the Angola accords the U.S. Government should send to this country an observer mission—either an American one or under the aegis of the United Nations. If these suspicions are confirmed, the arms must be confiscated and handed over to the united Angolan army after the general elections.

Sellars' allegations produced quite a reaction in South Africa. The ANC's Press Secretary Carl Niehaus issued an official rebuttal, in which he called Sellars' contentions "cheap propaganda." However, on the third day after the rebuttal the RSA's largest Sunday newspaper, the SUNDAY TIMES, reported that it has in its possession a list of arms belonging to the ANC and stored at the Grafanil base 12 miles east of Luanda, that is, precisely one of the five points named by Sellars (I doubt it was a mere coincidence, but what is the difference anyway). The document is dated February of this year and is signed by the ANC representative in Luanda, Lister Makeke. Among the items on the list are five "Russian tanks," five armored personnel carriers, a grenade launcher, 2,188 AK-47 automatic rifles, 727 Makarov handguns, 22 machine guns, 6 sniper rifles, 11,575 kg of trinitrotoluene, 800 kg of plastic explosives, 32 field binoculars, as well as large quantities of ammunition. The same day, Carl Niehaus denounced this information, calling it "an outright lie." Soon, however, Joe Modise, commander of the ANC's military wing "Umkhonto we Sizwe," confirmed the presence of "considerable," in his words, supplies of arms belonging to the

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ANC on the territory of Angola. "Angola is a sovereign country and does not need anybody's permission," he also said. Mr. Modise is wrong. He forgot about the international agreements on Angola, to which Duncan Sellars quite properly refers in his letter to General Scowcroft. That is why the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Angolan Government for explanations. Finally, the story was brought up at a UN Security Council meeting, where South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Roelof Botha reported, in addition to the details already known, another scandalous fact: The ANC representative in Harare had received instructions to start moving the arms currently stored in Zimbabwe to the South African province of Transvaal, and on top of that, the Zimbabwe army will be assisting with this operation.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reports quite extensively on events in the RSA. It is hardly necessary to explain to our readers how complex and unpredictable the situation in that country became after the ANC leaders refused to continue negotiations with the de Klerk government within the framework of the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA), accusing the latter of being party to numerous acts of violence. During the last two years at least 1,200 people have died in black settlements; the law enforcement service lost 120 people this year alone. During the same period police confiscated more than 19,500 units of firearms, including more than 8,500 AK-47 automatic rifles. In these circumstances, the battlefield cry "Kill the Boers!" coming from the ANC ranks is not an empty threat. As recently as 29 July, ANC President Nelson Mandela acknowledged the existence of serious disagreements in the ANC leadership and warned of the danger of the general strike turning into a riot. So far, this has not happened; however, the very first day of the strike that started on 3 August was marked by new casualties. It is quite obvious that unless the ANC's foreign arms caches are cut off in time, they are capable of setting blood flowing in the country and turning back the process of national reconciliation. Right now it is important at least to know how large these caches are.

I decided to find out from the Main Administration for Military-Technical Cooperation of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, since this department has complete information on the export of Soviet arms. The complete data on the ANC were made available to me.

Deliveries to the ANC started in 1963 and completely ceased in 1990. Naturally, the arms were not delivered to the RSA, but rather to third countries. During different periods, and depending on the political situation, these countries were Tanzania and Angola. It is hard to judge the volume by its monetary value, especially in rubles, but I will provide the data anyway. The total volume of aid during the entire period amounted to about 61 million rubles [R], of which R52 million went on deliveries, of which, in turn, the share of civilian goods amounted to R16 million. The remaining R36 million is special property—that is, arms. Naturally, all the aid to the ANC was rendered on a free-of-charge basis.

Now let us compare the information I have with the list published in the South African press.

First of all: The ANC did indeed have almost all of the equipment listed. In a number of cases the quantities mentioned constitute a considerable part of the total volume of shipments. This applies, for instance, to obsolete types of firearms: there cannot possibly be more than 24 of the 100 small-caliber TOZ-8 rifles left in the hands of the ANC. Unfortunately, the situation is considerably worse when it comes to more serious arms: Out of 3,362 SKS carbines supplied by the USSR, the list mentions only 19. Of the total number of Kalashnikov automatic rifles of various issue (I should note that we are talking only about Soviet-made arms—those made in China, Yugoslavia, Korea, and Czechoslovakia are listed as a separate line item)—approximately one-quarter. About that many Makarov handguns (727 out of 3,400), 100 out of 597 TT handguns, and none of the 168 PPSh automatic rifles and 2,000 Stechkin handguns. Approximately one-third (228) of the CG-43, RP-46, RPD, DP, and DPM machine guns (Degtyarev machine guns more than any others), and only 22 out of 162 PKM machine guns. Out of 275 grenade launchers—the only AGS-17 and a small quantity of ammunition for an SPG-9. Of the entire quantity of anti-aircraft armaments, approximately one-fifth is kept in Grafanil: none of the four 82-mm B-10 recoilless guns and 63 BM mortars, while of the 90 Grad-P rocket launchers there are 37 (there are, however, substantial quantities of ammunition for each of the aforementioned types). Finally, worth mentioning is the portable Strela-2M anti-aircraft missile launcher (although specialists are rather skeptical about it): the document lists 20 out of 41 launch mechanisms (not a single missile for it is listed, however). The same specialists praise highly the antitank missile launcher Malyutka: The ANC had 20 of them, plus 100 missiles, so there is a maximum of 11, plus 73 missiles, at other storage sites.

This is all, actually, except for one mystery: the five, according to South African newspapers, "Russian tanks" and five armored personnel carriers (in his letter to General Scowcroft Duncan Sellars even named the model: BRDM). There was no such shipment! During all the years in question Moscow gave the fighters against apartheid two BTR-60PB's; there were two BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles—but again, two, not five—and no tanks at all. The question is: Where did the ANC get them? My guess, as Vysotskiy used to sing—it is all quite simple. In addition to the ANC, Moscow also supplied SWAPO [the South-West African People's Organization]—the Namibian insurgents. In this case, by the way, the figures are much more impressive: for instance, the quantity of firearms units is 6.5 times greater than the number of fighters in the SWAPO army, while the total volume of special shipments is valued at R157.3 million. Among other things, SWAPO also received large quantities of armored vehicles and tanks—also through Angola, by the way; of armored personnel carriers alone there were 97—and more modern ones than those for the ANC, by the way. They were supposed to get 16 T-54B tanks, but never received any—next to the figure there is a small note: Not handed over by

the Angolan side. Would the five tanks plus the five armored personnel carriers discovered near Luanda not be from this particular shipment?

From 1982 to 1985 Colonel General Konstantin Kurochkin worked as the chief Soviet military adviser in Luanda; until 1988 he used to visit Angola at the invitation of the president, for consultations. Directly subordinate to him were not only the 220 thousand-strong Angolan army and the 40,000-strong Cuban contingent, but also a SWAPO brigade which, despite protestations on the part of Sam Nujoma, he used in operations against the armed forces of Jonas Savimbi. (General Kurochkin tried to bring in two ANC battalions but, in his words, they turned out to be "not serious troops.") The chief military adviser's apparatus alone had 700 staff members. During a conversation with me, Konstantin Yakovlevich recalled without any prompting the fact—how to put it mildly—of the Angolan Government's incomplete transfer to their destination of eight or 10 tanks designated for SWAPO ("grabbed them," said the general, without mincing words). Kurochkin described to me in full color how he "raised hell and contacted Moscow," and how Moscow in the end replied: "Konstantin Yakovlevich, stop pushing, nothing will come of it anyway." And nothing did.

In the general's opinion, it is unlikely that the Angolans would transfer the arms to the ANC: They themselves had limited supplies ("some 10 or 20 thousand automatic rifles and about 1,500 machine guns"), although Moscow satisfied all Luanda's requests promptly. Well, could the Cubans make a gift of heavy equipment to the ANC before leaving Angola—after all, it would be costly to take it to Cuba? To this, General Kurochkin said that he had "misreadings"—as he put it—with the Cubans more than once: The chief military adviser seemed unable to make them fight properly. By the way, he appraises the fighting capacity of the Angolan army much higher than that of the Cubans). In 1983 the arguments reached all the way to Fidel; he complained to the Politburo, and General Varenikov showed up on an inspection tour in Luanda; all of this ended, however, with Kurochkin being invited to Havana where he was awarded the Che Guevara Order of First Degree.

As to the arms, the general told me an interesting detail. Apparently the Cubans were offering to leave all their heavy equipment (Moscow mainly supplied them with obsolete types—T-34, MiG-19, MiG-21) to the Angolans, and instead receive from the USSR brand new replacements upon arrival home. Kurochkin does not know whether this plan worked: By that time he was completely removed from Angolan affairs.

On the whole, however, the chief military adviser had only an indirect relation to supplying the ANC and SWAPO—military intelligence was working directly with these organizations.

In the opinion of Vladimir Karpov, an officer in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the campaign involving the discovery of ANC weapons storage sites is aimed at discrediting the ruling party in Angola on the

threshold of the general elections set for the end of September. He also drew my attention to the fact that the government in Luanda does not control the entire territory of the country. This is true, of course, but the arms caches were in fact discovered on territory that is controlled by Luanda. As to the domestic political situation in Angola, it is, of course, extremely complex; each of the opposing sides—that of MPLA President dos Santos and UNITA's Jonas Savimbi—is eager to accuse the opponent of violating the trilateral agreements, and both violate them right and left. The process of forming a single national army is proceeding sluggishly; the demobilization condition is practically not being complied with; and arms are being stashed away in secret places. In these conditions the government indeed could do without arms caches it does not control.

Unfortunately, the Foreign Intelligence Service does not know whether the arms supplied to the ANC in Angola or Tanzania could end up in Zimbabwe, and would not venture any hypotheses in this respect.

Vladimir Karpov also told me that all decisions regarding support for the ANC were made at Staraya Square, at the level of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat; the KGB was only to carry out the decisions, which as a matter of fact quite often contradicted its own information.

Actually, I did not have any doubts regarding this latter part.

MiG Design Bureau Official on Exports, Trade
92UM1368B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Aug 92 First edition p 3

[Interview with OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan Chief Designer, Academician Rostislav Apollosovich Belyakov, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Aleksandr Andryushkov: "To Whom and How To Sell Aircraft: OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan Chief Designer, Academician R.A. Belyakov, Shared his Opinion on That Score With Our Correspondent"]

[Text]

[Andryushkov] Rostislav Apollosovich, we have known since time immemorial that arms sales are a profitable business. Today, even we have begun to talk about that aloud. But that is what puts us on guard: not only state structures but also commercial organizations and even private individuals are participating in the sale of ground, sea, and air military equipment. Recently, a report was issued that the Moscow Oblast Administration plans to sell MiG-29 fighter aircraft and is seeking an export license from the Russian Government. What do you think on that score?

[Belyakov] Today, Russian aircraft builders occupy one of the leading places in the world in the production of military aircraft, to which other countries are competing. For example, many armies would like to have the MiG-29 fighter aircraft in their arsenal, after its triumphal demonstration in 1988 at Farnborough. German pilots fly it with

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pleasure and there are proposals to purchase the MiG-29 for the Bundeswehr Air Force.

And the opinion has already formed that the aviators who work in the defense industry live in clover because they sell aircraft. But in fact there aren't any sales. Not a single aircraft was sold in 1991. The problems are as follows. First of all, already in the former USSR, arms sales were entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. They did not enlist us, the aircraft developers, in sales.

Today, all of the former services have shifted to Russian structures in their previous form. They do not have the skills to sell combat aircraft. For example, I do not see any restructuring in their work. There are only small attempts. A buyer respects professionals who do not simply want to sell him their goods but can also competently explain its advantages in contrast to others.

Second, throughout the world, they understand that the level of the Russian MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft is very high and that they exceed the much vaunted F-16, F-18, and other foreign aircraft in many parameters.

So far, there is no such weapons control system abroad like there is on the MiG-29 and Su-27. There is no analogous system to our optical-radar equipment which operates both autonomously and in combination with other onboard systems. We have also turned out to be ahead in the effectiveness of weapons utilization. Until the invasion of conversion into the defense industry, collectives were created in the country which combined in themselves science, research, flight testing, and series production. The state supported them and that explains why our aircraft builders were the leaders and the state won prestige in the world.

But there were and are problems in aircraft sales. Our Western competitors don't want to let us in to the foreign market. There is a precise guideline there: force Russia out of all regions. The foreign press does not let a chance slip by to defame Russia aviation. It's unfortunate that some of our own publications also facilitate that. The lack of perfection of native trading structures cannot withstand such pressure. And there is one other misfortune: everyone wants to participate in the sale of military equipment. As you said, it is a profitable business. But it must enrich the state and not the offices. My opinion: the supplier himself must sell the commodity, in this case, aircraft, with the participation of only the state foreign trade organization. Without a chain of intermediaries who are only interested in ensuring that something comes their way.

In this situation of hopelessness, we ourselves have begun to take the initiative. We have created "MIGservis," an organization that combines the design bureau and the manufacturing plant. There are no intermediaries in it to impede the delivery of aircraft and spare parts to the

consumer. The design bureau is working together with the plant that builds MiGs, that is "Znamya truda" [Banner of Labor], and with an organization that sells our product. In the process, we don't need any sponsors, besides the state. With the participation of the foreign trade authorities, it must issue a military equipment sales license only to the supplier. Today that is the main path in the sale of military aircraft. I reported on that to the President of Russia.

[Andryushkov] Don't let my question appear to be improper, but what portion of the profit will the design bureau get from the sale of the product?

[Belyakov] Until quite recently, the developers didn't get any profits whatsoever from the sale of aircraft abroad. All of the hard currency went to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. It allocated crumbs for us for representation during international airshows abroad. The ministry never provided hard currency incentives to the design bureau for its creativity. Whether an aircraft went into series production or for sale abroad or if it remained a single copy—it doesn't matter, survive on your own.

In 1991, we came to an agreement with the manufacturing plant so that it would allot certain sums to us from aircraft sales. And this year we hope that we will receive some sort of profit share if we manage to sell a shipment of MiG-29 or MiG-31 aircraft. Even if it is 10 percent of the proceeds, we will be able to materially support people, conduct development and introduce new ideas into aircraft design. In the appeal to the President of Russia, we are requesting 15 percent of the proceeds for the design bureau fund from the sale of our aircraft abroad. I don't know if that will be implemented. We will not survive without a material incentive. First of all we are losing cadres and we are losing prestige in the world along with them and Russia may be left on the fringe of aircraft production. Russia's defense industry is being irreparably damaged.

[Andryushkov] Rostislav Apollosovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA congratulates one of Russia's oldest aircraft collectives on the approaching Air Force Day. One more question to conclude the interview: what do you expect from "Mosaeroshoy-92" [Moscow Airshow-92] that opened in the Moscow suburbs?

[Belyakov] That is the first airshow in our country. The Design Bureau imeni A.I. Mikoyan is not exhibiting the latest achievements at it. For now—they are the design bureau's secret. But all modern combat aircraft will be displayed at static displays and in the air. We are prepared to respond to any question from both aircraft enthusiasts and from professionals. And we will be happy to meet with our foreign colleagues with whom we are ready to cooperate. You'll see the rest at the exhibition. The Design Bureau imeni Mikoyan Pavilion invites everyone to visit.

[Andryushkov] Thank you.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Feature on Arzamas-16 Nuclear Weapons Center 92UM1296A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jul 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Fireballs"]

[Text] The director of the memorial museum described the tragedy in detail because he himself had survived that day. "I was about 1.5 kilometers from the epicenter. An unexpectedly bright light struck me in the eyes, I was blinded, and later my clothing began to burn on me... Horrible pain and I lost consciousness," he said and was silent because he saw that tears were streaming down the academician's cheeks. Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov was crying.

That was in Hiroshima, at the city's memorial museum which Academician Sakharov mandatorily wanted to visit when he arrived in Japan.

"I can only say one thing: we are not to blame for what occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yes, we developed nuclear weapons, yes, we worked day and night, yes, we hoped that this would help to prevent a nuclear war on Earth and, in my opinion, this played its role...", that was how Andrey Dmitriyevich responded to a Japanese television commentator's question.

Sakharov talked not only for himself but for all of those who together with him developed nuclear weapons at Arzamas-16.

We must always remember the words of the great 20th century scientist and humanitarian when it is a question of Russia's Federal Nuclear Center. It is thanks to the work and talent of the people of Arzamas-16 that the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not lie on our people's conscience and that not once has there been an accident with nuclear weapons.

The history of Arzamas-16 numbers a bit less than half a century. From the very day when Stalin ordered the construction of an atomic "facility" no closer than 400 kilometers from Moscow. The ancient city of Sarov where a small military plant was located was four kilometers farther. When P.M. Zernov, who became the first director, and Yu.V. Khariton, the permanent scientific leader of the development of nuclear weapons, climbed the bell tower and caught sight of the boundless expanses that spread out beyond the city, they decided: "Atomgrad will be here!"

Right now Arzamas-16 is one of the world's largest scientific centers. Unfortunately, the crisis that has encompassed our society has had to affect even it.

The train was stopping. There was forest to the right and to the left and there were metal gates ahead. A strange landscape, isn't that so?

The soldiers and sergeants examined the documents and inspected the train no less painstakingly than border guards.

A sergeant I had met, embarrassed, asked me for a cigarette. It turned out that the lads had already been sitting at the KPP [entry control point] for a week without something to smoke...

Secret facilities, secret test sites, and a secret city. But the streets are painfully familiar because they bear very famous names—they preserve the memory of people of whom we are justifiably proud: Kurchatov, Sakharov, Zeldovich, Zernov, Muzrukov, Shchelkin... And their portraits and still dozens of others—thrice and twice Heroes, Lenin, Stalin, and State Prize laureates—the entire cream of 20th century physics—are at the Scientists Club. No matter which name you select—it is the history of science.

Our nation's intellectual might was concentrated in the nuclear bomb—whether we wanted that or not, that's the way it was. Therefore, it was also concentrated at Arzamas-16...

The request for a cigarette at the KPP threatens the soldier with an extra detail. Those are the rules here.

But what other danger threatens?

The local newspaper SAROV obtained the text of this announcement:

"Arzamas-16 Russian Nuclear Center specialists who are up to 40 years old and who do not have housing, but who have experience in the development, testing and fine tuning of original designs, and also doctors who serve the nuclear center's workers are ready to work for hire on a contract basis with the granting of well-appointed housing in any region of Russia and also outside its borders."

Fortunately, the newspaper did not list the address to which to inquire and published this commentary: "We do not think that this is a question of bomb-making specialists. We do not think that this is a question of leading specialists and that a serious threat of a 'nuclear brain drain' abroad exists. Leading bomb-making specialists have been tolerably provided for by Russian standards."

"Tolerably"—the newspaper reporters somewhat exaggerated that. In the evening, we met with the leaders of the Union of Nuclear Weapons Developers—this organization appeared, which unites the "bomb-makers" of both centers—Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. And our conversation was precisely about the lack of social protection for people who risk their health and lives each day while providing security for you and me. There are more than enough examples of their difficult situation. Well, let me cite just one: Until recently their salaries were one third lower than that of the railcar conductor that carries them from Arzamas to Moscow. Or about the "agricultural amusement" of the doctors of science. Almost everyone of the experts has acquired a garden for himself, mandatorily plants potatoes there, and hurries a bit faster to finish his work so he can visit his field.

"It is simply difficult to live without personal plots," admitted one of the developers. "We have families, children..."

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It is about this that they wrote in their appeal to the President of Russia and to the Supreme Soviet. As we all know, B.N. Yeltsin visited Arzamas-16. He saw the "items" with his own eyes—from the very first to modern ones. "Russia needs you!" he said and immediately signed the Decree on the Creation of Two Federal Nuclear Centers. The President left but the government machinery is barely turning—so, thus far substantial changes have not occurred in the life of Arzamas-16.

We had a long, detailed conversation with VNIEF [All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Energy and Physics] Director Vladimir Aleksandrovich Belugin—I hope to be able to describe it in more detail in the future when possible. We discussed both the fate of the center, the situation of the experts, nuclear weapons, and the life of Belugin himself. One of my questions was:

"What are you as director proudest of?"

"First of all the people," he responded, "and naturally the traditions. Hundreds of people began the traditions and the traditions have developed over the decades. Our oblast was created comparatively recently, it is one of the youngest. From the very beginning, it took hold of everyone that they are doing something very serious, very needed, and very dangerous and without which the country could not survive. A sense of high responsibility took hold of the people... Recently the vice-governor came to visit us and he became acquainted with conversion. He was interested in how we can help the Transvolga Region. We showed him our work for copper-smelting combines... Through our techniques, we are reducing by several times the demand for electrical energy, the quality is incomparable and the work rate is high. We are doing all of this using explosions—we have a high culture of work with conventional explosives. We detonate 18 spots simultaneously and we forge it... The vice-governor watched and later began to ask questions, he said, why are there so many instructions, can't you reduce them? We responded: we have a tradition of thinking about any situation, including the most improbable. Unfortunately, our traditions of responsibility, a serious attitude toward the assigned task and toward danger may be broken because those two or three generations that began to and are developing nuclear weapons are slowly leaving the scene and there are practically no young people among us. If in better times we hired 500, 600, or even 800 young specialists from the best institutes, now they simply do not come to us because there are neither housing nor salaries. The old people will leave, the traditions will be broken, and everything will end... There will be a facility, fantastic equipment, but there won't be any specialists... It is exceptionally important to preserve the traditions.

One of the most acute problems of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center is hidden behind the director's emotional monologue. No, not the future of the institute itself but the fate of nuclear weapons. We talked about that with various people, including with the "brain center", I have in mind VNIEF's scientific leadership—Academicians Khariton, Trutnev, Pavlovskiy, and Negin and Chief Designers Voronin and Romanov and many others.

The main conclusion was: "We need definitiveness!"

Russia has no military doctrine and there is no state program for nuclear weapons and therefore people do not know their future and are not confident in it. All the more so that some decisions that directly affect them are being made unexpectedly and they only learn about them over the radio... During the years of perestroika, it had already become a tradition to talk a lot about nuclear disarmament, to advance new doctrines, and to convene conferences and congresses. So many nuclear weapons advisors appeared near M. Gorbachev, and then B. Yeltsin, L. Kravchuk, and N. Nazarbayev that one could only wonder—where did they come from? And proposals began to rain down on the presidents that were so outwardly enticing that it was difficult to stand one's ground and therefore so many ridiculous mistakes have been made during the last six years for which they have had to blush because they frequently were unfeasible albeit for technical reasons. Neither the former president nor the current ones either have in their entourage a man who knows nuclear weapons and the majority of the advisors have never even seen a nuclear bomb with their own eyes... And all rational initiatives—I stress, all!—emerged precisely at Arzamas-16. This also concerns the drastic reduction of testing, the increase of weapons safety, the elimination of some types and, finally, the fate of tactical nuclear weapons! And no matter how much some people have tried to ascribe these ideas on disarmament to themselves in their search for popularity and who have immediately accused the bomb-makers of being "hawks", they are not achieving anything worthwhile because there can be no question of any disarmament whatsoever without Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70! The planet's safety first of all depends precisely on the scientists and specialists of these centers and their work, not in the potato fields, but in the laboratories.

An enormous scientific potential has been accumulated at the Federal Nuclear Center. And we can and need to use it not only, even not so much for the development of weapons, but practically in all sectors of industry, science, and in our lives.

"We have unique machine tools, including lasers, plasma, and so forth," said V. Belugin. "We are thinking about how to use them most effectively in various spheres. We have an 'Iskra-5' laser. The Americans have a more powerful one. I visited their equipment and saw it. I must say: their engineers are not as good as ours. Their equipment is very unwieldy, although their laser is only three times more powerful. But it costs one hundred times as much!... There are sectors in which we have moved far ahead. We have undertaken, one more example, the intensification of the extraction of oil. The Americans are spending enormous amounts of money just for experimental work but we can already pulverize rock up to 200 meters using shaped charges. That permits us to increase the extraction of oil by a factor of three. Right now they are extracting 30-40 percent from wells and we are proposing 90! We have conducted tests, submitted our conclusions—our methods are several hundred times cheaper than the Americans' methods... But why are they being given the preference? In

general, the Russian Federal Nuclear Center has accumulated enormous intellectual potential—it needs to be widely and rationally utilized.

We can also end our first meeting with Arzamas-16 on this note but I will nevertheless ask you to return to Hiroshima. There I became acquainted with a woman who survived the nuclear bombardment.

"When I found my way up, a horrible picture unfolded in front of me," said the woman. "Fireballs were flying down the street. They overtook people and the people burst into flame... Later a black rain fell..."

The scientists of Arzamas-16 discovered the secrets of the fireballs and that became the guarantee of the fact that they did not appear on the streets of our cities in the past and, I hope, we will never see them in the future.

Results of Moscow Air Show Reviewed 92UM1392B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Andryushkov and Velentin Rudenko under the rubric "Mosaeroshou-92": "A New Height for Russia"]

[Text] All last week, from 11 through 16 August, the skies over the Moscow area were given over to the aviation. The first Russian aerospace show, Mosaeroshou-92, was being held at Zhukovskiy Airfield—still top-secret today—which is the center for Russia's aircraft engineering.

The results of the air show are still being summed up, but it is already clear that it was one of the largest aviation events in the world. Mr. J. Glache, president of the West German company Glache International KG, commented that those foreign aircraft companies which did not participate in Mosaeroshou undoubtedly regretted it. They would not see much of what was exhibited at the show either at Le Bourget or Farnborough.

Enormous interest was shown in Mosaeroshou-92 by everyone from members of government to aviation fans from far-off Kamchatka. Even when the exhibition was catering to journalists, daily attendance ranged between 10,000 and 15,000 a day. During the actual air show more than 130,000 people attended.

We know that the idea of holding international air shows in Russia was up in the air for a long time. The nation's former leadership viewed the matter from a purely practical standpoint, however, believing that there would be no return on the investment.

The promoters of the current exhibit did not expect an immediate profit either. They regard it as a large-scale production venture, which will begin to generate revenues in a few years. Some of the outlays have already been recouped, however.

Yuriy Nagayev, general director of the exhibit, reports that the Russian side spent 85 million rubles to organize the

exhibit, with 60 million going for road construction and municipal improvements and 25 million spent on the exhibition complex.

What the promoters of Mosaeroshou-92 managed to do in three and a half months—and that record time is the short amount allowed to set it up—is a real miracle. The aerospace complex they built can compare with the most prestigious exhibition complex in Paris. The total area for exhibiting actual specimens of aviation, space and missile equipment is 160,000 square meters; pavilion space totals 20,000.

The exhibit has exceeded all expectations. A total of 214 Russian and 69 foreign aircraft associations, OBKs [experimental design offices], series-production plants, scientific research institutes, associations and other firms participated in it. A total of 114 aircraft were shown, from ultra-light to strategic missile-carrying aircraft and the Buran reusable spacecraft. Many of them—the Tu-160, Tu-22MZ, Su-27M, Yak-141 and Il-102, for example—were on display for the first time.

The exhibit unquestionably contributed to the strengthening of cooperation and the exchange of expertise with foreign aviation firms and also among our own, Russian firms. It is well known that following the collapse of the USSR many production ties were broken, and this did not have a positive effect upon aircraft engineering.

During Mosaeroshou-92 and the aviation celebration in Tushino our pilots made flights together with pilots from Western nations. Following a flight with test pilot Roman Taskayev, the commander of a Bundeswehr air regiment which has a squadron of MIG-29s, Mr. Menge, stated that there was no enemy this pilot could not defeat flying the MIG.

People frequently ask how many contracts were concluded during the exhibit. It should be pointed out that contracts are ordinarily not concluded at air shows. This takes many years. Mosaeroshou-92 was an exception, however. A number of agreements were signed for purchases of Russian aviation equipment abroad with the participation of the state foreign trade associations Aviaekspor and Oboroneksport. Nor were our aviation companies left out. On opening day for the exhibit an agreement was signed by the Russian Aeroflot International Airlines, the Aviation Complex imeni S.V. Ilyushin and the Voronezh Aviation Production Association for the purchase of 20 Il-96M aircraft by Russian Aeroflot International Airlines, beginning in 1995. Specialists with the Ilyushin, Pratt Whitney and Collins firms and the Aviation Complex imeni S.V. Ilyushin are presently working together on the development of this aircraft. It was simultaneously announced that an order had been placed by the Uzbek National Airlines for three Il-96M aircraft. The next day an agreement was signed by the Russian Aeroflot International Airlines, the Collins company and the Aviation Complex imeni S.V. Ilyushin for installation of the TKAS-II system for the prevention of air collisions on Il-86 aircraft now in service. Honeywell, one of the leading Western companies, formed

a new Russian company called Honeywell Aviation Control Moscow to outfit passenger planes with the latest piloting and navigation equipment and delivered the first set for the new Tu-204 liner.

Anatoliy Bratukhin, general director of the Department of Aviation Industry of the Russian Federation, stated that Mosaeroshou-92 demonstrated to the entire world the fact that Russia has a unique capability for holding regular international air shows. The first step has been taken in that direction.

Aviation events in the capital to celebrate Airline Day were not limited to Zhukovskiy.

A large aviation celebration was held in Tushino, at which the best pilot groups and pilots from the Air Force and pilots and sports parachutists from Russia's Technical Sports Defense Society demonstrated breath-taking flying skills and gripping aerial stunts. Major Avn Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, who attended the show, commented that even during what we call the period of stagnation, there was no stagnation in aviation, a fact convincingly demonstrated by the pilots on their holiday.

Army Gen Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, rated the pilots' skills highly.

In Moscow in recent days thousands of Muscovites and visitors to the capital have had an opportunity to view a unique aviation museum at which was assembled an extremely extensive collection of Russia's planes, helicopters and other aircraft. There were also demonstration flights and displays by parachutists and model aircraft enthusiasts.

After what they saw at Mosaeroshou-92, at Tushino and Monino, the spectators believe Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy's prediction that Russia will rebound as a truly great aviation power.

"The aviation always has been, is and will continue to be our nation's glory and pride, the beloved offspring of the people," he said in his commemorative speech to his colleagues in aviation. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the formation of the Russian army's first military air units. The best traditions of Russian aviators occupy a worthy place in the life and service of personnel of the Russian Federation's armed forces. The names of renowned air aces I. Kruten, P. Nesterov, V. Chkalov, I. Kozhedub, A. Pokryshkin and many others will live forever in the memories of their grateful descendants as an example of honor, courage and infinite love for the homeland.

SECURITY SERVICES

Central Asia Border Troops Chief on Joint Forces in Turkmenistan, Citizenship of Troops

*92UM1329C Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 4 Jul 92 p 2*

[Interview with Central Asia Border District Commander Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Vasilyevich Bogdanov by

G. Shchepotkina: "Coordinate Efforts to Defend the Borders: That is Central Asia Border District Commander A. Bogdanov's Opinion"]

[Text] The external borders of the CIS that pass through the territory of currently sovereign Turkmenistan are 2,472 kilometers long. That is not simply properly built up and equipped sectors of border. This is the deployment location of trained, highly-skilled military units that specialize in line defense. What is their state right now during the great changes in the country's socio-political life? This also largely determines your life and mine. Our correspondent's conversation with Central Asia Border District Commander Lieutenant-General A. Bogdanov was about that.

[Shchepotkina] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, shall we begin with a difficult and, perhaps, most difficult question?

[Bogdanov] Please.

[Shchepotkina] So, right now what is the status of the border troops on the territory of Turkmenistan?

[Bogdanov] That really isn't a simple question. Right now Central Asia Border District troops, who are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States Border Troops, are guarding the borders of sovereign Turkmenistan. The Agreement on their status was signed in Kiev on 20 March. However, a decision on the formation of their own border troops by the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan was made later. That has radically changed the situation. Now we face work to prepare proposals associated with defining the status of the troops on the territory of Turkmenistan since no similar decision has been made here. We are submitting them for review of the Council of the Commonwealth Heads of Member-States which will convene in Moscow on 6 July.

We intend to preserve existing ties, the attained level of cooperation, and to coordinate efforts for the defense of the borders in the interests not only of our own states but of the entire Commonwealth as a whole in the future.

[Shchepotkina] The Border Troops are part of the former single Soviet Army. The border troops have obviously not avoided all of the problems that have been dumped on the former Soviet Army right now. Can I ask you several questions concerning army units on the whole?

[Bogdanov] Please, I will attempt to answer them within my area of competence.

[Shchepotkina] The recently signed Protocol on the Military Cooperation of Turkmenistan and Russia. It stipulated the creation of national Armed Forces "under the joint command of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation" based on military division-sized and smaller units that are deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan. Does that mean that citizens of Turkmenistan will be the soldiers in this army and the officers will be citizens of Russia?

[Bogdanov] An agreement was reached during the course of the working meeting of the Turkmenistan Government and the Russian Federation military delegation and it has been consolidated in the Protocol that the manning of

military formations on the territory of Turkmenistan and the training of cadres for it will be carried out jointly by Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation. Yes, a large part of the soldiers in the national Armed Forces will be citizens of Turkmenistan. That is a natural process. It reflects the new political realities and is totally fit into the framework of the efforts that have been undertaken by the Government to consolidate Turkmenistan's independence. Yes, a large part of the officers in this army will be citizens of Russia for now. I think the reason is understandable: right now there is an inadequate number of officers in the republic. But the steps planned by the Government for training cadres will permit us to resolve this problem during the transition period and to ensure an optimal correlation of the ethnic composition of the cadre corps and compulsory service military personnel who have been drafted into Turkmenistan's armed formations in other CIS countries.

[Shchepotkina] How, as a result of that, will the fates be resolved of those privates and sergeants from Russia who are already serving on the territory of Turkmenistan and, at the same time, the fates of our lads who are performing military service in Russia and in other states of the former Soviet Union?

[Bogdanov] Privates and sergeants from Russia and the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, who are serving right now in division-sized and smaller units that are deployed in Turkmenistan, will continue to carry out their military duties. Those who have served the prescribed periods of active military service will be released into the reserve. For now, as far as we know, the majority of the Commonwealth states whose citizens are serving in Turkmenistan have not decided to recall them. Turkmenistan also does not intend to do that. And that is appropriate. Let those who have been drafted here continue to serve there where they began to perform their service to defend the interests of the entire Commonwealth and therefore of Turkmenistan. Those same servicemen who for whatever reasons were compelled to leave their units and who have arrived in Turkmenistan, in accordance with the Turkmenistan Presidential Decree dated 22 June "On the Release into the Reserve of Servicemen Who Are Performing Compulsory Active Military Service on the Territory of Turkmenistan and the Assignment of Servicemen-Citizens of Turkmenistan Who Are Arriving from Other States of the Commonwealth of Independent States", will be assigned to division-sized or smaller military units or military construction detachments that are deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan for further performance of service until the expiration of the term of service prescribed by law.

[Shchepotkina] And if, for example, Russian officers whose military fate has been cast to us want to continue service here and then remain to live in Turkmenistan?

[Bogdanov] I don't think there will be a problem here. The Law on Citizenship, the draft of which is being prepared right now, provides for that situation.

[Shchepotkina] What oath will the soldiers and officers take? Will it not occur that the commander and his subordinates will swear, naturally, each in due course, to different peoples and governments?

[Bogdanov] For now the soldiers who have been drafted to perform military service in the military formations deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan will take the military oath, the text of which has been approved by the Agreement on the Military Oath in the General Purpose Forces that was signed in Moscow on 16 January. It is not assumed that officers will have to take the oath again. Each of them in their own time has already sworn allegiance to the people and have sworn to sacredly carry out the laws.

[Shchepotkina] How has the issue on citizenship of servicemen been resolved? As you know, our country does not provide for dual citizenship?

[Bogdanov] Yes, Turkmenistan law does not provide for dual citizenship. The citizenship of the state in which servicemen previously resided and from which they arrived in Turkmenistan for performance of active military service will be preserved for them. However that does not mean that they will have restricted rights here. The Constitution of Turkmenistan guarantees that "foreign citizens enjoy the rights and freedoms of citizens of Turkmenistan...". That provision will presumably be included in all treaties between Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation. Servicemen-citizens of other states who are performing service in Turkmenistan will totally enjoy the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens of Turkmenistan.

[Shchepotkina] The Protocol states that the national Armed Forces are being created based on a certain number of division-sized and smaller military units. Are they all army divisions of the former USSR that are deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan? Or is the strength of the national Armed Forces different?

[Bogdanov] The Protocol of the working meeting of the Government of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation military delegation stipulated that the national Armed Forces of Turkmenistan will be created based on two divisions and on a number of units. Their list will be coordinated between Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation and will be attached to the Treaty on Military Cooperation. But already today I can say that these are not all division-sized and smaller units of the former USSR that are deployed in Turkmenistan. Individual units of them, specifically, the PVO [Air Defense] divisions and some Air Force units of the former Union, will organizationally be part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. So, the strength of the national Armed Forces will already be less than the total strength of the military formations deployed in the republic today. But it will remain unchanged during the transition period. Well, time will tell what the strength of the Armed Forces will be in the future. One thing is clear: They must be Armed Forces that are capable of ensuring the state's security.

[Shchepotkina] Actually, the Protocol especially stipulates the fate of the air defense divisions and individual Air Force

units that are deployed on the territory of our state. As a result, the question arises: Where will enlisted personnel and sergeants be drafted into these division-sized and smaller units?

[Bogdanov] Manning of these military formations will also be carried out jointly by Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation.

[Shchepotkina] **Will there be a supreme commander of the national Armed Forces or will their command be exercised by other more complicated structures?**

[Bogdanov] Yes, there will be a supreme commander in the national Armed Forces. According to the Constitution of

Turkmenistan, the President is the supreme commander. During the transition period, we propose having a joint command of the national Armed Forces of Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation which will be subordinate to the leadership of the two states and will act based on joint decisions made by them. While completing this interview, I want to say that the transition period will be quite difficult but the Government of Turkmenistan is doing everything to make it smooth and without any particular disruptions and, when possible, painless for all participants in the process and therefore also for the civilian population.

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